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PSYCHOLOGY AND GOD

By the same Author

A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE DOCTRINE OF
THE ATONEMENT

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PSYCHOLOGY AND GOD

A STUDY OF
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT PSYCHOLOGY
FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE

BEING
THE BAMPTON LECTURES FOR 1930

BY THE
REV. L. W. GRENSTED, M.A., B.D.

CANON THEOLOGIAN OF LIVERPOOL; ORIEL PROFESSOR OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF OXFORD

*" . . . ut ad eum ipsum qui nostram naturam a temporalibus
liberavit, et collocavit ad dexteram patris, perveni atque
pervenire mereamur."*

S. AUGUSTINE

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EXTRACT
FROM THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF THE LATE

REV. JOHN BAMPTON

CANON OF SALISBURY

‘ . . . I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned ; that is to say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the manner following :

‘ I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following, at St. Mary’s in Oxford, between the commencement of the last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week in Act Term.

‘ Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following Subjects—to confirm and establish the Christian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics—upon

the divine authority of the holy Scriptures—upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church—upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ—upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.

'Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two months after they are preached; and one copy shall be given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the City of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are printed.

'Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons twice.'

PREFACE

THE leisure of Oxford is a thing of the past, and the effort to be learned in the old, dignified manner amid its ever-increasing activity and noise becomes more and more a weariness, if it is not actually an anachronism. In the full sound of the roar of our busy streets these lectures were written and delivered. At least it has never been possible to forget, as the traffic sweeps by, how little either theology or psychology matter if they cannot be related swiftly and immediately to life. If my words can be so related, touching some moment's need, until, within a very few years, they are out-of-date and forgotten, they will have served their purpose well enough. And indeed, though I owe much to books, I owe far more to life itself as a teacher. Most of all, perhaps, I owe to my pupils, and to those whom I have tried, stumblingly enough, to help in their difficulties. From them I have learned to separate the essential from the transient, and if what I have said has value for a wider audience, it is because it has been tested by their criticism and their trust.

It would be absurd to hope that these essays in a subject already handled so often should have any distinction either as theology or as psychology. My training and my work as a college teacher lie in the field of theology. In psychology I can only claim the rôle of an interested spectator, interested because of my own needs and the needs of those who have laid upon me the responsibility and the honour of sharing their problems and anxieties—interested because, as it would seem, there is doubt abroad and perplexity as to the bearings of these things upon the Faith. It is impossible for a theologian to keep in touch with his

own subject and to be expert and informed in this vast new field of enquiry as well. For the multiplicity of psychological writings, and the kaleidoscopic diversity of psychological theories, constitute a phenomenon probably without parallel in the history of scientific discovery. It has been said that the stream of serious psychological publications continues at the rate of over two thousand a year. I need not say that I have failed to keep abreast of so sweeping a current. I have not even ventured upon the task of verifying the estimate. The apologist for theism, and for a Christian theism, cannot simplify his task by dealing with any one outstanding book or any single system of psychological theory. There are far too many books, and they abound in matter which, directly or indirectly, is of grave concern to Christians. The fact that many of these books are friendly in intention does not greatly lessen the gravity of the issue, since the presuppositions upon which they too often rest must, if pressed to their logical conclusion, tend either to a weakening of the grounds of faith or to a lowering of the level of Christian conduct. And throughout much of the literature, though happily the generalization is far less true for this country than for any other, the quest of the human soul for God, and the practices wherein it seeks the satisfaction of its deepest need, are assumed to be mere distortions of instinct, social or individual, pointing to no reality more ultimate than man himself. This has not been without its effect upon popular, and even upon educated, opinion. Psychological jargon has become current coin. The press and the modern novel are full of it. But psychological knowledge, and the deeper understanding of the words so glibly used, is rare enough still.

Had Canon Bampton been alive to-day he would have found a situation urgently demanding an apologetic such as he desired when he endowed the lectures which bear

his name, but a situation not readily to be met by an exposition of Holy Scripture, or by a detailed study of the Fathers. Of the writers to whom he would naturally have turned for counsel and for re-assurance only St. Augustine, whose *Confessions* remains a psychological masterpiece as remarkable in its sincerity as in its clarity of analysis, can be named as casting any real light upon the problems which I have attempted to discuss. And yet I cannot but feel that those who honoured me with the invitation to deliver these lectures were right in believing that the subject which I offered for their consideration, and now offer for the consideration of a wider public, is one which may not unfittingly find a place in this series, however unworthy my treatment of it may be.

This at least is certain, that these questions, however important at the moment, will wear a very different aspect in a few years' time. The psychological writers with whom I have been concerned are of significance to-day, but the psychology of the future will develop on lines as yet only dimly foreseen. It seemed, therefore, unnecessary to attempt to expand these lectures into a book which might rival in learning and in permanence those written by some of my distinguished predecessors in this lectureship, or even to adorn them with any very full references to the current literature. I have in all cases contented myself with citations of English translations, where such exist. And I have aimed at delaying publication as little as the exigencies of printing and publishing, of health and of the continued routine of college life, have allowed. To all who have helped to lighten my task, from the friends who have honoured my lectures by pertinent criticism upon points of detail, to the compositors, printers' reader, and publishers, who have made the final stages of the work a pleasure, my sincerest thanks are due.

L. W. G.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.
Whitsunday 1930.

CONTENTS

LECTURE	PAGE
I. SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY	I
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF RELIGION .	37
III. FAITH AND WORSHIP	67
IV. SPIRITUAL HEALING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS	95
V. SIN AND SPIRITUAL DIRECTION	127
VI. GROUP-PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH	159
VII. OBJECTIVITY IN RELIGION	193
VIII. THE CLAIM OF CHRISTIAN THEISM	227
INDICES	251

LECTURE I

SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

SYNOPSIS

THE end of man's being is the knowledge, or vision, of God. The secret of his life is to be found not within but without. The purpose of these Lectures is to show that this supplies a principle as necessary to the science of psychology as to theology.

The first problem is that of psychological method. The claims of Behaviourism examined and set aside, and the method established of observation interpreted by introspection.

This gives four main data :

1. The feeling or 'affect' as an essential aspect of experience.
2. Freedom, with purpose as its correlate.
3. The fundamental experience of worth, or value.
4. The experience of 'otherness,' which always involves an ultimate personal relationship.

It is wholly unscientific to ignore these data. A fuller exposition of them in the light of the work of James, of Behaviourism, of the psycho-analysts, and of McDougall and Shand reveals the breakdown of all attempts to apply mechanistic principles to the mind. Its purposive aspect, when further analysed, is found to be only in part a principle of self-determination. Its essential background is a relationship of self and other, within which the self comes to be established in its full personal relationship. This reveals itself, in a phrase common to Freudianism and Christianity, in the 'love-life.'

Thus psychology itself prepares the way for a view of life in which the principle is love and the goal is God.

Such is the Christian doctrine of the true nature of man's being, a doctrine vividly implicit in that 'Our Father' which has been more to Christianity even than the Creeds. It is the purpose of these lectures to show that this doctrine is more than a barren pietism or an empty hope. Without it the study of human nature is doomed to confusion and incompleteness. Without it the analyses of philosophy and psychology lose themselves in unending distinctions. Only in its light can we find that unity and coherence which is the basic assumption of philosophy and psychology alike, and which philosophers and psychologists so often seek in vain. The secret of man's life is to be sought in that which lies not within but without. It is not simply by some inner impulse that we are drawn upwards and onwards. 'Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it find rest in Thee.'¹ Not only our salvation but, in a very real sense, our sanity is of God.

The material with which we shall mainly be concerned is that provided by the so-called New Psychology. For though human nature has been observed and studied since the dawn of human thought there can be no question that the discoveries, real and alleged, of the last thirty years have set its problems in a new light. To every science there come occasional periods of sudden and startling development, consequent upon the invention of new modes of enquiry, or the statement of new general principles. Such a period has undoubtedly come to the science of psychology in the opening years of this century, and is now perhaps drawing to its close. The genius of William James and Freud has especially caught the attention of the public, and a host of investigators are busily engaged in working out the practical and theoretical results of their teaching. The world has been a little shocked, and vastly

¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, i. 1.

intrigued. The applications of new techniques to education, mental therapy, criminology, and industry are only at the beginning, but it is already clear that a great future is before them. For religion there has been great danger. The believer, who shall not make haste, finds himself faced with a rapidly changing situation, and with confident assertions that his faith is an illusion, an illusion that has no future, resting as it does upon complexes or endocrine reactions. And not unnaturally he is troubled, and does not readily see that all new knowledge is of God, and shall turn to His glory. The mortality amongst false gods shall indeed be great. But truth, being true, has nothing to fear.

Obviously it would be impossible, within the scope of these lectures, to give even a brief outline of the more important schools of modern psychological thought, nor, in fact, is it greatly relevant to our purpose. Our endeavour will rather be to discern some of the fundamental assumptions beneath the mass of empirical material, to observe the general tendencies of psychological enquiry, and amid a multitude of hypotheses to select those few which seem likely to become established. We shall not be concerned overmuch with descriptions of religious behaviour. Such descriptions have been given again and again in the series of books which began with Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* and James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, and of which Dr. Selbie's *Psychology of Religion* is the most recent, and not the least distinguished. That ground does not, at the moment, need further exploration. The literature is full and adequate on the empirical side, and even the amateur can find ample guidance if he desires a more detailed study of the subject. But the amateur who seeks an intelligible and defensible psychological position of his own, unencumbered by overmuch detail, a position which will enable him to read intelligently and to judge securely, will find,

as things stand to-day, but little help.¹ It will be our aim to see whether indications cannot be found, in the confused mass of modern psychological literature, of such a simplification of outlook, and whether we cannot find some general principle, fundamental to human nature, which will not only stand the test of psychological analysis but also allow an account of religious experience which does not destroy those values which have meant so much to man.

In the opening sentences of this lecture a principle of the most fundamental character was laid down in theological terms, the principle of the dependence of man's life upon God, and its goal in God. So stated, this is not a principle of psychology, and it is impossible that it should be derived directly from any form of psychological enquiry. For the methods of psychology are the methods of science, and science assumes, but can never prove, the objective reality of the matter with which it is concerned. We must not expect, therefore, to find, as a result of our examination, a new form of the theistic arguments.² These stand, both as to validity and as to criticism, exactly where they did before. We shall be concerned later with the meaning which the word 'God' has come to have for man and with the correspondence of that meaning with reality. Here, at the outset, let two implications of this theological principle

¹ The confusion is not limited to the Psychology of Religion. Spearman (*The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition*, pp. 23 ff.) makes exactly the same complaint as to general psychology. He cites the systematic works of Ziehen, Mercier, Tansley, and Watson. 'In no two of these does the matter seem to deserve even the same name. What a contrast is offered by the unquestionably sound sciences, as physics or chemistry! In these the divergences always remain confined to points of detail; in psychology they reach out to the very foundations, even to the whole terminology itself.' In the educational, medical, and industrial successes of recent psychology he declares that the systematic treatment of the subject has played no active part whatever. And the work of the laboratories is hardly used at all in the bulk of the text-books.

² Cf. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 358, and, for a general attempt to estimate the positive value of the psychological study of religious experience, Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 260 ff.

suffice: first, that it is in a relationship with that which lies beyond himself that man's personality achieves its full development; and secondly, that this relationship is itself essentially personal. If upon investigation of modern psychological theories we find that these two propositions fall naturally into line with them, and help to make them intelligible, then we can fairly say that while we have added nothing to the logical cogency of the proof of the existence of God, we have at least established a natural basis upon which that proof may rest. To this investigation, then, we may now turn.

At the outset we are faced with an issue as to the methods legitimate in psychological enquiry, and upon this issue we must needs be partisans. In the so-called 'Battle of Behaviourism'¹ there is no room for compromise. If only Behaviourism itself were concerned the matter would not be serious, since Behaviourism can be trusted soon to find its place as one of the lesser auxiliary sciences, of little theoretical importance, though of high value empirically in its relations to physiology on the one hand and sociology on the other. The confident manner in which it eliminates consciousness,² responsibility, and freedom, and more recently emotion and instinct³ as well, from the problems of human conduct is a mere absurdity, though of course it is legitimate enough if it is desired to examine those problems in a manner almost as remote from actual life as the dissecting-room itself. But a real danger arises from the fact that the principles explicitly avowed by the Behaviourists are implicit throughout a wide range of modern

¹ See especially the book with this title, consisting of statements by J. B. Watson and W. McDougall.

² So E. B. Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness and The Freudian Wish*; J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 1-4, and *Behaviorism*, pp. 5-10; and McDougall's reply in *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 26 ff. Also Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, i. p. 366.

³ Watson, *Behaviorism*, pp. 87 ff.

psychological work, being indeed the general principles of experimental science,¹ and it is of the greatest importance to recognize them clearly. Psychology has a perfect right to be an experimental science, purely objective and descriptive in character, but in that case it has no bearing at all upon the ultimate problems of religion, and is only of secondary importance for the understanding of human conduct.

The claim of the Behaviourist is that introspection must be rigorously excluded as unscientific, incompatible with exact observation and measurement, and in itself individual, a personal equation with quantities not only unknown but not even necessarily constant.² But, in fact, it was by the methods of introspection and not of experiment that the first great modern advances in mental analysis became possible. Locke is the founder alike of the Faculty-psychology and of the Associationist-psychology, though in both respects his inspiration really comes ultimately from Aristotle.³ The modern study of instinct simply rests upon the possibility of observing the impulses which arise within us, and of noting how we feel and how we act under their influence. This is exactly the method followed by Aristotle in developing his list of the virtues, and by Locke's successors in developing their system of human faculties. Obviously the whole method depends, first, upon careful

¹ Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence*, pp. 34 f.

² The best account of the general principles and methods of Behaviourism, together with a whole-hearted denunciation of introspection, is to be found in the first two chapters of Watson's *Behaviorism*.

³ Both in his *Ethics* and in his *Logic* Aristotle is describing the impulses and processes observable by introspection. In forming his table of the virtues he is following exactly the same method as that used, for example, by McDougall in analysing human instinct. And in his central principle of 'moderation,' by which the virtues are adjusted into a stable and balanced character, he is anticipating an important element in modern theories of 'sublimation' and of the formation of sentiments. Similarly his analysis of the judgment depends upon the observation and classification of the modes of reasoning recognized as valid by the mind

introspection, and, secondly, upon the assumption that other men feel and act as we do ourselves. But this assumption is not demonstrable by any scientific method. It is an act of faith, and its subjective character may readily be illustrated by the divergence of view which exists among psychologists as to the very existence of an impulse of pugnacity. The lists of the instincts given by different writers vary, in fact, very widely indeed,¹ and the personal equation of the observer is frequently in clear evidence. It is small wonder that Dr. J. B. Watson, in his latest ultimatum to non-Behaviourists,² has added instinct to the already long list of familiar things that do not exist.

So, again, the development of the Association-theories, which are essential to the whole range of psycho-analysis, essential, that is, if that complex technique is ever to have a scientific basis, begins with the observation of mental process. Association by similarity, by difference, by contiguity, and the rest, are observed facts, but observed by introspection before experimental methods were ever applied to them.

More than a century had passed after Locke's time before experiment came to be used at all freely. Its findings were subjected to interpretation at every point, and it was recognized that in the end the psychologist must find this interpretation by looking inwards and not outwards. We can have first-hand knowledge of the mind nowhere save within our own minds.

To-day we are told that such introspection is wholly unscientific. The facts of experiment must tell their own story, though how a fact is to do any such thing passes comprehension. Psychology must insist upon its scientific

¹ Hocking, *Human Nature and its Re-making*, pp. 68 ff., gives lists which illustrate the wide range of disagreement. Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 71.

² *Behaviorism*, pp. 83 ff.

status and guard itself at every point against the pre-suppositions of the observer. And so we are faced with a strange paradox. The physical sciences are being driven further and further away from ordinary conceptions of matter and even of space, reducing them to systems of equations which are in essence an analysis of mental process. Their fundamental principle has been termed, whether properly or not, relativity.¹ It is suggested that even the atom possesses individuality and that its behaviour as an individual is indeterminate. And at this very time Behaviourists, by way of claiming their scientific status, are tending more and more to a mere vulgar realism,² denying the significance of the very mental processes which they are investigating, and contenting themselves with wholly superficial and external accounts of the behaviour in which these processes result.

This matter of Behaviourism is happily not serious on this side of the Atlantic, though even at this distance it is difficult to contemplate with equanimity the fact that in America, for every serious student of theology, a hundred enthusiastic disciples of Dr. Watson are busy with their child-clinics, their schedules of stimulus and response, and their multitudinous array of apparatus, preparing themselves to condition the reflexes of the community, by scientific methods which provide no clue whatever as to the values and purposes for which its reflexes should be so conditioned. But it has been worth our while to raise the issue, because the whole field of psychological investigation has its Behaviouristic aspect, and it is of the first importance to

¹ The term 'relativity' is, to say the least, misleading. The equations used by Einstein in expressing the characters of a space-time continuum which takes into account the position and motion of the observer are just as rigid, logically speaking, as those which are based upon the Newtonian view of space. There is nothing in any degree contingent about the new physics, on their mathematical side.

² I venture to appropriate the term applied by Garvie to Ritschlianism.

realize that the material provided by external observation and experiment must not only be supplemented by the data of introspection but that it cannot be rightly interpreted, or safely used, without their aid.¹

Once admit the necessity of introspection as underlying any true science of the mind and a whole new range of facts comes into view.² It will be convenient at this point to enumerate, roughly and uncritically, those with which we shall be mainly concerned.

First of all, we have the affective aspect of experience. The events of life carry with them something more than the characteristic of happening. We feel their happening in various ways, so readily identifiable that such terms as fear, anger, joy, sorrow, are familiar and immediately understood in common speech. We all know how it feels to be afraid, or angry, or joyful, or sorrowful, and this knowledge is derived from within.

Secondly, we have the fact of freedom, quite unmistakable, though singularly difficult to define. Nothing could be further from freedom than the possibility of doing anything whatever, irrespective of precedent causes. Such action would be merely chaotic, and the least free of all things is chaos. With freedom we thus find correlated an awareness of purpose, expressing itself in its lower forms as a tendency or direction, and in its fullest development as the conscious and steadfast choice of an end, in such wise that end and means are not separated but are articulated into a single whole life-purpose. The essence of freedom lies in man's power to choose between purposes. Freedom to act is a dubious, perhaps a meaningless, phrase, for the action is determined when purpose, freely chosen in the light of the end, uses circumstance for its fulfilment.

¹ McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 38, and in *The Battle of Behaviorism*; W. R. Matthews in *Psychology and the Church*, pp. 6 ff.

² Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence*, pp. 49 ff.

Thirdly, we have the experience of worth or value, which accompanies the purposive choice, and constitutes its moral character. In making our choice of ends we are aware of them as good, in the broad Platonic sense which includes the aesthetic values. And this awareness of the good as good has an absolute, a compulsive, character, which completely resists analysis. We can compare goods, standardize them, schematize them, but the fact of value, worth, goodness, is in itself final and irreducible.

And lastly, and most difficult of all to state clearly, we have the experience of otherness. We are continually aware, so far as we are aware of ourselves at all, of a relationship with that which is not ourselves. What Von Hügel has termed 'givenness' is not characteristic only of religious experience. It is fundamental to the whole life-process, as we find ourselves aware of living. In one of its aspects it is simply that consciousness which seems so irrelevant to the Behaviourists, for in consciousness that which is conscious goes out to meet that of which it is conscious. Or, again, we may say that in introspection we become aware of the ego, that which experiences. But this ego is never pure, self-contained, and self-conditioned.¹ It cannot be observed in isolation from that to which it is related. We shall see later on reason for thinking that this ego-other relationship has always inherently a personal aspect, that the ego looks beyond itself not to things but to persons, and that things have only meaning, perhaps only existence, as the surrogates and vehicles of such personal relationship. And if we are to vindicate this position we shall require inevitably the hypothesis of a personal God.

Before we deal in more detail with these data of introspection we must observe that it is wholly unscientific either to ignore them or to explain them away. The attempt to

¹ For a full discussion of the theory of the 'pure ego' cf. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, vol. i.: *The Soul and Its Faculties*.

express them in terms of something else, supposedly more simple, would not destroy their significance even if it were successful. Vigorous efforts have been made, for example, to show how the not-conscious has risen by not-conscious mechanisms to an illusion of consciousness, or how the wholly determinate has developed, through determinate causes, an illusion of freedom. But though some psychologists seem to have found a certain satisfaction in such explanations, they have in fact explained nothing whatever. At the most they have only called their problem by another name. To take a simple analogy, it may be true that water is a combination of the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, but when this is said water is not explained away. Water and its properties are simply part of the truth of hydrogen and oxygen, as hydrogen and oxygen are part of the truth of water. This is no reduction of the facts to something simpler. From the point of view of direct experience the explanation is more and not less complex than that from which the enquiry started. And so with consciousness, or freedom. These are the simple things, readily comprehended and observed. It is the so-called explanations that are complex, abstract, and obscure. And we have a perfect right to judge between different psychological systems according as they take these simple and primary factors into account or not.

We start, then, with the affect, or feeling, this latter term being convenient but highly ambiguous unless we carefully distinguish the experience as observed from the experience as felt. The distinction becomes clearer if we note that it is possible to be aware of strong feeling without being directly conscious of the experience to which it is attached. The importance of feeling was noted by James, and it has been given a primary position by such writers as McDougall and Shand ¹ in their analysis of instinct and the emotions.

¹ In *The Foundations of Character*.

The theory of the affects which characterize the different types of instinctive behaviour, and of their organization into emotional systems, is perhaps one of the most secure results of modern psychology, and we shall have to revert to it frequently. The point which concerns us here is that in the affect we are closer to the living moment of experience than in the observation which transforms that experience into a concept, capable of being stored up as a memory. Life is more than history, and this is as true of individuals as it is of nations. So soon as we begin to think of life as a series of events, capable of being noted and recorded, we have already destroyed its essential character. Herein lies the fallacy of all the atomistic philosophies, from Hume to Mr. Bertrand Russell. It is the fallacy even of Kant's incomparable analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which depends upon this serial view.¹ For the essence of life is not that it is successive but that it is an experienced whole in so far as it is present to our awareness at all. And it is in the affect, the feeling of the experience, that this unity of experience expresses itself most directly. Bradley² in his

¹ Kant's whole treatment of the manifold of experience is based upon the acceptance of its spatial and temporal character. Most of his difficulties are due to the fact that he starts from the 'transcendental aesthetic,' though this aspect of experience is abstract and illusory in the highest degree. The concepts of the End and the Organism, which he reaches in the *Critique of Judgment*, should have been the starting-point, and not the goal, of his analysis. His negative treatment of the theistic arguments was inevitable so soon as this false start was made.

² *Principles of Logic*, p. 54. Compare the similar treatment by James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. pp. 237 ff., and *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 230 ff.: 'As our mental fields succeed one another each has its centre of interest, around which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable. Some fields are narrow fields, and some are wide fields. Usually when we have a wide field we rejoice, for we then see masses of truth together, and often get glimpses of relations which we divine rather than see. . . . At other times, of drowsiness, illness, or fatigue, our fields may narrow almost to a point, and we find ourselves correspondingly oppressed and contracted.' One of the greatest practical advances, and the greatest theoretical difficulty, of modern psychology is the discovery that 'there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its

striking description of the 'stream of thought' declares that life is not a series of point-events but rather resembles a patch of light upon the current of a river. There is an area of clear definition and the edges shade off vaguely into the darkness, but the patch of light is seen as one. It is possible to analyse it into parts, and to carry this analysis out in more and more minute detail. But this whole process is secondary and unnatural, the work of that understanding which ever follows the living moment, conducting unending post-mortem examinations upon that which has just passed away. As we judge, we slay. And life goes on, creative and new-born, eluding thought.

It was at one time fashionable to hold the ideo-motor theory, the view that an idea present to the mind tends to produce, by some impulse of its own, the appropriate response.¹ This theory is, in fact, though it is never, I think,

usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.' The whole modern theory of the Unconscious is built up round this thesis, and the facts are unquestionable. But extraordinary and unnecessary difficulties have been created by this astonishing misuse of words, by which the term conscious has been applied to that of which the only distinguishing feature is that we are not conscious of it. Freud's theory at least escapes from this absurdity.

¹ So in Herbert, the Mills, and Bain, sufficiently criticized in James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. pp. 1 ff.; ii. pp. 497 and 522 ff. Spearman (*The Nature of Intelligence*, see esp. pp. 340 ff.) has recently attempted to discover what he terms the 'noegenetic' principles and processes. The result is far more favourable to the point of view adopted in these lectures than is the older ideo-motor theory, but it seems to be essentially one with it in principle. Thus his first two laws run: 'Any lived experience tends to evoke immediately a knowing of its direct attributes and its experienter,' and 'The presenting of any two or more characters tends to evoke immediately a knowing of relation between them.' Clearly these laws are merely descriptive, unless something like the old ideo-motor theory is invoked. Otherwise there is no explanation of these tendencies among experiences. It is significant that Spearman sees the nearest parallel to his own point of view in the developed Hegelianism of McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence*. But this gives too much life to cognition. It is simpler to believe in personal being, and, in the end, in God.

explicitly stated by him, the basis of Freud's conception of mental process, in which the individual concrete symbols play a curiously dominant part. Here Freud's psychology seems to be astonishingly out of date. He has accepted quite naïvely the doctrine of the association of ideas, as we find it in Locke and his successors. And in this theory little is left to the mind itself. Ideas are linked together through resemblance, contiguity, and the rest, presumably on the simple ground that they have a natural tendency of their own to behave in this way. In Freud's system the sexual impulse upon which he lays such great stress makes use of this ideal mechanism—symbolization, as he calls it—to attain satisfaction in a form which the censor, himself only a transmuted form of that impulse, can allow.¹ But the impulse does not create the symbolic structure of which it makes use. That seems to be the work of the ideas themselves.

The modern tendency is to transfer this impulsive power from the idea or image to the affect. The change of outlook has come gradually. The first step was to argue that an idea gained dominance when it became associated with an idea of pleasure or pain. Thus the general Associationist conception of the mind as consisting wholly in a complex of ideas was preserved for a time, making possible incidentally the unpleasant philosophy of Hedonism, with its unending quest for that pleasure which, if sought as a concrete entity in its own right, for ever vanishes in the moment of capture. This position reappears in the Freudian assertion of the 'Pleasure-Pain' principle,² though the terms *Lust* and *Unlust* undoubtedly give this a wider meaning than the English equivalent suggests. But in such a

¹ Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 125 ff. ; E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 129 ff. For a fundamental discussion of the real nature of the censorship on the lines of Freud's later theories see Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, pp. 40 ff. and pp. 68 ff., and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 20 f. and pp. 64 ff.

² Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 298 ff.

psychological theory as that of Shand,¹ it is the whole group of affects, developed and organized into emotional systems, which carries the impulse to action. And this has great theoretical advantages. The ideas are infinitely varied and immense difficulties arise when we ask why it is that in this particular case we note similarity and in that case our attention is fixed upon difference. But affects are few in kind, and homogeneous. Fear is always fear; anger is always anger. It is probable that this homogeneity of the affect is one of the most important factors in the psychological explanation of memory. In this respect at least the present event which acts as a stimulus of recall is literally one with the past which is recalled. There is a certain timelessness of feeling which is most suggestive.²

But this is due to the inseparable unity of the affective system with the ego itself. The unity of the ego from past to present, with reference to a future in which that unity will still remain, is again one of those things which we know and cannot prove to be true. The psychologist makes the assumption as simply and necessarily as any one of us. He may not care overmuch to talk about the soul,³ and indeed that term, admirable enough in its theological use and as guarded by the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, is apt as it stands to suggest a division of human nature satisfying only to primitive Animists and to Dr. McDougall,⁴

¹ *The Foundations of Character.*

² If we keep to the language of the theory of association of ideas we note at once, with the older psychologists, such as Bain, the significance of the idea of the affect, which takes a prominent place in the memory of any event. In fact, it is doubtful whether any event could be remembered at all apart from its association with some definite affect. But the full discussion of this point would involve an analysis of the relation between affect, purpose, and the unity of the ego.

³ See Watson, *Behaviorism*, pp. 1-4, for a violent attack upon the influence of this religious terminology upon psychology.

⁴ McDougall really should not have called his book on the subject *Body and Mind, A History and Defence of Animism*. The term 'animism' cannot easily be freed from connotations obviously remote from his meaning.

and of ill omen when we ask in what immortality might possibly consist. But the continuing and abiding ego is a basic fact as to which we need have no doubts, and can have no doubts. Those writers who have tried to show how the ego came to exist do not touch the supreme mystery of the fact that it does exist.¹ Their argument, so far as it is true at all, is simply an account of the way in which the ego becomes aware of its existence, a very different, and a not very important, matter.

It is interesting to notice that in theology the stress upon feeling came earlier than it did in psychology. The genius of Schleiermacher forced the theological world to recognize the living and felt moment of religious life as prior to any theological statement.² Religion, he says, is a teleological piety. What matters more than any particular belief is that we should be religious. 'God-consciousness,' 'Christ-consciousness,' are more than Creeds. Often he calls this simply 'feeling,' and the feeling of which he is speaking is clearly affective. It is filled with warmth and emotion. In a word, it is alive. From the time of Schleiermacher onwards the affective aspect of religion has been fully recognized, and there has been only too much danger that, just because it is so obviously fundamental, its natural and necessary counterpart in a rational theology may fall

¹ Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence*, pp. 54 f., quotes from Ach (*Ueber den Willensakt u. das Temperament*): 'As regards an energetic act of willing, it must be emphasised that the *ego* is always lived as the antecedent in this act; and, indeed, with special impressiveness.' Spearman concludes: 'Pending, then, some much more plausible alternative explanation being proffered for the ubiquitous and indispensable notion of the *ego* than has ever been suggested hitherto, we will here adopt the conservative attitude of attributing it to direct experiential apprehension.' He cites, further, Lotze and Ebbinghaus in support of this view. It would be easy to multiply quotations, but the only point of importance here is that such a position can be maintained by experimental psychologists of the first rank.

² Especially in his *Ueber die Religion, Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*, published in 1799.

altogether into disrepute. We have seen the Ritschlians reducing theology to value-judgments, and if that mystery of Ritschlianism means anything it is Schleiermacher's 'feeling' again, the affective aspect of religious behaviour. Thus came the Liberal Protestant reduction of religion to ethics. William James, again, seeking to determine which experiences are to be admitted in evidence as religious, speaks in terms of affects. 'There must be something solemn, serious, and tender,' he says, 'about any attitude which we denominate religious.'¹ And to-day we find Otto² defining religion by mystery, terror, and fascination, blended into awe.

Yet in the very nature of things all such treatments of the nature of religion are unconvincing. They are true as far as they go, but they are inevitably incomplete. For just as feeling is closer to life than knowledge, so life itself is more than the feeling of living. Definitions of religion which depend for their content upon feeling must inevitably fail. And religion has notoriously proved itself astonishingly difficult to define.³ For religion is a matter between the soul or self, and God. And that which is between the self and God is just life, neither more nor less. To isolate part of life and to call it religious, is to degrade life and to destroy religion. That is why the God of our worship claims all or nothing. A divided allegiance He may not accept, if He is to be God.

We turn next to freedom and its correlate, purpose. It is here that the clash between experimental and introspective psychology is most acute. For Behaviourism, of course, freedom can have no meaning at all, save in that general and unilluminating sense in which all things are

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 38.

² R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 12-41.

³ Leuba has collected forty-eight in the Appendix to *A Psychological Study of Religion*.

free to do exactly what they are doing. Freedom and necessity in this case mean exactly the same. Anselm¹ calls it *necessitas sequens*, the necessity which the event itself creates, and of which the formula is 'Whatever was, was of necessity; whatever is, is of necessity; whatever will be, will be of necessity.' This necessity is exactly that of the current popular phrase, 'We shall all die when our time comes,' a fatalistic formula which does not in the least prevent those who use it from taking every possible precaution against an untimely death. It is a very different matter, as Anselm points out, when we turn to 'precedent and efficient necessity.'² 'There is precedent necessity, which causes the event, and sequent necessity, which the event causes.' And he goes on to contrast human speech with the rotation of the heavens, in words which, after a hundred pages of persistent cross-examination by his disciple Boso, have perhaps a touch of quiet humour, 'It is sequent necessity causing nothing, but itself caused, when I say that you are talking because you are talking. For when I say this I signify that when you are talking nothing can cause you not to be talking, not that anything³ compels you to talk. For the violence of natural conditions compels the heavens to revolve, but no necessity makes you talk.'

Such a quotation brings us to the very heart of the difficulties of the modern psychologist. For the problem which he has set himself to solve is just the problem of the necessity which makes Boso talk. Why do any of us talk, or carry out any of those actions which go to make up our life-story? Is there simply some 'violence of natural conditions' upon us, and nothing more, or have we in ourselves the dignity of 'precedent and efficient necessity,'

¹ *Cur Deus Homo*, ii. 18. The rest of the paragraph is abridged from Anselm's discussion in this chapter.

² Anselm depends here upon Aristotle's *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*.

³ Reading *aliquid*.

that purposive freedom in which, to however small a degree, we mould our own lives.

Here, naturally enough, the psychologists differ. There is general agreement among them as to the existence of some kind of life-impulse. Even the most rigid of experimentalists must concede this, since his experiments are conducted upon living and continuing organisms, and not upon corpses. No psychologist could possibly confuse his science with anatomy. But as to the nature and operation of this life-impulse the very widest range of view may be found. And here again we shall find ourselves compelled to take a decisive stand, and perhaps in the interests of a true psychology to claim a little more than would be granted us even by some of those writers with whom, in the main, we agree.

The whole method and aim of experimental psychology is to reduce to a minimum those aspects of human behaviour which are indeterminate and unpredictable. And it is of great importance to realize that this method is valid for a much larger area of human life than, at first sight, we might be prepared to allow.¹ Reflexes, simple, complex, and conditioned, exist beyond all doubt, and form an important element in our total response to any situation. And when the more absurd claims of Behaviourism have been happily forgotten there will remain a large body of most valuable experimental work, adding enormously to the already vast achievements of biology. The fundamental presupposition of all this is determinism, the operation of strict laws of cause and effect. It might not unsuitably be termed 'mechanistic freedom,' the freedom of a machine constructed to respond to certain situations in

¹ The situation has not appreciably altered since Temple wrote his Bampton Lectures on *The Relations between Religion and Science* in 1884: 'The fixity of a large part of our nature—nay of all but the whole of it—is a moral and spiritual necessity' (p. 92; cf. pp. 71 ff.).

certain ways, and entirely expressing in its behaviour the law of its construction. So far as experimental science seeks for fixed laws at all it must necessarily be along these lines, and it can give no explanation at all of the inner movement of causality, the impulse which carries cause over into effect. Behaviourism leaves the matter there, merely denying the existence of these minor philosophical difficulties. 'It is different from physiology,' says Watson, frankly enough, 'only in the grouping of its problems, not in fundamentals or in central view-point.'¹ Thus the Behaviourist claims, and may well be allowed to take, his true place, and we shall have little occasion to refer to him further.

When we turn to the analytic schools of thought which have arisen on the basis of Freud's theories, we find a very striking and hopeful development of outlook. Freud himself, especially in his earlier work, must be classed as definitely mechanistic and deterministic.² But the mechanism is now applied to mental process and we are no longer upon the borders of physiology. There is no denial of the existence of consciousness, or of the ego itself.³ The greater part of Freud's material is, in fact, derived from the introspection of his patients, who are asked to report faithfully and uncritically exactly what is passing in their minds. And Freud recognizes to the full that there must be some life-impulse behind the whole process. That he sees one of the main aspects of this impulse in sex, a term to which he gives a very wide connotation,⁴ is a comparatively unimportant

¹ *Behaviorism*, p. 11.

² See esp. *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, pp. 277 ff.

³ It is curious to find that a certain number of psychiatrists in America claim to be both Freudian and Behaviourist. The positions are wholly incompatible. Watson makes short work of psycho-analysis, declaring it to be 'based largely upon religion, introspective psychology, and Voodooism' (*Behaviorism*, p. 18). This predisposes us in favour of psycho-analysis at the outset!

⁴ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 37-40.

detail. It is, as he himself has said again and again, for reasons wholly unscientific that criticisms of his theory have turned almost entirely upon its sexual implications, and the unblushing prominence which he has given to sexual facts.¹ But science has no right to blush, and, however unsuitable his writings may be for general reading, no serious student of the facts revealed in modern analysis can doubt the essential truth and the clinical importance of much of his work. Sex may be a dangerous topic to handle, but that very fact is witness to its immense significance. Its dangers are in no way diminished if we ignore its existence, or treat it with surreptitious and hypocritically horrified whisperings, forgetting that it is part of that creation which God made, and saw that it was good.

The real danger of Freudianism lies in its mechanistic conception of the mind. The impulse of life is for him a system of forces, as closed and determinate in their application as the forces of physics. They can be summed up as three, the impulse to live, the impulse to pass life on in procreation, and the impulse to die.² And the principle which controls this is itself interpreted as mechanical in its operation. 'It seems,' he says, 'that our entire psychical activity is bent upon *procuring pleasure* and *avoiding pain*, that is automatically regulated by the PLEASURE-PRINCIPLE.'³

Freud recognizes also a 'reality-principle,' by which he means that the hard facts of life must also be taken into account. But this is again viewed as operating upon lines strictly mechanistic, and as securing what pleasure is possible by transforming and controlling our

¹ See, e.g., his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 16-18 and 383 ff. Also E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 360 ff.

² Freud has developed this analysis especially in *The Ego and the Id* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

³ *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 298. The italics and capitals in this and the following quotation are Freud's own.

attempts at self-gratification. A further quotation will illustrate this :

It is quite plain that the sexual instincts pursue the aim of gratification from the beginning to the end of their development ; throughout they keep up this primary function without alteration. At first the other group, the Ego-instincts, do the same ; but under the influence of necessity, their mistress, they soon learn to replace the pleasure-principle by a modification of it. . . . Thus trained, the Ego becomes 'reasonable' ; is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but follows the REALITY-PRINCIPLE, which at bottom also seeks pleasure—although a delayed and diminished pleasure, one which is assured by its realization of fact, its relation to reality.¹

Although this exposition remains mechanistic in principle we can at least welcome the recognition of the objective facts of life as significant and valuable. Further, the adumbration of this 'pleasure-principle,' however inadequate it may appear in this form, is at least a step towards the admission of an end towards which the activities of life are directed. It is the first rung of the ladder which leads us subjectively to holiness and objectively to God.

In Freud's later writings the inadequacy of his original thesis comes clearly into view. His attention is turned to what he had already called the Ego-instincts, and it is worth while to quote his words, since this aspect of his work is constantly ignored. 'Psycho-analysis has never forgotten that non-sexual instincts also exist ; it has been built upon a sharp distinction between sexual instincts and Ego-instincts ; and in the face of all opposition it has insisted, *not* that they arise from sexuality, but that the neuroses owe their origin to a conflict between the Ego and sexuality.'² When he comes to study the ego more closely he finds the creative tendency of the sexual impulses, themselves ultimately only creative in the sense of being conservative of the

¹ Freud, *op. cit.* p. 299.

² *Op. cit.* p. 294 ; cf. pp. 318, 346.

species, continually opposed to the tendency of the organism to secure its own continuance. And thus, curiously enough, the ego becomes identified with the refusal to develop. Its tendency is indeed rather towards retrogression. Freud actually speaks of it as bound up with 'the instincts which lead towards death.'¹ The aim of the ego is to persist as it is, to secure its own permanence, to repeat that which has been. Freud denies the very existence of any impulse in man towards a higher perfection, and regards the apparent evidence for such an impulse, which has been the main support of so many attempts to find a natural basis for religion, as arising solely from 'that repression of instinct upon which what is most valuable in human culture is built.'² For such repressed instincts never cease to seek their own appropriate satisfaction, a satisfaction most naturally found in the repetition of the primary experience with which it was originally connected. Thus the tendency of the ego is to revert to the non-personal and non-creative. *Das Ich* is bound up with *das Es*, and as soon as the stream of life passes on, the final objective of the individual is death. The longing for quiescence, for peace at the last, the Nirvana-principle, as Miss Low has termed it,³ is theoretically as fundamental to Freudianism as the creative but temporary sex-impulse.

Again we need not deny the truth and importance of this brilliant generalization. One of the world's greatest religious systems bears witness to its significance. And practically it is of immense value for the understanding of certain types of neurosis, the 'compulsion-neuroses,' though we may add that unless we can supplement it by that which Freud denies, the creative possibilities inherent in human nature, understanding of these disorders does not lead us

¹ *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 50.

² *Ibid.* p. 52.

³ B. Low, *Psycho-analysis*, p. 73. The phrase has been accepted by Freud himself.

hopefully towards their cure. Clearly it is not the whole truth and we must now turn to the attempts which have been made to supplement it in a manner which indicates a brighter destiny for the individual and for the race.

Freud's followers have diverged from their master mainly in two directions. In Adler's *Individual Psychology* we have a theory still mechanistic in principle, but recognizing an end or goal of life far more adequate than that of Freud. 'We can best understand the manifold and diverse movement of the psyche as soon as our *most general presupposition*, that the psyche has as its objective the *goal of superiority*, is recognised.'¹ In the broadest terms this is the universal end to which life is directed. It is the impulse of self-assertion, the basis of that bitter warfare of life in which the fittest survive. But Adler goes much further when he recognizes the significance of the individual. Cases are not the same. To understand a man we must understand his own individual life-plan, which expresses itself both as a final goal and as separate tendencies converging upon that goal. 'We insist,' he says, 'that without worrying about the *tendencies, milieu, and experiences*, all psychical powers are under the control of a directive idea and all expressions of emotion, feeling, willing, acting, dreaming as well as psycho-pathological phenomena are permeated by one unified life-plan.' Adler insists that this conception is dynamic and that herein it is an advance upon the 'static words and pictures,' and the 'unified formulas,' of the Freudian schools. Dynamic it may be, but it is still mechanistic in principle. It is as a result of what he terms 'the subjective evaluation,' which is rather a permanent mood, or feeling, than a conscious system of judgments, that 'there arises, depending upon the unconscious technique of our thought-apparatus, an imagined goal, an attempt at

¹ The italics here and below are Adler's own, and the references in this paragraph are all to his *Individual Psychology*, pp. 6, 7.

a planned final compensation and a life-plan.' Here then we have the full recognition of a direction or tendency in the individual life. That Adler comes to wholly negative results as regards religion is due to his treatment of this tendency as a closed and determinate system for each individual. He carries us a little further than Freud, but still leaves us without any indication of an end or goal subserved by the whole system of individual ends. The way to God is not yet made plain. At the most he allows us to envisage a race of supermen, attaining for a brief hour, and perishing as they attain.

The other great analytic school is that of Jung, a writer of astonishing industry, learning, and perversity, with an almost incredible persistence in finding mythology where ordinary folk see facts. It is discouraging to the theologian to find that he takes his conception of Christianity from Drews and similar writers. In a whole series of passages in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* he treats the most plainly historical details of the life of Christ as examples of solar mythology, itself with an underlying and unconscious sexual significance.¹ A single quotation will suffice to illustrate his general outlook in its provoking inadequacy, and, as we shall see, in its strength :

Comparison with the Sun teaches us over and over again that the gods are libido. It is that part of us which is immortal, since it represents that bond through which we feel that in the race we are never extinguished. It is life from the life of mankind. Its springs, which well up from the depths of the unconscious, come, as does our life in general, from the root of the whole of humanity, since we are indeed only a twig broken off from the mother and transplanted.²

'The divine in us is the libido,' he continues, and proceeds to expound this upon lines which render further quotation

¹ See esp. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 120-124. A reference to his index *sub voce* 'Christ' will provide numerous other examples.

² *Ibid.* p. 125.

impossible. But behind this obvious failure to understand either history or the religious conception of God, there is a principle of such importance that Jung's psychology has become the basis of almost all the more living recent developments in psychotherapy. In this country it would be true, if paradoxical, to say that by far the majority of those who are engaged in the treatment of mental disorder are disciples of Jung, and that they disagree with almost everything that he has said. This principle is that of the creative quality of the fundamental impulses of life. The 'libido' in Jung is 'a continuous life impulse, a will to live which aims at attaining the creation of the whole species through the preservation of the individual.'¹ At every point it is creative. Jung's treatment of the neuroses looks not back to a disordered past but forward to new possibilities, developing along lines which the analyst can already observe as foreshadowed in the unconscious symbolisms of the patient.²

But this is to the Freudian nothing short of heresy, since it breaks down the security of his determinism, the very basis of his claim to status as a scientist. No wonder that Freud declares that Jung has ceased to be a psycho-analyst and now aspires to be a prophet.³ In truth it is the pupil who is more scientific than his master. For the creative impulse, which is freedom, is fundamental to human life, and if analysis is to have any future at all it must do full justice to the fact that life is governed by something more than law. Creative striving towards a goal is more powerful than the goddess Necessity.⁴ To ignore this fact, directly given in any unbiased attempt at introspection, is obviously to destroy science as well as hope.

¹ Jung, *op. cit.* p. 80. I have ventured slightly to emend the translation.

² The classical account of a case analysed upon these lines is in Jung's *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 417 ff.

³ *Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 228.

⁴ The deification is made by Freud himself, and is used by him to illustrate the manner in which he conceives the figures of the gods to have come into view. See *Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 298, and *Future of an Illusion*, p. 94.

We may take McDougall as representing a broader conception of psychology and its methods, representative both in the definite stand which he has made against Behaviourism, and in the firm basis upon which he has placed the study of instinct, subject to correction though this may be in all manner of details.¹ Here the implications of the theories of Jung and Adler are stated in the simplest of terms. Behaviour is purposive, and that which is not purposive is not behaviour.² It is the behaviour of a conscious, thinking, subject,³ who is aware, however incompletely and vaguely, of an end in his action.⁴ So far as his actions are mere movements, not purposive, they cannot properly be called behaviour and they are not the subject-matter of psychology, but of some other science, such as physics or physiology. Psychology has nothing to say as to the trajectory of a man falling freely from an aeroplane under the influence of gravity, or as to the contraction of the pupil of the eye when a strong light is flashed upon it. But wherever the action is related, however indirectly, to an end beyond itself, there we have behaviour properly so called. And since it is in the valuation and choice of ends that freedom consists, we find volition or free will to be a further datum which must not be ignored.⁵

¹ Quite apart from the wide variations in the lists of instincts given by writers of this type (see p. 9), the whole theory of the instincts is being reconstituted in the more recent *Gestalt-psychologie*, with its substitution of 'patterns' or 'forms' for McDougall's integrated systems of behaviour. The difference is in some respects far-reaching, and in all probability the term 'instinct' will fall out of use altogether, though for reasons very different from those which have led to its rejection by the Behaviourists.

² *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 47 f.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 39.

⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 48 f. Cf. W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 8: 'The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and the criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon.'

⁵ Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, pp. 66 f.: 'What higher systems are there than self-love, on the one side, and love of others, or respect for conscience, on the other? What other system can estimate theirs, and choose between their alternatives? Yet our personality does

The study of the instincts is peculiarly illuminating in this respect. Each instinct is marked by its own specific type of activity, often highly organized and complex. It has, further, its own peculiar quality of feeling or affect, clearly enough distinguished in introspection, though in some cases, such as the satisfaction of the appetites, or of the impulse of curiosity, these affects have no precise definition in popular speech. But in none of the instincts is the specific behaviour or the affect sufficiently isolated to make a precise analysis of our instinctive equipment at all an easy matter. The only simple mode of approach is to be found in the end which the instinct fulfils. James, in fact, has defined instinct as 'a faculty of acting in such a way as to bring about certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance.'¹ And when these ends are examined it is at once seen that instinct seeks its own satisfaction only in the service of ends which lie beyond itself, the maintenance of life in the individual, or in the race, and its protection from danger. To understand instinct at all we must seek its significance in the ego and in that wider whole of which the ego forms a part.

The weakness of all the psychologies of which we have been speaking, including that of McDougall, is that in their study of man they make man the end of their study. Thus they are unable to develop a system of values which has for the Christian any validity at all. The values advocated

not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments. These are our many selves ; but there is also our one self. This enigmatical self which reflects on their systems, estimates them, and, however loath to do it, sometimes chooses between their ends, seems to be the central fact of our personality.' Ach (cited by Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence*, p. 53) has made a special experimental study of the introspective apprehension of the will. 'The act of willing as such is immediately given and well characterised : it must be claimed as a specific psychic experience' (*Ueber den Willensakt u. das Temperament*, p. 247).

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, ii. p. 383.

by any individual psychologist are not derived from his psychological theory, but from his own preferences and adjustments of impulse, his individual plan, as Adler would say. And psychology, as psychology, has no means of judging between these values. William James, discussing the value of saintliness, finds no criterion save 'practical common sense and the empirical method.'¹ The one great danger is that the values accepted should be self-centred values, a danger into which McDougall falls, perhaps even more gravely than his Behaviourist opponents. They at least are purely empirical, and even saintliness would be observed by them as an interesting behaviour-type. But McDougall by his stress upon the self-regarding sentiment as the key to the development of the ego has been led into an ethic of self-sufficiency, closely akin to Stoicism, and utterly irreconcilable in principle with the Christian values.²

We need not say more at this stage as to this, the third, datum of introspection upon which we found it necessary to insist. For in discussing the problem of an ultimate standard of values we are brought to the most important psychological fact of all, the reference of life to that which lies beyond itself. This was our fourth datum of introspection, the awareness of otherness.

We have already found hints of this in the psychoanalysts. Freud's recognition of a reality-principle is a starting-point, at least calling our attention to a realm of fact with which analysis has nothing to do. It is in a real world that mental mechanism operates. Ferenczi, quoted with approval by Freud, has carried the suggestion even further. 'One is obliged' he says, 'to gain familiarity with the idea of a tendency to persistence or regression governing organic life also, while the tendency to progress in development, adaptation, etc., is manifested only as

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 377.

² Especially in his *Character and the Conduct of Life*.

against external stimuli.’¹ Freud himself speaks of ‘external forces impelling towards adaptation.’² And it is the presupposition of all the variant forms taken by the Darwinian theory of evolution that species attain and persist in their characteristic forms as the result of an environment which they do not themselves create. The most recent development of this type of thought is to be found in the *Gestalt-psychologie*,³ with its emphasis upon structures or patterns, in which a single complex and inter-related situation in the environment evokes a complex response in the organism, which despite its complexity is nevertheless one. MacCurdy has made a brilliant attempt to show that these patterns which dominate and shape organic life are one and the same in the psychological and in the physiological spheres.⁴ Perhaps there is as yet little more in this than had been already foreshadowed by Kant in his discussion of the organism as an interrelation of ends, a discussion which forms the climax of the three great Critiques, though it should really have been their starting-point.⁵

The reference to Kant reminds us of his insistence that it is rational being, or personality, which must always and

¹ In his *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, chap. viii.

² *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 52.

³ The starting-point of this school is Köhler’s fascinating *Mentality of Apes*. The most important further works available to English readers are Koffka’s *Growth of the Mind* and R. M. Ogden’s *Psychology and Education*.

⁴ MacCurdy, *Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology*. See especially pp. 140 ff. and 249 ff. for the parallel series of patterns. Dr. MacCurdy would not claim to be a direct follower of the *Gestalt*-psychologists, but his speculations go far to provide an intelligible basis for their theory. As he himself perceives, he is working on lines parallel to those which in the realm of physics have almost (though not quite) reduced matter and its properties to a series of mathematical abstractions (*op. cit.*, Preface, pp. xi-xv). Matter and mind are indeed drawing together. Others besides MacCurdy himself will see in his work a close connection with Whitehead’s mathematical philosophy (e.g. in *Science and the Modern World*).

⁵ See p. 14, note.

in all circumstances be treated as an end and not as a means. And this brings us to the most important suggestion of modern psychology for the understanding of religion. The relationship of self and other, within which the self comes to be established in its full individual status, is always in essence a personal relationship. A first indication of this can be found in Freud himself, when he declares that the essential life of man is the love-life,¹ a Christian phrase, and used in a sense which, despite the most deplorable failures to distinguish between moral values, is not as far removed from a Christian meaning as might at first sight appear. After all, it was a greater than Freud who used the simile of marriage to express the relation of Christ with His Church.

The hint given by Freud is worked out more fully in the generally accepted psychological doctrine of the sentiments, of which Shand has been the most successful exponent.² The essence of this doctrine is that man's inherited store of instinctive tendencies are built up into emotions and dispositions, in a word into character, by direction upon objects which lie beyond their immediate ends. McDougall has especially stressed the significance of the object in this connection,³ though the suggestion was originally due to Shand.⁴ 'Our emotional dispositions tend to become organised in systems about the various objects and classes of objects that excite them.'⁵ Of all the sentiments the

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 37 f. Here libido is defined as 'the energy of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word "love." . . . We do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in name "love"—on the one hand, self-love, and, on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas.' Cf. *Introductory Lectures*, p. 277.

² In *The Foundations of Character*.

³ *Social Psychology*, chaps. v. and vi.

⁴ In his essays, "Character and the Emotions" (*Mind*, N.S., vol. v.) and "M. Ribot's Theory of the Passions" (*Mind*, N.S., vol. xvi.).

⁵ *Social Psychology*, p. 122.

most characteristic and comprehensive are love and hate, which under different circumstances press into service the impulses of the whole range of instincts and emotions. The wide range of the sentiments in linking together the emotional dispositions has been fully worked out by Shand, whose whole theory must be regarded as one of the most important pieces of pioneer work in recent years. In his later work he has especially considered the inner mechanism of the sentiments, in accordance with his well-known law: 'Every sentiment tends to include in its system all those emotions that are of service to its ends, and to exclude all those which are useless or antagonistic.'¹

For our purpose the importance of this theory is that the objects which play this immensely important rôle in human life, being, in fact, the very basis of its coherence and unity, are always, in the last analysis, personal. Thouless has suggested the subdivision of the sentiments into 'concrete particular, concrete general, and abstract.'² This arrangement has obvious empirical value. It is convenient to be able to distinguish the love of a child, love for children, and love for justice.³ But here the Freudian analysis may give us a clue. When we come to investigate the real character of these apparently higher, more abstract, more disinterested sentiments, we find at once that they rest directly upon simple and direct personal relationship. All alike are modes of love and hate, and love is incapable of resting upon a void. It is always love seeking an object loved. The particular concrete sentiment, in its personal aspect, is the highest and not the lowest form which sentiments can take, and it is in turning out from ourselves to others, and to Another, that our personal life becomes a reality. There is the strange possibility open to us of

¹ *The Foundations of Character*, p. 62.

² *Social Psychology*, p. 106.

³ *Ibid.* I have slightly changed the illustration used by Thouless in this passage.

refusing love. McDougall's stress upon the self-regarding sentiment at least bears witness to the dreadful possibility of refusing the true way of growth, making ourselves the object towards which we turn, and so forming a character self-reliant indeed, since it has become its own god—and for a short season it has its worship. But we cannot form sentiments about things. Always the thing is a symbol and significant of some personal end beyond itself.

Here then we have our foundation for the belief that the life is a matter between God and the souls of men. It is only as yet a foundation and psychology as psychology has told us nothing directly about God at all. But if it has shown us that it is not without good warrant that we look upon life as free, purposive, responsible, looking to ends in and beyond itself, and finding its climax in love, then we have no ill starting-point for our quest into that mystery of human life which expresses itself as religion and of which the goal is God.

LECTURE II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF RELIGION

SYNOPSIS

THE psychological attack on current religious ideas, from the time of Plato until to-day. Its parallel in the Hebrew prophets. The full weight of this attack only recently made clear, since it is now not the arguments for religion that are criticized but the very mental processes upon which those arguments rest.

In this attack psychology of the classical type, as seen, *e.g.*, in Ward, remains neutral. The real danger begins with the attempt of William James to defend religious belief upon a pragmatic basis. Behaviourism is simply the logical outcome of this position. It is defended by mere crude assertion and may fairly be met by counter-assertion.

The psycho-analysts have developed the attack on more serious lines, claiming to show, in the mental process of 'projection,' a natural origin for religious symbols and beliefs, and at the same time their transitory and unreal character. The case, as developed by Freud and Jung, when fully stated, proves to be itself a mythological structure since—

1. It does no justice to the fact that the processes to which it refers, as well as the persons in whom they take place, are real.
2. It fails completely to recognize the significance of historical facts and the impossibility of reducing these to mental process.
3. It substitutes, especially in Jung's psychology, an even more mythological system of 'racial' or 'absolute' dominants.

The attack from the side of the sociologists, *e.g.* Durkheim, need not be taken seriously, since its basis is to be found in the theories of the analytical psychologists.

The value of this critical attack for Christianity is in its exposure of false gods, and of inadequate grounds for belief. The essential basis of theism in our response to creative Reality remains untouched.

LECTURE II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF RELIGION

For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth ; as there are gods many, and lords many ; yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him ; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him.—1 Cor. viii. 5, 6.

In the very beginning of science, the parsons, who managed things then,
Being handy with hammer and chisel, made gods in the likeness of men ;
Till commerce arose, and at length some men of exceptional power
Supplanted both demons and gods by the atoms, which last to this hour.
Yet they did not abolish the gods, but they sent them well out of the way,
With the rarest of nectar to drink, and blue fields of nothing to sway.
From nothing comes nothing, they told us—naught happens by chance but by fate ;
There is nothing but atoms and void, all else is mere whims out of date !
Then why should a man curry favour with beings who cannot exist,
To compass some petty promotion in nebulous kingdoms of mist ? ¹

So begins the parody, written by a great scientist and a great Christian, of Tyndall's famous presidential address to the British Association at Belfast in 1874, at the very crisis of the issue between science and religion. The atom has passed through many vicissitudes since Tyndall's day, but Clerk

¹ By J. Clerk Maxwell. Published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, under the title "British Association, 1874. Notes of the President's Address."

Maxwell's lines remain in all other respects as terse and vivid a statement as exists of the fundamental difficulties which arise when the scientific categories of thought are made absolute.

The type of thought was not in the least new. We recall at once poor Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, struggling to keep up to date with the latest ideas of the 'reflectory.'

. . . Vortex? Of course, I'd forgotten,
There is no Zeus, and now in his place Vortex is reigning.¹

There comes to mind, too, Lucian's ludicrous picture of the gods in conclave upon Olympus, taking counsel as best they might in view of the stringency which had resulted from the cessation of sacrifices.² Cultured thought in classical times is revealed as sharply by the satirists as the real Oxford of yesterday by the shrewd pen of Mr. A. D. Godley, and cultured thought had firmly sent the gods 'well out of the way.' Much of the modern psychological attack upon religion can be found foreshadowed in the later Greek writers. And for the matter of that the prophets of Israel, in their own more concrete and more passionate way, deliver exactly the same judgment upon the gods of the nations. 'Of their silver and their gold have they made them idols, . . . the workman made it and it is no god.'³ 'The work of men's hands'⁴—that is the verdict written by man across the figure of every god that he rejects.

But to destroy the false gods is not to deny that God, the true God, exists. The best thought of Greece is at one with the prophets of Israel here. The philosopher, reaching out to the ideal world of the good and the true, finds a reality greater than that of the gods whose existence he has

¹ *Clouds*, ll. 381 f.

² *Zeus τραγωδός*. The seriousness as well as the satire of Lucian's dialogues is brilliantly brought out by Frowde in his *Short Studies*.

³ Hos. viii. 4-6. Cf. the tremendous satire in Is. xlv. and Ps. cxv.

⁴ Ps. cxv. 4; cxxxv. 15.

challenged. Even Lucian has a serious purpose behind his exposure of credulity and hypocrisy. And the author of Psalm xix. sums up the whole vision of the prophets when he declares, in words strangely anticipating Kant, how the starry heavens without and the moral law within point alike to God.

The heavens declare the glory of God ;
And the firmament sheweth his handywork.

The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul :
The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.¹

When we turn to the present day we find that the issues are still unchanged. A speaker at the last meeting of the British Association ² reiterated the challenge of deterministic science, repudiating, upon grounds identical in principle with those stated by Tyndall, the mediating vitalistic theories, in which so many of us have seen a real hope of a mutual understanding between science and religion. Science, to be science, must hold that ' naught happens by chance but by fate.' Where then in such a universe is there room for freedom, or for God ?

Before we examine in detail the form which this ancient problem takes for us to-day, we may indicate our answer in a few words. Our defence is to admit the truth of the

¹ Ps. xix. 1, 7.

² Prof. L. T. Hogben, in the course of the debate upon ' The Nature of Life,' argued against theories of ' Holism ' and vitalism on the ground that they could not submit experimental evidence capable of establishing results which would enable the scientist to make predictions with the certainty possible upon mechanical principles. He urged that the work of Loeb and Pavlov on conditioned reflexes had broken down the distinction between voluntary and reflex activity, and that even conscious behaviour could be subjected to physico-chemical interpretation. At the same meeting Prof. G. Barger, while maintaining an agnostic attitude as to the ultimate nature of life, declared that it is ' treachery to science ' to resort to any other hypothesis than the mechanistic. For a full criticism of the theories of tropisms and conditioned reflexes see McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 21-71.

claims of science, and to welcome every advance in empirical knowledge which it can give. Within, and in virtue of, its limitations, it is a method of immense fertility and usefulness of result. But we deny wholly that it gives, or can give, a full account and explanation of life. If it does not set its problems, like the traditional examination question, 'neglecting the weight of the elephant,' it must set them neglecting the elephant's individuality,¹ its absolute and intrinsic worth, and the possibility that it may act upon its own initiative. We refuse, therefore, to be bound by the restricted methods of science, holding that despite all appearances it is the world of the scientist and not that of the philosopher or the theologian that is abstract and unreal. And it is only when our more concrete world of common life, with its individual values resting upon that supreme

¹ This remark is open at first sight to the obvious criticism that modern science, and modern psychology in particular, are at the moment paying great attention to the individual. In the British Association debate to which reference has been made above Dr. J. S. Haldane and Prof. Wildon Carr both laid great stress upon this point. But in each case the point of the argument was that in recognizing individuality biological science differs radically from the mechanistic sciences, and that its world must be differently interpreted. Dr. Haldane referred to the modern physical investigations which seem to reveal something very like an individual life even in the atom and molecule, as showing that no meaning can be attached to the idea that life has arisen by mechanical processes. And Prof. Wildon Carr argued that the essential substance of the world is activity, 'and activity distinguished from mechanical movement by its individuality.' 'Activity is essentially individual and purposive, and in its higher form personal.' (I quote, in this and the preceding note, from the *Times* report—all that is available at the time of writing.) This position is quite distinct from the strict scientific study of the individual which simply seeks to find in him a special case of the working of general rules. True science abhors an exception just as much as nature abhors a vacuum, and for the same ultimate reason. In the special field of psychology we have at least two considerable attempts to deal with the individual. Adler's 'Individual Psychology' depends upon the principle that each individual has his own special 'guiding principle' (see p. 26 above). And Dr. C. Burt and others have made a special study of the individual differences of normal adult minds, fully summarized in Burt's presidential address to the British Association, Psychology Section, in 1923. But even here we have not the study of individuality *as such*, but only the attempt to study the laws and meaning of variation.

value which is God, is taken fully into account, that we dare trust the scientist. For indeed we have committed ourselves into his hands in these latter days, and, if the growth of science outruns that growth of goodness with which science has no concern, we cannot say to what strange chaotic horror our civilization may be hastening. There is nothing unscientific about war, and it is for the sake of values unknown to science that war must cease to be.

The fields of astronomy, geology, and biology are no longer battlegrounds of religious controversy, and though there are still those, in Tennessee and even nearer home, who rush to the defence of positions long since abandoned, time and education will gradually curb their zeal, or turn it to more useful ends. It is only in the field of psychology that there is still a living problem. For the psychologist studies not only external facts, but the very processes of the mind which perceive them and estimate their worth. And if he shows, as sometimes he claims to show, that religion is simply a natural by-product of those processes, having no validity beyond the processes themselves, then indeed man walketh in a vain shadow, and the shadow is his own.

It is not with the whole range of psychology that we are specially concerned. Such writers as Stout and Ward, maintaining what may be called the classical tradition, are in principle neutral upon the fundamental question of the validity of religion and the realities upon which it rests. In their emphasis upon the ego and its direct apprehension of values as true psychological data they may, indeed, be called in evidence by the apologist for religion, since it is exactly here that they challenge the presuppositions upon which the destructive theories of the psycho-analysts and their allies rest. A few sentences from Ward will suffice to make the point clear :

Personality and values, as we have seen, are mutually implicated. The only psychological standard for assigning gradations

of rank to values and motives we found to be the thinking and willing self. . . . In appraising the world the individual at the same time ranks himself : find the microcosm and you find the man.¹

And again :

It detracts in no wise from this living by faith—we must emphatically maintain—that its so-called God-consciousness may be epistemologically unverifiable. We are for the present concerned exclusively with the psychological facts and these seem to be beyond question. . . . There are no more important psychological facts—especially when character is in question—than the ideals or values that determine conduct.²

And Ward closes his study of man with an expression of faith which carries us far on our way :

Upon one point only is it needful to insist—all such topics must be regarded in the light of the one organic whole on which their meaning and their value depend, viz. the creative synthesis which reveals and must perfect personality.³

It is not surprising, then, that in the first volume of his *Philosophical Theology*, a volume to which he has given the significant title of *The Soul and its Faculties*, Tennant has found it possible to take Ward's psychology as a firm basis for theological reconstruction. We may safely leave this aspect of the subject in his hands.

The transition to the theories of those psychologists who have found it part of their programme to abolish God, even though in some cases they endeavour to conserve religious values, is to be found in the destructive pragmatism of William James. Unquestionably James writes as an apologist for religion. His *Will to Believe* is far more bracing than a multitude of devotional treatises. 'I wish to make you feel,' he says, 'that we have a right to believe

¹ Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 467.

² *Op. cit.* p. 469.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 470.

the physical order to be only a partial order ; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again.' ¹ But what, for James, is this right to believe ? It is an option, ² a freedom to believe what we will, subject only to the empirical testing that life provides. The fundamental affirmation of religion, ' that the best things are the more eternal things,' is ' an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.' And so we are left with a second-best. ' The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true.' ³ James declares passionately enough his right to this option, this over-belief, ⁴ but in the end there can be no doubt that he has delivered faith into the hands of the critic, and his successors have set themselves to show that these values can readily be explained as resting upon nothing more than compensatory fantasies, accommodating the stress and strain of living to biological necessity and social interadjustment.

Before leaving James we must observe that a more positive principle does after all emerge. The options are not all upon the common footing which a sound pragmatism would demand. We cannot apply the freedom of belief to ' some patent superstition.' It ' can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve ; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider.' ⁵ We must choose among the gods. ' To-day a deity who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously.' ⁶ ' To this extent, to the extent of disbelieving peremptorily in certain types of deity, I frankly confess that

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 52.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 3 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 25 f.

⁴ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 513-515.

⁵ *The Will to Believe*, p. 29.

⁶ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 328.

we must be theologians. If disbeliefs can be said to constitute a theology, then the prejudices, instincts, and common-sense which I chose as our guides make theological partisans of us whenever they make certain beliefs abhorrent.' ¹ That James goes on to point out the empirical evolution of these tests whereby man unmakes his gods does not alter the fundamental implications of his admissions. In the end the living options are not options at all, for they reduce to one, and one that we must take or leave by a choice which we know in the end to be not merely intellectual or empirical.

We needs must love the highest when we see it,²

and to love the highest is to make an affirmation of the most definite kind about the nature of the Universe. We have no right and no need to ask that all shall understand the theistic arguments, or be able to discuss the metaphysical problems of the nature of Ultimate Being. But love of the highest is open to all, and is the way that leads directly through Christ to God. Of that we must speak again when we come to deal with faith.

It would be impossible within the limits of this lecture to trace out in historical order the development of the psychological attack. Much of it, especially on the sociological side, is far earlier than James, and his pragmatism merely lent force to a movement already well established. We can only attempt to deal with one or two main arguments which have had a considerable vogue in recent years.

Behaviourism may be dismissed in a very few sentences. The almost prophetic aptness of Clerk Maxwell's lines attracts our attention at once.

Till commerce arose, and at length some men of exceptional
power
Supplanted both demons and gods by the atoms.

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 328.

² Tennyson, *Idylls of the King*: *Guinevere*.

Behaviourism has in fact not only a strikingly commercial outlook but even a directly commercial purpose. It is an application of the pragmatic conception of truth which would have staggered William James. It deals entirely in observable facts and in results. Its methods of propaganda are precisely the methods of commercial advertisement, since its exponents proceed entirely by positive assertion and never attempt to deal with the issues raised by their critics.¹ When Watson is asked what he means by experience or consciousness he simply says that he does not care. Behaviour is all that matters. 'Tell me,' he says in effect, 'what you want, whether it is to sell a soap or to fill a church, and I will give you the necessary advice, based upon observation and experiment.' And his ally Dr. E. B. Holt, one of the extremer American Neo-Realists, has successfully gone back to Tyndall, or to Aristophanes, and explains that all man's consciousness, volition, desire, and the rest 'are really movements of particles or of currents of energy in the world about him.'²

What then has Watson to say of religion? Simply, and in so many words, that upon the advent of Behaviourism it is 'being replaced among the educated by experimental ethics.'³ That there is some truth in this, especially in a country which has the divorce records of America and in which companionate marriages can be seriously advocated,⁴

¹ See especially *The Battle of Behaviorism*, by Watson and McDougall. The 'postscript' by the latter seems to me to be entirely justified.

² Quoted from McDougall's *Outline of Psychology*, p. 27. Holt's *The Concept of Consciousness* may be said, perhaps more accurately, to revive the theory of 'diminutive vibratiuncles' expounded by David Hartley in 1747, in *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections*. But for Hartley the ideas, being vibrations, are real enough. For Holt they have no reality save as vibrations or movements of particles. The change of emphasis makes a whole world of difference between the two positions.

³ *Behaviorism*, p. 18.

⁴ For details Lindsey's *Companionate Marriage* and Calverton's *The Bankruptcy of Marriage* may be consulted. But it is difficult to believe that accurate statistics are available. Some estimate of the gravity of

there is no need to deny. Nor, as every parish priest knows, are we free here in England from the slackening of moral fibre which results when the very existence of moral sanctions is called in question. But this disastrous state of affairs is no commendation of a psychology which claims, rightly or wrongly, to be responsible for it, and if Watson means us to infer that he regards experimental ethics as an improvement upon religion his remark is nothing less than an impertinence.

Yet we may well ask ourselves why we feel the impertinence so keenly. The answer is simply that we know that love, love of man and love of God through man, is not an experimental principle but absolute. By it all experiments must be tested, and not by results. And that this primary ruling of religion is not out of keeping with a sound psychology the whole doctrine of the sentiments bears witness.

We pass on, then, to the main psychological attack. This takes many forms, but the principles upon which it rests are few and can be simply stated. They emerge most clearly in the writings of the psycho-analysts, into whose theories the view of religion as a purely cultural or sociological phenomenon can readily be fitted. Their central feature is the mental mechanism known as *projection*, the name being that given by Jung¹ to one of the processes

the problem is possible in the light of the following estimates, made by specialists. Max Hirsch (*Fruchtabtreibung und Präventivverkehr*, 1914) states that according to an estimate of the *New York Medical Record* 800,000 (a misprint for 80,000) abortions are procured annually in New York alone. This state of affairs is, however, now general. Bertillon estimates that 50,000 abortions are procured every year in Paris, and Julius Wolf puts the annual number for the whole of Germany at 600,000. I owe these references to the Dean of St. Paul's.

¹ Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 426 ff.; cf. p. 409. The classical account of Freud's theory is to be found in his *Traumdeutung*. A full summary is given by E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 187 ff. Freud usually terms this process 'displacement,' a term which is far less confusing than that used by Jung, since it suggests the reality of the object to which the affect or interest is displaced.

which had been found by Freud to play a very large part in dream structure. It is a process independent of the aware and rational consciousness, and it may be said at the outset that there is quite general agreement among psychologists as to its importance. Its interpretation is another matter. Dr. Tansley's account of it may be taken as typical :

In projection, as in repression, the mind refuses to acknowledge part of its own contents, but instead of refusing attention to the existence of the content in question, it recognises the existence while denying the ownership. The ownership of the content in question is too painful, or too sublime, to be compassed within the limits of its weakness, and an external substitute is sought, whether as scapegoat or as support.¹

The process is familiar enough and may be illustrated any day by the spectacle of two controversialists each accusing the other of losing his temper, of the child scolding its doll to restore self-esteem after its own scolding, of the layman leaving the business of Christian living to some parson whom he profoundly respects but does not dream of imitating. Many a man is only too glad to entrust his ideals to the keeping of a church in order that he may proceed about his business unencumbered. He will, of course, have little to do with the said church in outward practice, and yet his real identification with it is shown by the violence with which he will defend it when it is attacked, even though the proposal be no more than to change the colour of the bags in which the offertory is collected.

Freud applies this principle to the explanation of religion when he speaks of the relation between the ego and the ego-ideal in the individual.² The ideal ego is formed through the pressure of the family-environment, developing into that

¹ *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life* (1920 edn.), p. 133.

² So especially in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 60 ff., and *The Ego and the Id*, pp. 34 ff.

of society, and since it must always serve the ends of the family or of society, it must conflict in greater or less degree with the actual ego, which has its own individual impulses and needs. It is out of this clash of impulses and ideals, we are told, that the gods are born.

For Freud the basis of religion is this universal situation in which man's needs demand a solution, which if denied on earth, as it always is—for here to the end we fight a losing battle with weariness, failure, and death—must create its ideal satisfaction, establishing it in 'blue fields of nothing' and so securing its reality against all criticism. And he sees in the appearance of the gods simply the restoration of the infantile situation, living on in the unconscious, and distorted, and so again secured from criticism, into forms suited for adult use. In his *Totem and Tabu* he has worked this out as an expression of the old 'son-father relationship'; God is the exalted father and the longing for the father is the root of the need for religion.¹ We need not linger over the unpleasant and unessential sexual turn which is given to this theory. After all, no Christian can ever be afraid or ashamed to follow out the implications of the opening words of the Lord's Prayer. We have the highest authority of all for seeing the God of our worship in terms of Fatherhood. For Freud the blending of fear and mystery and love, and the dimly understood fascination of creative energy, are simply the reappearance in adult life of the emotions of early childhood. And we note that these are the very characteristics which Otto has singled out as peculiar to the religious experience.² The analogy is exact.

In his more recent essay, *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud has stressed especially the development of the task of culture, the reaction of man's helplessness against the forces with

¹ Freud's own summary of the theory in *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 39.

² *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 12-41.

which 'nature rises up against us, sublime, pitiless, inexorable.'¹ The first step, he tells us, is the humanization of nature. Instead of impersonal and eternally remote forces and fates man sees in the elements passions such as rage in his own soul, and he uses against 'these violent supermen of the beyond' just such methods as 'we make use of in our own community; we can try to exorcise them, to appease them, to bribe them, and so rob them of part of their power.' Thus there is not only immediate relief, but a hope of further mastery of the situation. And by linking this process up with its infantile prototype, the child's relationship to its parents, the figure of God comes full into view. He is simply the father, at once an object of fear and the strong protector. He is eternal, and knows no weakness. How should a child understand the frailty of this gigantic, strong being who has always been the centre and the security of the home? Perchance this father-god may avail even against death itself.

But science destroys the human traits in nature, and nevertheless man retains his helplessness, his father-longing, and the gods. Inevitably then the gods are withdrawn into the background. 'Without doubt the gods are the lords of nature: they have arranged it thus and now they can leave it to itself.' Occasionally they may intervene in miracle, but in the main destiny prevails. Indeed the suspicion persists that destiny stands above even the gods themselves. The father after all dies in the end. Nature appears increasingly autonomous. God is seen as Himself the first subject of the Eternal Law. And thus the function of the gods comes to be found more and more in the field not of destiny but of morality. They secure not life but goodness. They are both the guardians of that social structure by which man has sought to ward off the vicissitudes of fate,

¹ *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 27. The next two paragraphs are roughly abridged from Freud's argument on pp. 27-34 of this essay.

and the guardians of the individual against the evils and restrictions of that structure itself. They become fused into the figure of Providence, at once benevolent and just, which secures, in another life (itself a projection-fantasy) if not in this, that moral perfection and its correlative happiness which we fail so dismally to attain. And so Freud says, and he is speaking specifically of Christianity, the last advance of religious development reveals once more 'the father nucleus which had always lain hidden behind every divine figure ; fundamentally it was a return to the historical beginnings of the idea of God.' And therewith, 'now that God was a single person, man's relations to him could recover the intimacy and intensity of the child's relation to the father.'

For Freud, with his mechanistic hypothesis, all this is illusion, and the future which he foresees for religion is that man should be set free from this fantasy-structure, which is only the product of his weakness and fears. He sees the one hope for mankind in a courageous facing of facts as they are, a morality which stands in its own right, based upon a scientific understanding of the truth of life. 'Religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis.'¹ Man, putting away childish things, will grow to his full stature, which is at least that of a man, if it may not be that of a god. And when Freud sees his purpose as at one with that of religion in 'the brotherhood of man and the reduction of suffering'² we may wonder how, upon a mechanistic hypothesis, he should give value to such ideals, but we cannot refuse him the hand of fellowship.

Obviously the case is formidable, the more formidable for a certain rugged moral grandeur :

Why should a man curry favour with beings who cannot exist,
To compass some petty promotion in nebulous kingdoms of
mist ?

¹ *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 92.

² *Ibid.* p. 93.

But before making our reply we must note how Freud's attack has been supplemented by other recent psychological writers, and most notably by Jung.

Jung¹ starts from the suggestion, made independently by Nietzsche and by Freud, that myths are simply the traces in man of an infantile mode of thought. They are for the race what the dream is to the individual² and they have the same striking unity of type. The history of religion is simply the history of mythology, in which the longings of mankind find in fantasy a fulfilment which reality denies. The power of religion is the power of this primitive, infantile, pre-logical type of thinking, which lingers on in the unconscious, dominating our lives to an extent which, for the first time, analysis has revealed. In times of weariness, or stress, or necessity, when the conscious, rational approach to the world fails us, as it must fail us all in the face of the great destroying forces of nature, or in periods of social disintegration, these mythological structures take life. By the principle of projection they are seen as realities.³ The gods become living and personal, and by their protection secure for the individual peace and morality. For the power of the fantasy to influence the mind through suggestion is entirely real.

The great world-religions have for Jung no historical basis. Christ and Mithra are one, figures of the divine hero,

¹ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 15.

² 'The myth is a fragment of the infantile soul-life of the people' and 'Thus the myth is a *sustained, still remaining* fragment from the infantile soul-life of the people, and the dream is the myth of the individual' (quoted by Jung, *loc. cit.*, from Abraham, *Dreams and Myths*). The subject has been especially studied by O. Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, and Riklin, *Wish Fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales*.

³ The well-attested accounts of 'the angels of Mons' are an admirable example of this process from the war-records of 1914. An exact parallel is to be found in the classical legends of the Great Twin Brethren, which undoubtedly reflect real experiences. Cf. Macaulay's *Battle of the Lake Regillus*, stanzas 32 ff., an excellent piece of psychology.

who is nothing more than the father-god rejuvenated. All alike are sun-gods, and Jung points, effectively enough, to the many traces of sun-worship in Christianity.¹ Of the historical Jesus, he declares, we know nothing.² Christianity arose, with its splendid moral idealism, simply because the libido, uncontrolled in a world where philosophy was undermining belief in the gods, was resulting not only in degeneracy but in destructive chaos. Civilized man of to-day no longer needs the Christ, by whose aid he stood firm amid 'the whirlwinds of the unchained libido which roared through the ancient Rome of the Caesars.' Instead, says Jung, cynically enough, 'he has become merely neurotic.'³

But Jung goes further back than Freud in seeking the origin of these divine figures. He traces them back not to the infantile situation in the family, but what he calls the 'historical collective psyche' or the racial unconscious. His account of this most difficult conception must be given in his own words :

The collective unconscious is the sediment of all the experience of the universe of all time, and is also an image of the universe that has been in process of formation for untold ages. In the course of time certain features have become prominent in this image, the so-called *dominants*. These dominants are the ruling powers, the gods ; that is, the representations resulting from dominating laws and principles, from average regularities in the issue of the images that the brain has received as a consequence of secular processes.⁴

Here we have a theory of a racially-acquired and inherited mode of response to the world of experience. It is neither thought nor feeling in the developed sense, but a pre-logical

¹ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 61 f.

² *Op. cit.* p. 142 : ' . . . the historical and philosophical weakness of the Christian dogmatism and the religious emptiness of an historical Jesus, of whose person we know nothing, and whose religious value is partly Talmudic, partly Hellenic wisdom.'

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 42 f.

⁴ *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 431 f.

condition of mentality, an unconscious and basic imagery, which can only take form when it is transferred by projection to suitable physical or personal experiences. Thus these dominants take shape as gods or demons, powers protective or destroying. But their compulsive power, which is for Jung the basis of all religious sanctions, is from within and not from without. It is none other than the life-impulse of the libido, now viewed not as sexual but as something more primitive and vital still, striving creatively, as it has ever striven throughout the history of the race, to make itself a place and a security of achievement in a transient and a hostile world.

This appearance in history of this religious fantasy is, so Jung declares, inevitable. We may quote a famous passage :

Every man has eyes and all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, cold, and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence of such from empirical necessity. On the contrary, there was need of a phantastic, indestructible optimism, and one far removed from all sense of reality, in order, for example, to discover in the shameful death of Christ really the highest salvation and the redemption of the world. Thus one can indeed withhold from a child the substance of earlier myths but not take from him the need for mythology. One can say, that should it happen that all traditions in the world were cut off with a single blow, then with the succeeding generation, the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again. Only a few individuals succeed in throwing off mythology in a time of a certain intellectual supremacy—the mass never frees itself. Explanations are of no avail ; they merely destroy a transitory form of manifestation, but not the creating impulse.¹

As to the future which lies before religion, and the goal towards which mankind should strive Jung is in agreement with Freud. The unconscious resolution of the conflict

¹ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 15 f. Cf. Tansley, *The New Psychology*, p. 139.

'into religious exercises' is not the only possible way. Our positive creeds only serve to keep us infantile and therefore ethically inferior. 'Although of the greatest significance from the cultural point of view, and of imperishable beauty from the aesthetic standpoint, this delusion can no longer ethically suffice humanity striving after moral autonomy.' Religion, with its symbolism, is perhaps the greatest of all human achievements. It has no actual truth, but psychologically it is the basis of all that man has accomplished. And, psychologically, man must go further still.

It is thinkable that instead of doing good to our fellow-men for 'the love of Christ,' we do it from the knowledge that humanity, even as ourselves, could not exist, if among the herd, the one could not sacrifice himself for the other. This would be the course of moral autonomy, of perfect freedom, when man could without compulsion wish that which he must do, and this from knowledge, without delusion through belief in religious symbols.¹

And so religion is to end in an ethic, an ethic forced upon man by necessity and not by love. Jung's theory provides a broader basis than that of Freud in his conceptions of the creative energy of the libido and of the racial character of the unconscious. But the end is the same. The impetus of man's life has its inevitable limit. The structures which it erects may secure it a place in time, but have no foothold in eternity. The analogy with the vital impulse of Bergson's philosophy is obvious enough,² but there is no trace here of Bergson's strange, almost prophetic, vision of death itself going down before the onward sweep of human life.³ As for Huxley so for Freud and Jung man stands, courageous

¹ This quotation and those in the preceding paragraph are from *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 144.

² So Jung himself, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 231 and *passim*. See also Dr. B. M. Hinkle in her Introduction to Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. xvii ff.

³ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 286.

enough at his best, but a pathetically futile figure when all is said. 'From nothing comes nothing, they told us'—*unde haec nihili in nihila tam portentosa transnihilatio?*¹

Another form of the psychological attack is to be found in the rather numerous body of writers who, from various points of view, regard religion as purely a social phenomenon. Fortunately Professor Webb² has made it unnecessary for us to deal in detail with the theories of Durkheim and Lévy Bruhl, and we may content ourselves with pointing out that their argument, so far as it is not merely destructive, but claims to explain the genesis of religious belief and practice, demands as its basis the psychological mechanisms described by Freud and Jung. In answering the one theory we shall in effect answer the other. And with these writers we may class those who identify religion with morality, finding the key to this identification in the social consciousness. Ames,³ for example, defines religion as 'the consciousness of the highest social values' and declares that we must dispense with the 'rigid distinction between the natural and the supernatural, between the human and the divine.' Apart from such dualism 'the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely.' Similarly Patten 'identifies religion, not with morality, but with the social reaction against degeneration and vice.'⁴ Surely this is distinction without difference, and in any case these writers fail to explain the process by which the figure of the deity is separated from the society for which he becomes significant. They bring us to the point from which, as we saw, Jung starts his analysis, and no further.

Durkheim makes the transition boldly enough. 'The

¹ I owe to Archbishop Temple (*The Nature of Personality*) this reference to Coleridge's comment upon Schelling's Absolute.

² *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*.

³ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. vii, 168 f.

⁴ From the opening sentence of *The Social Basis of Religion*.

reality which religious thought expresses is society.' ¹ 'It is unquestionable that a society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers.' ² And again, rather more tentatively: 'at bottom the concept of totality, that of society and that of divinity, are very probably only different aspects of the same notion.' ³

This is, of course, the direct corollary of Durkheim's well-known definition of religion as consisting in 'obligatory beliefs connected with definite practices relating to objects given in these beliefs.' ⁴ As he identifies all obligation with social obligation there is nothing more to be said, except to refuse the definition. And history provides an admirable precedent for our refusal. The attempt to erect an Imperial cultus of 'Roma et Augustus' was the greatest experiment on these lines that has ever been tried. And a whole world of loyal Roman citizens, pagan and Christian alike, rejected it with a decision which should have been final. Whether it were Christ or Mithras, men demanded a god who could be worshipped, and not the empty and unreal personification of a system. Apart from some such theory as that of Freud we cannot make the transition from society even to a god who merely confirms the social sanctions. And when the principle of projection is brought into play at once we reach the figure of a god who is more than society, even as the individual is more than the group of which he forms a part and within which his ideals are shaped. Here Freud carries us further in the direction of Christian theism than these barren sociological speculations. His god, if he *were* real, would at least be personal.

¹ Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 431.

² *Op. cit.* p. 206.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 442 note.

⁴ Quoted and fully criticized in relation to other definitions given by Durkheim in Webb's *Group Theories*, pp. 46 ff. See especially the note on p. 60.

We may notice in passing a close parallel between one aspect of this sociological theory and Jung's psychology. Lévy Bruhl¹ has developed a theory that the genesis of religion took place in a phase of human development which preceded logical and scientific thinking, and other writers of this school² have maintained the same view. He speaks of the group as compelling its members to believe and act in certain ways, which had no rational basis but were simply the tribal reactions to what Cornford has called nature and destiny.³ Custom was powerful long before it could possibly be understood, and thus arose what Lévy Bruhl terms 'collective representations.'⁴ It was in this phase of thought that the figures of gods, demons, and the like took shape, and therefore, these writers conclude, religion in all its forms is a sheer anachronism. The conclusion is illogical enough, but we should not on that account refuse to recognize the large element of truth in theories of this kind. It is probable that the facts to which Jung points in his evidence for a racial unconsciousness find their explanation in the processes which Lévy Bruhl has described. We may question whether they can possibly be regarded as inherited modes of symbolic thinking. It is more probable that they are developed anew in the life of each child as it takes its place in the family and then in society, each of them at once the product of Jung's 'absolute dominants' and their cause. And it is obviously true enough that many of the concepts even of Christianity are of social origin, and that Christianity, with all the higher religions, has rested again and again

¹ *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures.*

² Hubert and Mauss, *Esquisse d'une Théorie Générale de la Magie* (*L'Année Sociologique*, vol. vii.). Cf. the rather similar position taken up by Miss Jane Harrison in the Introduction to *Themis*. I owe the reference to Prof. Webb.

³ Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy* takes these two conceptions as the basic principle of Greek religion, and traces its development on lines very like those expounded by Lévy Bruhl.

⁴ For a criticism of this view cf. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 74 ff.

upon social sanctions. In fact the very existence of the Church, and the acceptance of its necessary function in maintaining and developing the religious life of its members, is a witness to the fundamental truth of Durkheim's position up to a point. After all society is real, and the fellowship of mankind may not be ignored in any right religious development. But the writers of this school fail utterly to do justice to the significance of the individual and therewith of his relationship to a God who can and does respond in a directness of intimacy which is the supreme goal of Christian worship. And this is a value which may not be surrendered.¹

We may now attempt the task of seeing what parts of this attack are really relevant to Christianity, and at the outset we must guard against the mistake, made so often by enthusiastic but short-sighted apologists, of rejecting new knowledge because its advocates have arrived at wrong conclusions in matters outside their proper sphere. Our full answer will emerge in later lectures, as we develop certain suggestions, drawn from psychology, in the direction of a constructive approach to Christian theism. At this point a few comments must suffice.

(1) Christianity holds no brief whatever for false gods. The modern vague idea, which has even infected a good deal of our missionary work, that there is much truth in all religions and that our task is to bring out and strengthen this indigenous approach to God rather than to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ, is no part of the authentic Christian tradition. 'For all the gods of the peoples are idols: but the Lord made the heavens.'² 'Though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth; as there are gods many and lords many; yet to us there is one God, the Father of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him.'³ There can be no doubt whatever that

¹ So Webb, *op. cit.* pp. 171-173.

² Ps. xcvi. 5.

³ 1 Cor. viii. 5, 6.

Freud and Jung are perfectly right in principle, if not always in detail, when they show how pantheons have arisen to give expression and satisfaction to man's emotions, needs, and desires. Nothing can save the gods of Olympus, with all their beauty, from the charge that they are mere projections, having no more reality than the primitive and universal human emotions from which they sprang. But no Christian wishes to save the gods of Olympus, or any of the gods of the nations. 'There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions.'¹ At the very outset of his faith the Christian disclaims a god who is in any sense a reflection of himself, fashioned in the image of man. Herein is the essential truth of the doctrine of the Divine impassibility.

Further, we are ready and very willing to recognize that Christians have from time to time held the most varied conceptions of the God whom they worship, and that these conceptions are fully open to psychological criticism. We have no more desire to defend paganism within than to make terms with paganism without. Here too we accept gladly all the help that psychology can give in showing how we have confused the truth of God by making Him the bearer of our emotions and by clothing Him with our passions.

(2) There is danger for Christianity in all definitions of religion which lay specific emphasis upon man's sense of need. This approach to the subject has had considerable popularity, largely through the influence of Ritschl, who saw in religion the solution of the conflict in which man finds himself involved as a member both of the realm of nature and of the realm of grace. The plea for religion that it is 'a very present help in time of trouble' is constantly put forward, but it is a dangerous plea indeed in face of the power of the human mind to fashion and to believe in the reality of its own compensatory fantasies. As we have seen,

¹ XXXIX Articles, Art. I.

this is actually the basis of Freud's whole theory, and we go far to rob that theory of its power when we point out that Christianity, whatever may be true of other religions, did not take its rise in the discovery of a Saviour, but in the discovery of a Friend.¹ The psychological theory of the sentiments which teaches that man's personality is shaped into a unity through personal relationships is the essential teaching of Christianity too, though Christianity goes further and sees in a special historical manifestation of friendship a revelation of the central mystery of the Universe, the truth that God is Love. But the sentiments rest not upon fantasy but upon fact. The whole theory breaks down unless their object is real. And, as we have pointed out before, Freud himself can be called in evidence for the reality and the cardinal importance of the 'love-life.'

(3) The same criticism applies to any attempt to reduce Christianity to a system of ethical teaching. This has been characteristic of a certain type of liberal Protestantism, and religious thought is now, rightly, in strong reaction against it. It has been found impossible to isolate any part of the ethical teaching of Jesus which accounts for His hold over His disciples and over the world.² Much of it can be illustrated from contemporary Judaism, and it is only in the light of His Person that it takes a new significance. An

¹ Incidentally this is also the answer to those who have sought to derive all that is essential in Christianity from Greek conceptions of a 'saviour-god.'

² The one feature in His teaching which cannot easily be paralleled is His insistence upon forgiveness, as has been pointed out by Reitzenstein (e.g. *Poimandres*, p. 180, and Rawlinson's comments, *New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, pp. 152 ff.). But this is not, strictly speaking, a matter of ethics at all, although ethical considerations enter in. Forgiveness, as Jesus taught and practised it, is in the higher sphere of personal relationships, and has in fact created problems for ethics which remain unsolved to the present day. The distinction becomes clear when it is realized that no law of forgiveness can be stated which does not result in immediate contradiction. The position taken up by R. C. Moberly (*Atone-ment and Personality*, chap. iii.) may be unsatisfactory, but he at least makes this essential antinomy abundantly clear.

ethical teaching by itself merely invites the test of an empirical trial. And Christianity is no system of Pragmatism or Behaviourism. Even Jung can advocate an ethic of self-sacrifice, but he can give no reason for it save that any other ethic might be self-destructive, and that is a matter of opinion. But to pass directly from an ethical teaching to belief in God is impossible except by the philosophical route of the ontological assumption, or by the psychological route of projection and fantasy. The one method assumes faith to be already there. The other makes its object a mere shadow cast upon a cloud.

(4) It is perhaps worth while to point out the danger of finding a special sphere for the Divine activity in the subconscious levels of the mind. This idea is mainly due to William James, with his account of conversion as due to repressed conflict, breaking out in sudden solution.¹ The subconscious has become a sort of psychological dust-bin, a tempting repository for problems which resist analysis on more obvious lines. Even Dr. Sanday was drawn into a tentative acceptance of this apparently attractive theory,² trying to reach by its aid a solution of some of the difficult problems of Christology. The step is, however, a fatal one. The unconscious mind is beyond question the sphere of the mechanisms described by Freud and Jung. It is tenanted by the gods and demons of fantasy, and it has a curious, quasi-religious, authority derived simply from the ego itself. But this is not the ego of full and free personal relationships, of love that is aware of itself as love. It is at our highest,

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 189 ff.

² *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, pp. 155 ff. 'The deposits left by vital experience do not lie together passively side by side, like so many dead bales of cotton or wool, but there is a constant play as it were of electricity passing and repassing between them. In this way are formed all the deeper and more permanent constituents of character and motive. And it is in these same subterranean regions, and by the same vitally reciprocating action, that whatever there is of the divine in the soul of man passes into the roots of his being' (p. 157).

most self-conscious, and most self-controlled, that our lives come most fully within the power of God, that

Our wills are ours, to make them thine.¹

(5) The main weakness of the psychological account of religion lies in its failure to take account of reality. Jung completely ignores the fact that the Jesus of Christianity is a figure of history, and that fantasy certainly did not create the Gospel-narratives. Freud, it is true, speaks of a reality-principle, whereby life is forced to make terms with circumstance. But he does not carry this conception far enough. This mechanism of projection of which he speaks is no fantasy, but a perfectly real process within the reality of the ego itself. And if it is able to create fantasies which have the appearance of otherness, of external self-existence, it is only because the other and the self-existent is already there. It is essential to the whole theory of projection that the transferred and dissociated affects are attached to some perfectly real object, which is significant for the ego in some way. We do not cast our shadow-gods out upon a void. The ego never creates entities. There is always an objective basis upon which the fantasy rests. And the very material of the fantasy is drawn from real experience. Our dream figures, however super-imposed and distorted, are always built up out of memory-traces, and these traces, whatever precisely they may be, always depend upon real events in our life-history. So too the symbolic structures of mythology are linked both with the real history and with the real psychological needs of some tribe, nation, or cult. Thus the popular idea that the gods are reduced to nothingness by this theory of projection is a sheer misunderstanding, and one of which no sensible psychologist would be guilty. For Freud and Jung the gods have all the reality and significance of the ego itself, or of the social group.

¹ Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, *init.*

But what if we can say one thing more? What if these projections, these fantasies, which for our peace we cast upon the outer world and worship there, find in that reality upon which they are cast a fulfilment greater than our dreaming, greater than all the collective dreaming of the social group, which is more than any individual dream? What if the God of our worship bestows upon us not peace, not the solution of our conflict, but growth and a warfare ever-renewed in our growing? The stream may not rise above its source, and upon the theories of Freud and even of Jung the slow but real progress of human ideals is a thing hard to explain. Here is no merely mechanical process. May it not be that the explanation is love? Is there any way in which we can make sense of psychological mechanisms and of historical facts together, unless that Reality, that Other, towards which our lives are turned, is not only greater than our fantasies, but more real, more personal, than the ego from which those fantasies are cast forth, unless, in a word, there is a God?

LECTURE III

FAITH AND WORSHIP

SYNOPSIS

THE reply to the psychological attack upon religion is to be found not in the theistic arguments—though it should be noted that such validity as these possess remains completely unaffected—but in a constructive approach to religion as it is developed and expressed in human life.

By common agreement the basic principle is faith, developing in relation to love. The dual aspect of faith, according as its emotional or its cognitive aspect is stressed, only appears in its later phases, and is only a difficulty if Creeds are regarded as the starting-point of the religious life.

The essential character of faith is personal relationship with its object. This is implicit even in its earliest forms. Thus its natural expression is to be seen in Prayer and Worship.

The psychological criticism that these are merely forms of suggestion is readily met by a consideration of the nature of suggestion, which is seen to be a principle of the same character as faith, and, like faith, dependent upon the reality and significance of its object. While it is doubtless true that this principle is fundamental to the development of the ego, it finds its full expression in the organized sentiments. This is exactly parallel to the organization of faith through love. Thus there is no conflict here between the psychological and the religious account of human development.

LECTURE III

FAITH AND WORSHIP

Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three ; and the greatest of these is love.—1 Cor. xiii. 13.

THE most fundamental of the problems raised by modern psychology has been stated, as fully as possible, in the last two lectures. Is the whole structure of religious belief an illusion, the God of our worship a shadow of ourselves ?

Thou art a man ; God is no more.
Thine own humanity learn to adore.¹

What if not only Blake's mysticism, but all that religion has ever meant to simple folk, can really be cramped within the narrow limits of those two strange lines ?

Certain general considerations which may help us towards an answer were outlined briefly at the close of the last lecture. We must now turn to consider more fully the real nature of the problem, and the ordering of our reply.

But at this point our opponent may well interrupt us. Psychology has much more to say, and things that loom even larger in those mists where men grope for the truth. Is not faith now seen to be only a form of auto-suggestion, whereby we attain not reality but mere conviction ? Are not prayer and corporate worship simply the means whereby the illusion is fixed ever more firmly in men's minds ? Do they mean more than that we whisper encouragingly in our own ear, or shout together in the four-part harmony of ecclesiastical tradition, until the last vestiges of doubt are swallowed up

¹ Blake, *The Everlasting Gospel*.

in the reverberations of our mutual reassurance ? Or, again, if we speak of the wonder of conversion and of the new life and strength which comes to those who have found themselves in finding God, is there anything here that cannot readily be matched in the records of modern psychotherapy ? Do not the miracles of scientific healing at once explain and surpass all that we can really believe of the narratives of the Gospels, or of the legends of the saints ? Is there not, further, fundamental confusion between sin and mental disease, which would rapidly be cleared up if it were not for the obscurantism of the Church ? And, finally, is not the long search for an adequate theory of that authority which men undoubtedly find in their varied conceptions of religion and of the Church, in itself a proof that its real basis is within man himself, that it is in fact but one more manifestation of that *élan vital*, that libido, which is the driving force of all human endeavour, and that its apparent association with a form of Church government, or with a book, is only another example of the principle of projection ?

It is small wonder that many among us are confused. The doubts are so many, the difficulties real enough, and the explanation offered seems at first sight so simple and complete. It is only upon a closer scrutiny that we find that the explanation does not explain, and that all the difficulties remain, transformed in nothing save the language in which they are described. And further, behind all the new psychological terminology, a structure as yet more imposing in its technicalities than in its accuracy of reference, the problem of the nature of Reality is still untouched, and, to say the least, is no nearer a solution for being shelved. Yet this is, after all, the fundamental question. Compared with this challenge to the reality of God, the other questions that we have asked are secondary and unimportant. If we can build up an adequate answer upon this main point we shall find ourselves taking such lesser matters in our stride.

We may start our task by making two general observations. In the first place nothing in the whole range of psychological criticism makes any difference whatever to the classical theistic arguments, as stated, for example, by Kant. So far as pure reason is concerned the situation remains unchanged. Philosophers have been, and are, divided as to the ultimate validity of these arguments, and it is doubtless true that the final step of the ontological argument is rather assumption than proof. But psychology has nothing to say in the matter upon the one side or the other. The arguments would still hold, for whatever they may be worth, even if the experience upon which they are based were riddled with illusion. For the experience of an illusion is just as real as any other kind of experience, and forms just as valid a basis for the fundamental ontological assumption that there is a Reality towards which reason strives, whether it may attain or not.

This consideration is of real importance, but it is outside our main purpose to discuss it in these lectures. We have to bear in mind, too, that the defence of religion by logical argument has proved singularly unconvincing. And that is as it should be, for to demonstrate the existence of God would be to reduce Him to the status of an inference. But it is not in an inference that 'we live, and move, and have our being.' God is nearer to us than that.

In the second place it should in fairness be noted that psychology gives no account at all of the nature of reality. Theology at least makes the attempt, and although its language is inevitably symbolic¹ when it endeavours to

¹ I should like to enter a protest against the use of the term 'mythological' which seems to be coming more and more into use in modern theological literature in the sense in which I have used the term 'symbolic.' The usage goes back to Plato's employment of the 'myth' to express some truth which lies beyond the reach of ordinary logical analysis and statement, and has been popularized by the recent German scholars of the *Formgeschichte* school, starting from the publication of Dibelius' *The Form-History of the Gospel* (see especially p. 85), followed by

define what it means when it speaks of God, the attempt is worth making. Even if the symbolism proves inadequate, the Reality remains. Psychology may even help us to understand and so to revise our symbols. But God remains ever greater than the garment of words which we weave about Him.

But when this has been said it still remains worth while to consider the psychological account of religion in detail and to enquire whether the conflict between psychological and religious conceptions is as great as we are sometimes asked to suppose. For this purpose it is obviously useless to start from such formulae as the Creeds. Creeds are the last and not the first words of religion. We must turn rather to the elementary facts of the religious life and submit these to psychological analysis. It is clear enough that such an analysis is possible, since religion, like all other aspects of life, has its emotions and its specific types of behaviour. What we may hope to find is that the mechanisms and processes of religion, and, indeed of all life, are not to be explained from within, but that they look always to an end beyond themselves. Our task is, in fact, to give a constructive account of religion, and to see whether we can, in so doing, dispense with the hypothesis of a God.

By common consent the basic principle of religion is faith and upon no term in the theological vocabulary has

Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*. For an account of this literature see Easton, *The Gospel before the Gospels*. Such English writers as Dr. Rawlinson have used this hypothesis in a conservative form, and in their occasional use of the term 'mythological' they stress the truth which the 'myth' expresses, rather than its unhistorical character (e.g. *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, pp. ix, 32. For the Platonic background of the usage cf. Webb, *God and Personality*, pp. 167 ff. Dr. Rawlinson sets in the forefront of his *New Testament Doctrine of the Christ* quotations from P. E. More and G. K. Chesterton which use the term in this broad sense). I cannot help believing that the popular meaning of the term is too strongly entrenched to allow of this usage, and that it will give rise to endless misconception.

there been such persistent and widespread misunderstanding.¹ It is at once the beginning of the Christian life, and its final and most difficult achievement. It is the simple and direct act of the human soul, whereby the child may come to Jesus, for of such is the Kingdom of God. It is one of the three supreme 'theological virtues,' infused by God Himself, fed by knowledge, and formed by love. Even those whose lives may truly be called Christian commonly think of faith as the means whereby they are enabled to retain a sure hold upon truths which, as they imagine, lie beyond reason,² and it is hardly a step from this to the famous 'credo quia impossibile'³ of the early Church, or to the almost equally famous schoolboy howler, fabricated, doubtless, by some nineteenth-century cynic: 'Faith is that power whereby I steadfastly believe what I know to be untrue.'⁴

Let us examine this paradox a little more closely. The writer to the Hebrews speaks of faith in God as part of the foundation laid at the very outset of the 'preaching of Christ.'⁵ It even precedes that preaching, for it underlies hope⁶ in those who did not receive the promise.⁷ And this is entirely in accordance with the usage of the Synoptic narratives. Those who came to Jesus for healing in Galilee

¹ C. H. Dodd, *The Meaning of Paul for To-day*, p. 107: 'In the theological constructions which have been based upon Paul the term "faith" has suffered such twistings and turnings that it has almost lost definition of meaning. Indeed, even in Paul's own use of the word there is very great complexity.'

² This was the practical value of the distinction between natural and revealed religion, characteristic of the eighteenth century (e.g. in Butler's *Analogy*) and going back to Lord Herbert of Cherbury. It is a convenient distinction for simple folk, but, unfortunately, leaves religion helpless against rationalistic criticism.

³ Tertullian, *De carne Christi*, 5: 'Crucifixus est dei filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile est.'

⁴ The early history of this saying is not known to me. It is quoted by James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 29, and appears to represent with accuracy Jung's idea of Christian belief: cf. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 15.

⁵ Heb. vi. 1.

⁶ Heb. xi. 1.

⁷ Heb. xi. 39.

were certainly not instructed Christians. Many of them, we may suppose, never became Christians. Yet by faith they were made whole. In the Fourth Gospel we have a careful and considered analysis of the stages of belief, starting from the interest and attention resulting from the preaching of the Baptist and from the signs wrought by Jesus Himself, and finding its climax in an assurance and certainty in which the effort to understand has been superseded by a trust and love which lies beyond knowledge. 'Let us also go, that we may die with Him'¹ is the climax of personal faith. Where this has been achieved, conviction follows. It is St. Thomas who at the last proclaims the first and the final creed of Christianity, 'My Lord and my God.'² But already, even within the pages of the Gospel the supreme triumph of love and trust is beginning to be stated more and more in terms of knowledge: 'These things are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life in His Name.'³

This movement of thought is carried much further in the first Johannine Epistle and is perhaps one of the most substantial pieces of evidence that it is by another hand than that which wrote the Gospel. Here faith is primarily 'faith in the Name.' It is true that the love of God is stressed, but the end of the whole matter is an assurance which is less trust in God than a certainty that a series of propositions are true.⁴ The age-long confusion of faith and knowledge has already begun, despite the warning of St. James that 'the devils also believe, and tremble.'⁵

The position is put clearly enough by the great

¹ Jn. xi. 16.

² Jn. xx. 28.

³ Jn. xx. 31.

⁴ The repeated emphasis upon knowledge as the result of either faith or love is perhaps the most characteristic mark of the Epistle: 1 Jn. ii. 5, 20, 27-29; iii. 2-5, 14, 19, 24; iv. 2, 7, 8, 13; v. 2, 13-20. There is nothing in the Gospel so self-conscious as this. Both writers bear witness to faith and love upon the highest Christian level, but faith in the Epistle is beginning to feel its own pulse.

⁵ Jas. ii. 19.

theologians. 'When the mind,' says Augustine, 'hath been imbued with the beginning of faith, which worketh by love, it goes on by living well to arrive at sight also, wherein is unspeakable beauty known to high and holy hearts, the full vision of which is the highest happiness.'¹ This is entirely in the tradition of the Gospels, and states with precision the fundamental character of those beginnings of the religious life which, as Augustine himself points out, precede understanding, and are therefore prior to all theology. But love must sometimes give account of itself, and in the effort, often an unwelcome effort enough, theology is born. It is not the first but the second phase of faith when we declare that 'he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him.'² Or, as Augustine puts it, 'No man can love that which he doth not believe to exist. Then if he believe and love, by doing well he bringeth it about that he may have hope also.'³

This close connection between faith and love persists throughout their development in the Christian life, and at every point underlies their creedal aspect. Anselm's famous *credo ut intelligam*⁴ is an astonishingly obscure remark, but at least it implies the futility of all attempts to understand that do not rest upon a faith that lies deeper than understanding. And the whole argument of his *Cur Deus Homo* is explicitly stated to be a rational exposition of a faith firmly held on grounds other than reason.⁵ It is only

¹ *Encheiridion*, c. 5.

² Heb. xi. 6.

³ *De doct. Christ.* c. 37.

⁴ *Proslogion*, c. 1. The whole section is of great interest, and is entirely in line with the main thesis of these lectures. See Webb's illuminating note upon it in *The Devotions of Saint Anselm*: 'The permanent nature of the mind is a trinity of self-consciousness (or, as St. Anselm says, *memory*), *understanding*, and *love*; for love is the intensest form of the interest which continues without rejecting to contemplate any object. And therein he sees in the human mind an image of the Divine.'

⁵ 'Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem accedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur, et ut sint, quantum possunt, parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti se rationem de ea quae in nobis est spe' (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 1).

rendered necessary by the misunderstanding of unbelievers,¹ and in any case reason can only go part of the way. 'At the last,' Anselm says, 'we must recognise that whatever man may say or know upon such a topic, yet deeper reasons lie hidden.'²

Aquinas, in his discussion of the 'theological virtues' has given classical accuracy to the distinction between the simple faith in which religion begins and the finished faith of the Christian, which includes knowledge. The link between them is not knowledge but love, in which *fides informis* becomes *fides formata*. 'In the order of perfection,' he says, 'love precedes faith and hope, since both faith and hope are formed by love, and attain perfection as virtues.'³ And so he draws his conclusion: 'Although in the order of perfection love, which is the form and root of all the virtues, precedes hope and faith, yet in the order of their generation faith precedes hope, and hope precedes love.'⁴

We need not spend much time over the disastrous lowering of the conception of faith in the writings of the great Reformers.⁵ Melancthon simply defines it as 'a constant assent to every word of God,'⁶ and again as 'trust in the divine mercy promised by Christ.'⁷ It had meant much more than that to Luther, for whom Christ was far more than creeds or promises. 'To believe in Christ is to put Him on, to become one with Him.'⁸ 'Faith unites the Soul to Christ as the wife to the husband.'⁹ Here we have the authentic note of Christian experience, and the language in which it is expressed is, as we shall see, of profound psychological import. But for the later Protestant theologians faith is almost entirely restricted to an assurance of

¹ *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 1; cf. i. 3 and ii. 22.

² *Op. cit.* i. 2.

³ *Summa Theol.* ii. Q. 62, Art. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Conclusio*.

⁵ See V. J. K. Brook's essay in *The Atonement in History and Life*.

⁶ *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxi. p. 162.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 163.

⁸ *Comm. in Gal.* iv. 5.

⁹ *Christian Liberty* (in Wace and Buchheim, *Primary Treatises*), p. 111.

salvation coupled with conviction of the truth of God's word. Love seems to be forgotten, at least in its full and personal significance. 'Human faith,' says the Second Helvetic Confession, 'is not an opinion or a human persuasion, but a most firm assurance and an evident and constant assent of the soul, and, finally, a most right comprehension of God's truth.'¹ And again the Heidelberg Catechism declares that faith 'is not only a certain knowledge whereby I hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in His word, but also a heartfelt confidence, which the Holy Ghost works by the Gospel within me, that not only to others but to me also, remission of sins, everlasting righteousness, and blessedness, are freely given by God, of pure grace, only for the sake of Christ's merits.'² In itself such language as this is not untrue, but it lacks the living simplicity of the faith of Aquinas and Luther. It stresses the effects of faith at the cost of losing that directness of personal trust in God which is far more than trust in any written record. And so it opened the door to a Fundamentalism, a confidence in words, as strange to the tradition of the Church as it is remote from the simple love and trust of the first disciples.

Faith then is linked with both love and knowledge, but love is the key to its development. And this explains an important emphasis which we find again both in Aquinas and in Luther. The power of love is less a power within us than a power upon us. 'The theological virtues,' says Aquinas, 'are wholly from without.'³ Even of ordinary human love this is true. The response within us is evoked, transformed, and raised to utterly unexpected levels by the object of our love. Much more is this true of the love of God. And thus the faith in which love finds its perfect work is of God too. 'True faith,' declares Luther, 'is a

¹ *Conf. Helv.* c. 16.

² *Heidelberg Catechism*, Q. 21.

³ *Summa Theol.* ii. Q. 63, Art. 1.

work of God in us whereby we are reborn and renewed from God.' ¹

It is by this time clear that the theological account of faith and the psychological doctrine of the sentiments are very closely related. The main distinction is that for the theologian faith is always in the last resort faith in God, while the psychologist is less concerned with the object towards which a sentiment is directed than with the inner structure and development of the sentiment itself. Once grant the existence of a God and there will be little if any divergence between the two accounts. The most striking parallel that I have found is in a writer perhaps never before cited as a serious theologian, Alexander Cruden, more than a little mad, and maker of a Concordance through which he did yeoman service to his own and to all subsequent generations. 'Faith,' says he, in his note upon that word, 'has a prevailing influence upon the will, it draws the affections, and renders the whole man obsequious to the Gospel.' ² William James and Shand together could hardly have put it better. Perhaps only one who had been through the struggle not only for peace but for sanity itself could have seen the essential mechanism of faith so clearly, and phrased it with such telling brevity.

The specific character of faith is thus seen clearly enough to lie in the field of personal relationships. This underlies the whole of its later development in the Christian life. Nobody who considers the matter at all really believes that the climax of faith consists in an assent to any series of theological propositions, or to the contents of the Creeds, whether these are regarded as statements of historical fact or as ontological interpretations of such fact. For the purpose of meeting psychological criticism it is important to notice

¹ Introduction to Romans. I owe this, and one or two of the preceding references, to Brook's essay.

² *Concordance, sub voce.*

that this characteristic of faith is implicit even in its earliest forms. We cannot, for example, accept the account of its first beginnings in childhood given by so sympathetic a student of religion as J. B. Pratt. Discussing those who 'believe in God because when children they were taught to believe, and have continued doing so ever since,' he goes on to say: 'Their first belief in God as children—and that is true of all of us—was a simple case of primitive credulity, the original tendency of the mind to accept whatever is presented to it.'¹ There is an important truth here, and one which is as relevant to the psychological theory of suggestion as to the study of faith. 'Primitive credulity' undoubtedly exists, and is indeed a factor in belief which continues to operate throughout our lives, nor should the use of the word 'credulity' mislead us into thinking that it implies anything necessarily discreditable to faith or any unreality in its object. It is simply a way of describing the typical beginnings of knowledge, before selective attention and criticism have built them into the structure of individual life. But this is not the beginning. Behind even the most primitive forms of knowledge there lies what can be most simply called the ego-object relation, its duality still implicit. The child does not start out into life with an assured individuality, from which it sets out to conquer an outer world. It starts rather from an unresolved confusion² within which the ego and the other are at first undifferentiated, and out of which they are developed into the comparatively sharp distinctions of adult life.³ The child accepts what the

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 210. See also his full discussion of primitive credulity in his earlier *Psychology of Religious Belief*. The analysis in Bain, *The Emotions and the Will* (see esp. p. 511), underlies all subsequent treatment of the subject.

² James, *Principles of Psychology*, ii. pp. 8, 34 f.

³ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chaps. i., ii.; Royce, 'The External World and the Social Consciousness,' in *Phil. Rev.* iii. pp. 513-545. I owe these references to J. B. Pratt. *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 93 ff. Pratt himself says that 'the child's consciousness of himself

mother says, not as some new and external addition to the structure of its personality, but rather as something existent within that relationship to the mother which is prior, unanalysed, and unquestioned. It is not even, in James's phrase, 'faith in some one else's faith.'¹ That is a much later and a much more complex development. It would be more nearly true to call it simply 'faith in some one else,' if even that phrase did not imply a consciousness of faith and of the Other, which goes beyond the direct and unresolved unity of the relationship. This is not as yet love, or knowledge, or faith, but it is the basis of all three.

The baby new to earth and sky,
 What time his tender palm is prest
 Against the circle of the breast,
 Has never thought that 'this is I.'

But as he grows he gathers much
 And learns the use of 'I,' and 'me,'
 And finds 'I am not what I see,
 And other than the things I touch.'

So rounds he to a separate mind
 From whence clear memory may begin,
 As through the frame that binds him in
 His isolation grows defined.²

We note, further, that this essential basis of faith does not lose its character as life develops. It gains, however, enormously in complexity and wealth. The ego-other relationship is no longer limited to an environment of one or two persons. The whole range of the brotherhood of man opens up, with strange hints of possibilities even beyond that. The ego itself becomes more definite and

and his consciousness of other people as selves grow up together out of a social milieu' (*ibid.*), but even here he does seem quite sufficiently to emphasize the essential unity of that milieu as inherently personal from the first.

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 9.

² Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, xlv.

more individual in response to the ever-growing range of personal relationships about it. It does not create these relationships, though it can profoundly modify their development. Its own increasingly rich emotional life is built up into sentiments of more and more stability with love at once as its motive power and its richest achievement. Faith becomes aware of itself as an active principle of personal trust, and is more and more linked with knowledge as it takes into account the facts of experience, including that material world about us which seems to have such solid and substantial existence in its own right, and yet which only holds our attention at all in so far as it relates itself significantly to the ends and purposes of our corporate personal life.

This last point is worth a moment's consideration. The belief that a knowledge of things is in some way prior to the knowledge of persons is sheer delusion. In the analysis of life we cannot start from the solid world about us, for both its solidity and its apparent self-existence are mere interpretations of our experience. And the experience from which we set out to interpret the world is not simply our own.¹ It is and was from the very first a corporate existence, in which we are intimately interrelated with others like ourselves. The contact of spirit with matter constitutes a problem of apparently insuperable difficulty. The contact of spirit with spirit is a primary and uncontrovertible datum. Here at least is something of which all are directly aware, even if they cannot state in clear terms exactly what they mean. Faith and love are simple and

¹ In saying this we again traverse the fundamental presuppositions of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, where it is implicitly assumed that individual rather than corporate or shared experience is the basic material of philosophy. This assumption renders the problem of reality insoluble from the outset, since there is no way of escaping from the circle of individual experience, within which the whole argument proceeds. But the assumption is not only unnecessary but misleading.

immediate facts, and, unlike our knowledge of the so-called external world, they carry with them a certainty and a security of their own.¹ Thus, to turn back once more to the beginnings of knowledge in the child, it is not for the child in some theoretical and wholly abstract condition of isolation that the material things about it have significance, but for the child in an already existent and unquestioned relationship with its mother. Its interpretation of the confused mass of sensations which assail it bewilderingly on every side is reached through a joint experience, apart from which, to all appearance, no such interpretation would ever be achieved.² So alone can we account for the familiar but ever mysterious fact that words can acquire a common meaning, as the current coin through which experiences and values come to be both wholly our own, and at the same time the means whereby we share the wide manifold of common life.³

We thus reach a truth of the very first importance, the

¹ K. Heim's *Glaubensgewissheit* is an elaborate defence of this position. See esp. pp. 17-37.

² If such a case as that of Kipling's Mowgli had ever been recorded it would be of extreme interest in this connection. But Mowgli is a creature of the romantic imagination, and has no basis in fact. Such records as exist of so-called 'wolf-children,' even if true, point wholly in another direction.

³ For the Behaviourist attempt to explain this process on mechanistic principles cf. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 338 ff., and Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 178 ff. The fullest account, and much the best, is given by Markey, *The Symbolic Process*. There is little to criticize in this book except the account of the fundamental situation (pp. 33 ff.) where the actual presence of the mother or nurse is simply assumed as part of a 'general situation containing general behaviour and objects.' How the child associates the 'verbal stimuli' either with the mother or with itself remains as obscure as ever. Markey himself says that 'the first moment that such an integration occurs in the behaviour of a child must be a startling one. This flash of co-ordination, facilitation, inhibition, summation, and integration which occurs in the behaviour mechanisms would be a novel and extraordinary experience.' It would indeed, if there were a developed and conscious ego there to be startled. The whole theory, true as it is descriptively, begs the fundamental issue completely.

truth that the meaning of the world of nature cannot be found in a direct scrutiny of the external phenomena of which, for us, it is composed. The days are past when gentlemen about to be ordained could be exhorted to diligence with their microscopes. It was within another order of things, the order of personal relationships where love leads faith on to fuller and ever more conscious faith, that the natural order first had meaning for us at all, and it is within that other, higher order that the key to reality must be sought.¹ In saying this we are not for an instant denying the reality of the world about us, as the concrete and material environment of our experience. That reality has, indeed, a quality of objectivity, of self-determination, which has made it a singularly obstinate element in psychological theory. If all were mind how comparatively simple the task of the psychologist would be! But if it is indeed true that the way to the knowledge of the real world lies through the highest intimacy of human relationships, then we can begin to understand why it is that mankind has steadfastly refused to view that world as a cold impersonal mechanism of immutable laws. Somewhere within that range of meaning to which faith is the door and love the key, there may well be that which our ordinary human relationships, even the love of father or mother, can but faintly symbolize. It is not apart from man but through man that we come to God.

Nor is there anything irrational in believing that once in history this meaning of the Universe has been uniquely revealed in a human life. No philosophy can possibly prove that this has happened. But if it has happened, if Jesus spoke rightly when He said 'I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life,' then the path of understanding lies

¹ For a development of this answer to theories of emergent evolution, as stated by Lloyd Morgan or S. Alexander, see Quick, *Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition*, and L. S. Thornton, *The Incarnate Lord*.

not through some elaborate process of theological analysis, but through faith and love. It begins, as love must begin, at home. So we pass on from love to ever wider love. The love of father or mother is the key to all human relationships. We find in that love a possibility of loving which may not stay until it reaches out to all mankind. But it is only in Christ that we come to realize how deep and rich that love may be. And in that revelation of love faith reaches out to that ultimate mystery of being which men call God. 'He that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen.'¹ 'Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.'²

The natural expression of this development of faith is obviously to be seen in prayer and worship. The essence of prayer is that it is addressed to God, not in word only, but in reality, and in the organization of its various forms, whether private or public, the one test of its reality is that it should be so addressed. 'Prayer,' says Aquinas, 'is the ascent of the mind to God.'³ That prayer has a strongly marked effect upon the character of the person who prays, and that corporate worship is often arranged with the explicit object of influencing the life and conduct of those who join therein, is wholly beside the mark. Equally irrelevant is the fact that prayer is often used as a means of seeking for comfort in times of distress, for peace of mind in time of anxiety, or as the last pitiful refuge of despair when all else has failed; or again that corporate worship, with its possibilities of high emotional tension, and of appeal at once to the senses and to the intellect,

¹ 1 John iv. 20.

² 1 John iv. 7, 8.

³ *Summa Theol.* ii. 2. Q. 83, Art. 1: 'Oratio est ascensio mentis in Deum'; cf. ii. 2. Q. 83, Art. 17: 'Oratio est ascensio intellectus in Deum.'

may become a mere luxury, where the tensions of life are relaxed in a transient ecstasy of self-indulgent piety. All is not worship that is called by that name, and a Church that seeks to organize its devotion with a view to making it more attractive and more effective has good cause to beware lest in seeking to save its life it lose its soul. There is nothing in 'the finest prayer ever addressed to a Boston audience' to distinguish it from a concert or a dramatic performance. The test whether of worship or of prayer is sincerity, and the test of sincerity is that the worshipper should forget all else save that he is speaking with his God.

This does not mean that prayer cannot be taught, or that the forms and adornments of public worship are necessarily illegitimate. The truth that it is through man that man comes to God is all-important here. The child taught to pray at its mother's knee prays first of all to his mother, for his mother is the one reality which he knows.¹ But he soon realizes that the mother is praying too, and that the unity of their praying looks to something or Somebody who gives the prayer its meaning. The knowledge of God is very dim as yet, but the prayer is real. And as the practice of prayer goes forward the range of humanity with which it is shared grows too. We cannot pray, any more than we can live, in real isolation, and no man has a stronger sense of his oneness with all mankind than the hermit who withdraws from the world that he may give himself up to prayer. But for most men this full corporate sense of prayer is not achieved without an outward expression in joint acts of worship. Here the one thing that matters is that the means used should not become ends in themselves. It is the danger that threatens our

¹ Tracy, *The Psychology of Childhood*, p. 190 : 'A child who, for any reason, has never worshipped his mother will be by so much the less likely ever to worship any other divinity.'

cathedrals, where the crowds of sightseers may often far outnumber those who find in great architecture and beautiful music a power to check the insistent clamour of daily life, and to set them free to pray. It is the danger that threatens any parish church, where need is for order and organization, and for financial support, and where the interest of the choir in its own singing, of the bell-ringers in their own ringing, of the preacher in his own preaching, may often attract worshippers indeed, but not worshippers of God. Perchance it was for this that the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was ordained, that in the presence of the humble symbols of so great a tragedy of love, our human pettiness and self-esteem might be swept aside, so that worship might be very worship, and the spirit of man lie bare to the Divine Presence. And so again and again it has been—and yet, when man has made of the Eucharist an occasion of strife, when Churches, to the amazement of angels and the shaming of their Lord, have wrought the Sacrament of love into a special instrument of disunion, denying their common brotherhood in the presence, as they claim, of Christ who died for all, one might almost wonder whether it was ordained in vain.

And what has psychology to say to all this? Much in every way. It is perfectly clear that a great part of the mechanism of this ordering of faith in worship can be described in psychological terms. Suggestion, and methods of reinforcing suggestion, meet us at every turn. If, for example, we take any typical account of the higher stages of prayer, as attained in the mystical life, there is an obvious parallel with the stages by which simple suggestion passes through attention and concentration to those hypnoidal conditions which lead on to complete hypnosis.¹ In the 'prayer for individual acts' we have exactly the

¹ For a fuller development of this parallel cf. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 165 ff.

mechanism used by Coué to draw the attention away from sickness to health, thus disarming the morbid suggestions due to fear and to the more subtle quest for the power which can be secured through the strong appeal of weakness to human sympathy. Here we have true auto-suggestion, the constant repetition of some single, self-chosen, idea, producing a state of what Baudouin has termed 'concentration.'¹ In meditation the same end is achieved, but with a wider, and in the end a more normal and saner, range of voluntary submission to suggestive thought. From these the mystic passes on to so-called 'affective prayer,' in which the emotions are strongly engaged, and the element of rational control recedes more and more into the background. And so the prayer of individual acts passes over into the 'prayer of simplicity,' in which all volition seems to be lost. The soul is utterly rapt in the contemplation of some vision of God. It is the state called by Baudouin 'contention'² and by the mystics 'contemplation,' or the 'prayer of union.' It is the goal of Hindu piety, the condition attained in the practice of Yoga, in which the soul sinks more and more into a condition of utter self-forgetfulness, losing itself in a sense of reality for which, as all the mystics agree, no words can be found, as it passes up the Unitive Way and seems, for a time in which no sense of time is left, to be one with God.

We might similarly point to those forms of worship in which everything possible is done, through mental and physical relaxation, through the fixation of attention by lights in a darkened church, by music, by suitably chosen forms of prayer and praise, beautifully and rather monotonously reiterated, and, above all, through the strong pressure of the group itself, to induce the condition of attention and concentration in which the soul feels itself more and

¹ *Suggestion et Autosuggestion*, pp. 118 ff.

² *Ibid.*

more free to sink back into a sense of union with God. Or, again, in revivalist types of worship we note how the heightening of the emotions, through appeals which owe more to reiteration than to any clear intellectual presentation of a case, results in a complete if temporary abandonment of volitional control in a mystical ecstasy of penitence and in, once more, that strange heightened sense of reality and significance.

In all this we are moving strictly within the sphere of psychology. There is nothing here which, given the desired end, might not have been evolved in some wholly secular laboratory of the Behaviourists. It is exactly upon a level with the methods which psychologists have used again and again, since the days of their ancestors the witch-doctors, for all manner of purposes, black magic as well as white.¹ And we note further that this whole process has an aspect of retrogression to the infantile which practical students of religious method would do well to study. For primitive suggestibility is a necessary condition of the first stages of childish learning. But it is equally necessary that it should be superseded in the adult by free and conscious choice and control among the objects that clamour for his attention. Too much of our organized worship depends for its effects upon the lowering of the congregation to the condition of children awed by the pageantry of a circus, or overwhelmed, as in revivalism, by the sudden and overmastering emotions of a terrified and stricken moment. The very sense of reality which is so strong an element in the mystical experience is strangely like that primitive and unresolved condition of the personal relationship, from which the child must grow to knowledge of itself, of others, and, through others of God. And we remember that the mystics and the revivalists alike have taught us strangely little. They have the vision and

¹ On this whole subject *cf.* the opening section of Janet's *Psychological Healing*.

the power, but they have not greatly interpreted the ways of God to men.¹

There is much food here for thought, and if we venture to suggest that what is called vocal prayer, such prayer, clothed in direct and consciously chosen words, as most nearly resembles the speech of man with man, such prayer as any child, scholar, or saint may utter when he will, is the highest prayer of all and not merely an elementary stage of some more honourable or more effective way, we shall be speaking contrary to all received religious opinion, but, I think, very comfortably to simple and sincere souls. And if we urge that the highest moments of Christian worship are not the so-called great occasions but the meeting of small groups for prayer, the quiet and unadorned gathering of the faithful about the Table of the Lord, the peaceful and unhurried silence of a retreat, we shall perplex the journalists, but the saints will understand. And as understanding spreads the Church may once again enter upon the Way of Renewal.

For in recognizing the truth of almost all that psychology has to say about suggestion in connection with faith and worship we have by no means abandoned the case for religion. All that we have done is to urge that the development of faith through love, reaching out through the reality that is known to the Reality that is unknown, is more important than the various modes through which it is expressed. If there is neither faith nor love in some particular occasion of prayer or worship, we are well content to repudiate it as superstition or worse, and to go our way. But, when we pause to think, how very few are the cases upon which we should care to pass so sweeping a condemnation.

¹ In this respect the criticism of James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 379 ff., and Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 300 ff., seems unanswerable. Mysticism has in fact been associated with every sort of creed. Von Hügel in his great book, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, does not succeed in relating the mysticism of St. Catherine to anything essential in her theology. To realize this does not in the least diminish the greatness of his heroine. See p. 206.

It is when we come to look more closely at the psychological theory of suggestion itself that we find the real answer to this particular attack. For, surprisingly enough, the psychologists do not in the least know what suggestion is. It is simply a name attached to certain observed facts of human behaviour, in which the phenomena of hypnotism and hysterical dissociation are seen to be correlated with the childish and adolescent approaches to reality. It would not be untrue to say that suggestion is more in need of an explanation in terms of faith, than faith an explanation in terms of suggestion. And there is very much in the work of recent psychologists to support this view. We may easily see that the whole theory of suggestion involves the pre-supposition of a world of real personal relationships, and that even so it is incomplete, since it does not and cannot explain the search of the human soul for a reality that lies deeper still. We cannot expect to find here a psychological proof of the existence of God, but if we find that suggestion itself is no mechanical process, but itself a principle in which person and person meet in purposive activity, we may well ask whether the distinction between suggestion and faith can be maintained. And with this the whole religious approach to the problem of reality is open once again.

Suggestion is a primitive and highly important mode of communicating ideas in such a manner that they are accepted quite apart from any logical grounds for the conviction so produced.¹ The person who receives the suggestion may be influenced to act, to feel, or to believe in certain ways, and

¹ McDougall defines suggestion as 'a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance' (*Social Psychology*, p. 97). Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 18 f., criticizes this as not covering the cases where what is communicated is a feeling state or activity, and gives, as an alternative definition, 'a process of communication resulting in the acceptance and realisation of a communicated idea in the absence of adequate grounds for its acceptance.' See also Thouless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 164 ff.

under suitable conditions the imposition of the suggestion appears to take place quite automatically, as though his conscious volition and control were in complete abeyance. The most striking instance of this is in hypnosis, a condition in which the most absurd suggestions are readily received, and may even be carried out in action long after the hypnotic trance is over.¹ A familiar example in ordinary life is to be seen in the obvious success of advertisements which depend simply upon the attraction of attention through striking colouring or an effective picture and upon the reiteration from a thousand hoardings of some statement which a moment's rational thought would show to be pretentious to the point of absurdity. Where the assertion is accompanied by the prestige, whether of an individual or of some long tradition, as in a nation or a Church, there are few sufficiently strong-minded to resist the suggestion altogether, unless some counter-assertion, also supported by prestige, supports them in so doing.

It is sometimes asserted that this process is purely mechanical, depending simply upon the attraction of attention by a sufficiently striking stimulus and the repetition of the suggestion with sufficient frequency. And though this view is not held by any reputable psychologist it is implied in the popular misconception which reduces faith and prayer to 'mere suggestion.' In actual fact the process is not mechanical at all. Even in such a technique as that of Coué,² in which the insistent pain of a sufferer could be

¹ An especially interesting study is that of T. W. Mitchell, *Medical Psychology and Psychical Research*, pp. 1-68.

² On the whole method cf. Coué, *Self Mastery by Conscious Autosuggestion*; C. Harry Brooks, *The Practice of Autosuggestion*; Baudouin, *Suggestion et Autosuggestion*. There is the very greatest confusion between hetero-suggestion and auto-suggestion. Coué supposed that nothing more was necessary than that the patient should carry out the suggestion for himself. But clearly this does not determine the source of the suggestion, and the truth of the matter is that the process always has the double aspect, external and internal.

harried into unconsciousness by the rapid and incessant repetition, 'Ça passe, ça passe, ça passe,' the new idea of recovery and health had to be accepted by the patient. Hetero-suggestion must become auto-suggestion. And this acceptance was a personal and not a mechanical affair. Undoubtedly too it depended very largely upon the prestige of Coué and his method. The efficacy of the suggestion depended in fact upon faith.

The modern study of suggestion ¹ has proceeded upon two main lines. It has been noted that readiness to receive and to act with unreasoning promptitude upon suggestion is highly necessary among gregarious animals. And man is unquestionably gregarious. It is an obvious fact of human behaviour that men tend to accept quite uncritically the opinions and to conform to the conduct of any society to which they may belong. Suggestibility is thus largely a phenomenon of the group, a point to which we shall return when, in a later lecture, we consider the nature of authority. But this is only part of the truth. The non-gregarious species of animal are also highly suggestible to one another, though in a very different way. And in man the most striking phenomena of suggestion are those in which individual influences individual directly. Jung, and the psycho-analysts generally, have explained this by reference to those intimate personal relationships which constitute the 'love-life.'² Here we have an element of isolated and individual attraction and attention which operates even among gregarious animals, and operates just as powerfully as herd-suggestion, and at

¹ W. Brown, *Science and Personality*, pp. 86-104. In this passage there is a good discussion of auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion. See also pp. 152 ff. for a discussion of Coué's curious confusion of imagination, suggestion, and the will. Cf. W. Brown, *Mind and Personality*, pp. 272 ff.

² Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 238 ff.; Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, chap. ii.; Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 97 ff.; E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 331 ff. For a criticism of this view see W. Brown, *Mind and Personality*, pp. 177 ff.; *Science and Personality*, pp. 96 ff.

certain times and seasons even more powerfully. We need not concern ourselves with the sexual language in which this theory has been expressed. Obviously it is true that the condition of falling in love renders men highly suggestible to a particular person, and true also that the special relationship of child to parent is one within which suggestions are received with peculiar force. Hypnosis may well be a state in which this condition of childish suggestibility reappears when steps are taken to hold the attention and when the person hypnotized is willing, within certain limits—for there are very definite limits to the suggestions which can be enforced under hypnosis¹—to sink back into the infantile state of dependence. It is worthy of notice that the attention of the person hypnotized is never directed to the object, the bright light or the monotonous words, which may be used to establish the condition. It is always held by the person who is for the time being in control. We find, in fact, that primary condition of which we spoke at the beginning of this lecture, a condition which is essentially an unresolved and undifferentiated personal relationship, and in which the ego has not yet been developed into individuality by the exercise of its own activity, controlled by its own critical use of reason.

But all this means that suggestibility bears a striking resemblance to *fides informis*,² the basic and elemental per-

¹ The belief that hypnosis can be used to facilitate crimes is now generally abandoned. See Janet, *Psychological Healing*, p. 184, and the references there given. The point is of considerable importance, since it proves that only certain aspects of the infantile condition are renewed under hypnosis. The adult ego-ideal persists throughout, even though its modes of manifestation are modified.

² The close connection between faith and suggestibility is discussed by W. Brown, *Mind and Personality*, pp. 271 ff. ; cf. also his *Science and Personality*, p. 220. He emphasizes the important distinction that faith is active and suggestion (by which he means suggestibility) passive. The distinction is valid and important for the later, adult, developments, but the passivity even in such extreme forms of suggestibility as hypnosis is a passivity accepted by the ego of the person hypnotized. It has, in fact,

sonal relationship which develops as love and which, through love, shapes itself in life as that free, voluntary trust which is what we ordinarily mean by faith. It underlies all knowledge, for apart from faith, and personal faith, the knowledge of the scientist would never take shape at all. It reaches out into the unknown, seeking its own fulness of personal being in an ever-growing quest for love. And even though to the end, in human life as we know it, suggestibility and faith are intermingled, faith is not shamed or stultified thereby, any more than man is shamed or his adult personality rendered unreal by the fact that he was once a child and that he never, in this life, wholly puts away childish things.

And if faith and love are indeed the means whereby alone we penetrate to the mystery of reality, may it not well be that reality itself is such that the true approach to it is by faith and love? ¹ We have not proved the existence of a personal God. But is it not at least suggested that any other hypothesis is inadequate to the point, we might almost say, of absurdity?

an original active element, personal in character, and this element is identical with those primary personal contacts out of which faith also develops. In striking support of the view taken in these lectures is L. Dewar's identification of grace with suggestion: 'grace is another word for suggestion, and . . . the essence of suggestion is that it is an appeal to the instinctive forces of the psyche' (*Magic and Grace*, p. 117). Mr. Dewar here perhaps puts his case a little too abruptly, not distinguishing sufficiently clearly between grace and the mode of its operation, or between its elementary and its more developed expression in life. But if grace and suggestion can thus be connected, a similar relation obviously holds between faith, the response to grace, and suggestibility.

¹ This point is strikingly argued in McDowall's *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*, p. 16 and *passim*.

LECTURE IV

SPIRITUAL HEALING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS

SYNOPSIS

THE most striking, though not the most far-reaching, phenomenon of faith is to be seen in spiritual healing. This has always been an element, not only in Christianity but in all religions. Its essential character discussed.

The peculiar position of the Gospel miracles, and their real evidential value. Parallels in modern times. The great difficulty of obtaining evidence as to the nature of the cures which are effected by 'spiritual' means.

The modern discovery of psychological healing as a science has opened up new problems. It has made it possible to accept many of these healings as perfectly normal cases of suggestion. But this explanation does not cover the ground either of the Gospel miracles or of modern healings. And very great difficulties arise as to the distinction between 'functional' and 'organic' disorder. The common belief that all 'spiritual' cures are simply due to suggestion is based upon a misunderstanding both of the nature of these cures and of the full implications of suggestion.

This can be illustrated from the methods of psychotherapy. Both the simple treatment by suggestion and the more complex methods of rationalization and analysis are found in the end to depend upon prestige in the method, or in the healer, and faith in the patient. The whole issue is thus not physical or purely mental, but personal.

This can be seen again by considering the nature of a 'cure.' Psychotherapy in fact demands an end or goal, and, in effect, a religion. It thus points the way to an understanding of the efficacy of a true religion.

Some suggestions from the modern 'pattern-psychology' as to the true nature of both spiritual and psychological healing.

LECTURE IV

SPIRITUAL HEALING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS

Daughter, thy faith hath made thee whole ; go in peace, and be whole of thy plague.—St. Mark v. 34.

UNTIL these latter sceptical days the connection between healing and religion was unquestioned. No miracle was altogether impossible where the gods were concerned, but while nature-miracles were always a dream of fantasy, miracles of healing were, and are still, an everyday fact. We are not concerned in these lectures with the problem of the nature-miracles recorded in the Gospel tradition. If the Christian belief in Jesus as God is true they stand in a different category from all other miracles of the kind, and certainly they are unique alike in their spiritual purpose and in the restraint with which they are recorded. But they have ceased to have direct evidential value. A faith that rests upon miracle is not Christian faith at all.

The miracle of healing rests upon a very different footing. 'The cures have been numerous and undoubted. They have been by no means confined to Christianity. The temple inscriptions at Epidaurus testify to the gratitude of patients almost as numerous as those at Holywell or Lourdes. Even the witch-doctor has white magic available as well as black, and his prestige is due at least as much to success in curing as to success in cursing. Within Christianity itself orthodoxy has no prerogative in this matter. The prayer of faith, with or without the laying on of hands, has again and again raised the sick, whether the healer be a saint of the Western Church, such as St. Catherine of Siena, or of the Eastern, such as Father John of Cronstadt, or a layman of some Protestant body, such as

Mr. Hickson, or a Christian Science practitioner with his simple and impossible philosophy, or even a Mormon elder with his crude transatlantic supplement to the Bible.' ¹

That these cures have been in the main cures of disorder arising from causes well known to psychology need not be doubted, nor indeed are such cures, as some critics seem almost to suggest, in any way discreditable to religion. 'Nothing,' says Janet, 'is more difficult to cure than a neuropath, and Lourdes would deserve all its reputation and more if it were pre-eminent for the cure of neuropaths alone.' ² The importance of suggestion in this connection has often been emphasized, and undoubtedly the promise and hope of a cure, resting upon the immense prestige of shrine, saint, or system, plays an immensely powerful part in bringing about the desired result. But, as Janet points out, other psychological factors enter in. He fully admits the statement made by Bertrin in defence of the Lourdes miracles, that 'patients are cured who had no hope of cure, blind unbelievers who spoke evil of religion and were none the less cured; and there have been others who have been cured after returning home, when they had ceased to expect a cure.' ³

'This,' Janet says, 'merely proves that religious faith is not the only factor; the instinctive respect for wealth and power has made it possible for kings to cure illness just as well as priests. The journey, fatigue, the strangeness of the environment, a new physical and moral hygiene, emotional shocks of all kinds, the effect of public opinion exercised in virtue of the reputation of the remedy, the powerful and little understood influence of the crowd—all these things combine to work on the patients' minds.' ⁴

¹ I venture to use a paragraph from an article of my own, first printed in the *Morpeth Review* and then published as a pamphlet by the Guild of Health under the title *Psychology and Spiritual Healing*. For a full statement of the facts cf. Janet, *Psychological Healing*, pp. 21-97.

² *Op. cit.* p. 50.

³ *Lourdes, apparitions et guérisons*, p. 185.

⁴ *Psychological Healing*, pp. 51 f.

Some of these influences are physical. Others come within the scope of suggestion in the broad sense. Among the rest Janet calls special attention to the importance of nervous and mental excitation, breaking the spell of the 'depression of nervous energy' and arousing a response to new interests and possibilities.¹ This is obviously not suggestion, but it is closely allied to that suggestibility to which the appeal of suggestion is made. In a primitive, almost a childish sense, it is the dawn of faith.

Of the cures thus wrought we may leave on one side those due to physical agency for which the religious setting is merely a background. There remain an immense number which must be assigned to psychological or spiritual causes, operating through the religious environment. If, again, there are any of these which must be called strictly miraculous, in that stupid sense of the word which identifies the miraculous with the unpredictable, arbitrary, and irrational, we have no more to say. Miracles of such a kind do not bear witness to the God of Christianity, but to a sheer and terrifying disorder at the heart of things. At the best they display a God Sultanic in character,² taking the one of two women grinding at the mill and leaving the other, for no reason save that of his meaningless and mysterious pleasure. The world does well to be terrified of ghosts and strange supernatural happenings, for they threaten man's sanity, as well as his peace. A mere arbitrary multiplication of loaves and fishes is no better, unless there is such love manifest in the miracle that we can bear with the miracle for the

¹ *Psychological Healing*, pp. 51 f. Precisely what is meant by excitation is not quite clear, nor is the phrase 'depression of nervous energy' much better. The latter is rather a description of a psychological symptom than of any definite physical condition. It never seems to be the nerves that become overtired. Exhaustion of the synapses only means that the nerves work the harder, and we become, as we say, 'jumpy.' It is for this reason that I have given 'excitation' a psychological and not a physiological meaning.

² H. Anson in *Concerning Prayer*, pp. 69 ff.

sake of the love. And casual healings that save some and leave others, of equal need and hope and faith, to suffering and despair,¹ are no more a witness to the love of God than is the Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional election, with its inevitable corollaries of limited salvation and the foreordained doom of the majority of mankind.

When we have thus eliminated the purely physical and the wholly miraculous, there remains a vast body of evidence for healings not in the least irrational, but far outstripping the achievements and explanations of physiological or of psychological medicine. That there are physiological and psychological factors there is, of course, no doubt, and these are perfectly capable of scientific study. But it would be wholly unscientific to refuse to recognize in all healing, and not merely in these more specifically religious healings, a factor of which a materialistic and deterministic science can give no account. The very term suggestion, so commonly used as though it conveyed a complete explanation of all that happened in Galilee or happens at Lourdes, contains within itself the recognition of such a factor. For suggestion is the counterpart of faith, and faith is a personal relationship and no mere psychological mechanism. It is not the least remarkable feature of the Gospel narratives that our Lord insists everywhere that His healings are not miraculous in the pagan, irrational sense. 'Daughter, thy faith hath made thee whole, enter into peace.'² 'According to your faith be it done unto you.'³ 'Go thy way; thy faith hath made thee whole.'⁴ It might be faith in the patient, or the faith of his friends,⁵ but always there must be faith. In His own village of Nazareth faith

¹ It should in fairness be said that both at Lourdes and in Mr. Hickson's missions there is ample evidence of spiritual strength and comfort gained by many who are not actually cured.

² Mk. v. 34.

³ Mt. ix. 29.

⁴ Mk. x. 52.

⁵ *E.g.* Mt. viii. 5-13 = Lk. vii. 1-10; Mk. ii. 5, vii. 25-30, ix. 14-27; Jn. iv. 46-53, xi. 40.

was lacking, 'and he could there do no mighty work, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them. And he marvelled because of their unbelief.' ¹ Here we find a piece of true psychological insight which we may take as our clue in the whole tangled problem of spiritual healing, a problem desperately perplexing to the Church of to-day. For the Church has good cause for anxiety, challenged as she is by the immense and unverifiable claims of Christian Science, and confused by enthusiastic reports of missions of healing. There is an insistent demand that the ministry of healing should be recognized, a demand by no means easy to meet until it is more clear how that ministry may be wisely exercised, or what results it may be expected to achieve. And yet while the Church is waiting for more knowledge, taking counsel with doctors and psychologists, seeking to understand the kinds of disorder which may be expected to yield to spiritual treatment, it may well be that she should rather be praying, 'Lord, increase our faith.' For the limits of physical and mental treatment are beginning to be fairly clear. There is no reason in the world why the Church should be content to work within those limits. 'All things,' said Jesus, 'are possible to him that believeth.' ²

It is this emphasis upon faith which gives the Gospel records their unique position in the history of religious healings.³ The faith upon which Jesus always insisted was faith in God.⁴ Doubtless many of His healings rested upon something much more elementary. His personal prestige as a healer must inevitably have led to many cures of hysterics of different kinds, and He must have had experience of those cases in which the first astonishing cure was followed by a disastrous relapse, cases where the first stirring of

¹ Mk. vi. 5, 6.

² Mk. ix. 23.

³ See especially E. R. Micklem, *Miracles and the New Psychology*.

⁴ Mk. xi. 22.

faith never passed beyond the level of bare suggestibility. The evil spirit had been cast out, but its house was left empty, swept, and garnished, ready for any new tenancy, and 'the last state of that man becometh worse than the first.'¹ 'Behold thou art made whole: sin no more, lest a worse thing befall thee.'² It is entirely in accordance with this that we find far more stress laid by Jesus upon the healing of the spirit than upon the healing of the body. The true need of the palsied man at Capernaum was a need for forgiveness. The healing of his body followed, but in a manner which suggests that alike to the sick man and to his healer that need came very really in the second place.³

The important thing for Christ was not the bodily healing, but the spiritual healing and the faith which both made the bodily healing possible and gave it its saving grace.' It is very good that psychical cures should be understood and practised intelligently; but the important thing for *faith*-healing remains the spiritual change—a new belief and confidence in the power and reality of the love of God—on which it lays its chief emphasis.⁴

Evidence is lacking for any estimate of the permanence of the cures wrought by Christ, but it is clear enough that He cannot be classed as one of those who work by a mere superficial suggestion. For the disciples, wholly unlearned in psychology, the wonder of the cures was enough. That they recorded the miracles is a proof of their belief in the Divine power which blessed His ministry. The climax and seal of that belief is to be seen in the narrative of Acts, when the disciples went on to work miracles not through faith in God but through faith in the Name of Jesus: 'In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk';⁵

¹ Mt. xii. 43-45.

² Jn. v. 14.

³ Mk. ii. 3-12.

⁴ A. C. Turner in *Concerning Prayer*, p. 403. I owe the reference to Micklem, *op. cit.* p. 132.

⁵ Acts iii. 6.

'By faith in his name hath his name made this man strong, whom ye behold and know: Yea, the faith which is through him hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all.'¹ But this faith, to St. Peter and St. John, meant nothing less than faith in Jesus as God. It is the practical counterpart of that conviction which had come to St. Thomas when the Resurrection appearance crowned his love with assurance.

This is the real though indirect evidential value of the Gospel miracles. They are a complete proof, by the very fact of their place in the narrative, of the belief of the early Church. Only those who accepted Jesus as Lord and God could have written in this way. And the narrative carries further proof of its accuracy and authenticity in its clear subordination of the miraculous element to the known and comprehensible principle of faith. The world, and even the Church of Christ, has hardly been able to take Him at His word when He tells man that his own faith has made him whole. It does not sound nearly mysterious enough. Yet it is true, and the way of faith is open for all who will enter upon it. And the mystery remains, for the end of that way is not seen as yet.

When we turn to the study of the actual effects of faith in the healing of the body we are faced not with too little material but with far too much. The recorded miracles of faith in modern times far surpass, in the variety of their claims, the sober narratives of the Gospels. And there is no reason whatever to doubt the substantial sincerity of the astonishing records whether of Lourdes, or of Christian Science, or of Mr. Hickson's missions.² There is honesty enough, though enthusiasm may have outrun all ordinary

¹ Acts iii. 16.

² Sincerity is, however, no proof against the creative powers of rumour, or the transformations which result from the unconscious desires and enthusiasms of the individual. Anson, *Spiritual Healing*, pp. 179-181, illustrates this vividly from first-hand experience.

common sense, in the testimonies of Christian Scientists, even when they solemnly record the cure of a horse from colic by the agency of a short homily upon its perfection as God's handiwork,¹ or bear witness to the extinguishing of some blazing spirit by the aid of a few reflections upon the impossibility of accident in the thought of God.² And the sinister possibilities of disaster through the neglect in Christian Science circles of elementary precautions against infection and the like, possibilities so serious that Christian Science must on the whole be regarded as an actual menace, should not blind us to the very real results achieved. Undoubtedly there have been healings, even if we can get no clear diagnosis as to the true nature of the disorders cured, and in worth far more than the healings has been the peace of mind which has come to thousands as they let their minds rest in the thought of that love of God which the Churches have too often failed to proclaim in any form that man could recognize.

The actual nature of these healings is exceedingly difficult to ascertain. So far as the miracles of Lourdes are real miracles³ they obviously have no significance for psychology and, if we dare suggest it, very little significance for religion either.⁴ The evidence is, of course, carefully recorded, and yet it is impossible to avoid the impression that it is collected not with a view to understanding, but with a view to finding cases which cannot

¹ Janet, *Psychological Healing*, p. 92, quoting Milmine's *Life of Mary Baker G. Eddy*.

² Fisher, *Our New Religion*, p. 155.

³ No definition of the 'miraculous,' as applied to the events at Lourdes, has been given by the Holy See, and Roman Catholic accounts of the cures contain such notes as 'The author only claims natural scientific certainty with regard to the cures, and disclaims any intention to anticipate the decision of ecclesiastical authority with regard to them' (Woodlock, *The Miracles at Lourdes*, p. 2; cf. Marchand, *The Facts of Lourdes*, p. xvi).

⁴ I am greatly encouraged in this boldness by Quick's similar remarks in *Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition*, p. 73.

be understood.¹ That numerous cures take place is beyond all question. That the vast majority are cases of nervous disorder cannot be seriously disputed.² Of the rest it may suffice to quote Janet's verdict :

Collections of observations concerning miracles are not scientific works, and should not be criticised in the same manner as collections of medical observations. It is extremely difficult to appreciate the worth of each individual fact, and yet there emerges a general impression of the truth of the whole. . . . Speaking generally, I believe that cures take place at Lourdes.³

But the evidence for these cures is, as Janet goes on to point out, exactly upon a level with the amazing records of successful healing accomplished during the period when animal magnetism was in vogue.⁴ When the fashion changed and the magnetizers were discredited, the stream of healings ceased. Somewhere behind this curious mass of evidence we are undoubtedly dealing with a phenomenon of faith, whether at the primitive level of credulity, or at the higher level of hope and love. And we have only to go back to Epidaurus to see the same phenomenon, producing upon so sober a critic as Galen much the same impression as the Lourdes healings make upon Janet.

¹ Great care is taken at the Bureau des Constatations at Lourdes to secure medical evidence, though an examination on the spot is only made if a cure is claimed. As some 600,000 pilgrims visit Lourdes yearly nothing more can be expected. Dr. de Grandmaison, in *Twenty Cures at Lourdes, Medically Discussed*, has given an account of some of the more definitely organic. The Bureau is not equipped with the more important modern medical apparatus. In particular cases of cure of old-standing fractures, described by de Grandmaison, there was no examination by X-rays. The best account of the medical evidence is that by Dr. A. Marchand in *The Facts of Lourdes and the Medical Bureau*. The case-sheets brought by the pilgrims are models of scientific detail and accuracy, so far as doctors are prepared to furnish the facts required. But I cannot declare myself convinced. Nor, for my purpose in these lectures, is a decision necessary. Hadfield, in *Psychology and the Church*, pp. 238 f., finds the evidence 'not always very convincing.'

² Janet, *Psychological Healing*, p. 49.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 45.

⁴ See Additional Note, p. 125.

'We have proof,' says Galen, 'at the temple of Aesculapius that many serious illnesses can be cured solely by the shock administered to the mind.'¹

In the case of Christian Science and of the healing missions of Mr. Hickson the scientific observer is in an even worse position. Nobody doubts that much good is done, and yet it seems to be completely impossible to obtain evidence as to the real nature of the disorders which are cured. The Committee on Spiritual Healing appointed by the Archbishops has recently tried to procure such evidence in the case of two missions loudly acclaimed as successful. In one case there was a long printed list of specific healings, several of these being healings of physical disorder of the most explicit character. Yet letters sent to every doctor and to every clergyman in the districts concerned failed to produce any information as to the real nature of these more definitely organic cases.² Those who have attempted the same task in the case of Christian Science have met with the same result. The abundance of published testimonies³ tells us very little. They rest solely upon the sensations and opinions of the patients concerned. Even when they quote the verdict of some doctor they only quote it in support of their own preconceived ideas. Nor can they be trusted to quote correctly. Evidence which passes through the mind of a neurotic patient emerges transformed beyond recognition, as all who have dealt with such cases are well aware. Criticism is at once stilled by accusing the critic of false belief in matter. This was the answer to Myers

¹ Quoted by Janet, *op. cit.* p. 49.

² It should be added that there was plenty of evidence of the cure of 'functional' disorders, and, which is the greatest achievement of these missions, of spiritual conquest and of peace of mind brought even to those who were not healed. In such disorders as consumption this alone is no mean advance towards health.

³ The long section entitled 'Fruitage' at the end of *Science and Health* is more than enough to convince any intelligent reader of the complete lack of any critical care in the recording of the cases.

when, in 1893, he endeavoured to ascertain the true facts of a particular cure, and identically the same answer has been officially made to Mr. Fisher's recent book.¹

These things are not encouraging, and they leave an unpleasant suspicion that along with the good there is a grievous risk of serious harm in these movements. There is a complete absence of diagnosis, no attempt being made to cope with the significance of physical symptoms. There is no recognition of the mental factors involved, and especially of the fact that the strong element of suggestion is liable in certain types of case to produce most undesirable results. And in Christian Science at least—for this criticism does not apply to Mr. Hickson's work—no attempt is made to guard against the bitter disappointment which results when hopes are raised far beyond any probability or possibility of fulfilment.

And yet, when the worst has been said, these movements have opened our eyes to new and immense possibilities inherent in faith. The final comment of Janet, no very friendly critic of Mrs. Eddy and her followers, deserves to be repeated: 'When true psychotherapeutics replaces Christian Science, it will be incumbent on its practitioners

¹ The answer to Myers, in 1893, was published in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, ix. p. 173. It simply exhorted Myers and his friends: 'If they will come out of their material beliefs, they will learn more in one day than they can otherwise learn in an age.' The example of Jonah in leaving the darkness of the whale's belly was held up for them to follow. But no information was given as to the case. I owe the reference to Janet, *op. cit.* p. 93. The reply to Mr. Fisher, in the *Times Literary Supplement* of Dec. 5, 1929, shows no advance in mental outlook: 'Not one word that Mr. Fisher has written will have the slightest effect on the faith of the Christian Scientist, for the Christian Scientist knows that Mr. Fisher is only writing about his false concept of Christian Science and its teaching. . . . Truly St. Paul has said, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." Mrs. Eddy, through her spiritual discernment, has been able to lay bare the so-called carnal mind and its inconsistencies.' There is more of the same kind, but nothing to enlighten the scientific enquirer as to the real nature of the facts.

to remember what they owe to their forerunner.' ¹ We may add that there will be no such true psychotherapeutics unless the religious values preserved in Christian Science are retained. For the strength of Christian Science is that with all its simple-minded credulity, its mass-suggestion, and its shirking of criticism, it has placed the love of God in the forefront of its teaching. It has helped men to forget their silly and unnecessary fears, their exaggerated anxieties, in the contemplation of that love. And therein it has been true to the mind of Christ, and some at least of its work fully deserves to stand side by side with His.

It was with the therapeutic extravagances of Mesmer and the magnetizers that the methods of religious healing began to be developed upon scientific lines.² The link with religion can be clearly seen in the mysterious setting of darkness and music with which he surrounded his famous magnetic tub, and his own lilac robe and magnetic wand. But a new step had been taken. It was no longer a quest for miracles but for scientific healing making use of known forces. That the theory of animal magnetism was all wrong mattered little. Subsequent experimenters could amend the theory when once the principle of enquiry was established. Charcot, at the Salpêtrière, in those studies of hysteria which paved the way for the work both of Janet and of Freud, was directly influenced by the work of the magnetizers. Perhaps even more important was the daring generalization of the American watchmaker, Phineas P. Quimby, who in 1859 abandoned magnetic practice, and developed the thesis that all cure is the work of the mind. It was Quimby who cured Mrs. Eddy of partial paralysis, and whose teaching was embodied by her in the epoch-making system of Christian Science. Christian Science

¹ *Psychological Healing*, p. 97.

² *Psychological Healing*, pp. 30 ff. Janet gives some useful notes on the literature.

knows no psychology, but the thesis that it is mind and not matter which counts in the battle for health is the link between psychology, hitherto a purely academic subject, and medicine. The idea proved a fruitful one far beyond the borders of Christian Science, and thus the science of psychotherapy was born.

It would be absurd to claim that this new science has reached maturity as yet. The accurate study of its successes and, still more, of its failures has barely begun. But it is at least fully recognized that we are working within the domain of science, and not of miracle. And the recognition of this fact has been of the utmost importance. It has led to a complete change of attitude towards the whole question of spiritual healing not only among psychologists but in the popular mind. And it has introduced certain simplifications of theory, the most notable being the distinction between organic and functional disorder, which seemed at first sight likely to solve all outstanding problems, whether of the Gospel miracles or of the modern practice of spiritual healing. But, as has always happened when a new scientific generalization is introduced, we can already see that scientific and popular enthusiasm has outrun the facts. A more sober analysis shows new problems opening up on all sides, problems very unlikely ever to be solved at all by the methods of pure science.

The change in popular outlook was due to the discovery of the mind as a separate entity. Hitherto the mind had been the special property of the philosophers, and the academic discussion of its functions and properties had been carried to a very high level of accuracy. And almost from the first the philosophers had been aware that the relationship between mind and matter, or, more strictly, between mind and reality, involved problems of the most intractable kind. But when enthusiasts like Quimby, and the many exponents of popular 'Mind-cures,' brought home to the

man in the street, and even to the doctors, the fact that they possessed minds, these further problems were utterly hidden from them. 'What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter.' The famous *Punch* jest sufficiently reflects the popular attitude. Some optimists, such as the Christian Scientists, leaped to the conclusion that matter can only be an illusion of the mind, and that therewith pain and evil are illusions too. In that case man needs no more than to rid himself of the illusion and all will be well. The philosophers had tried that path long before, and found that it led nowhere. But Mrs. Eddy and her friends were no philosophers, and nothing would have made her admit that theories, however illuminating, must submit to fact. To the end she proclaimed her gospel, rigorous the while in her insistence upon the service of her illusory meals, and even more upon the payment of her illusory fees, and so died, believing herself the victim of a magnetic persecution which could destroy her despite its non-reality.

But for more ordinary people, and here the doctors must be included, the mind was just a new factor to be taken into account. Some disorders were undoubtedly physical. For others no physical cause could be assigned and it was now unnecessary to have recourse to theories of evil spirits or Divine judgments. This new entity, the mind, operating through its special mechanism, the nervous system, was sufficient to explain everything. In particular the manifold symptoms of somnambulism and hysteria could readily be shown to be simply the physical expression of mental processes. And thus a valuable working distinction was made. Where an obvious physical cause could be assigned a disorder was called organic. Where there was no such cause discoverable it was called functional and its origin was sought in some maladjustment of the mind. Attention was specially paid to the immense possibilities of suggestion.

Maladies of all kinds, ranging from insomnia and headaches to paralysis of the limbs or of one or other of the senses, were shown to arise from unconscious auto-suggestion, and often to be readily curable if a more powerful suggestion was brought to bear upon them.

The effect upon ordinary educated opinion as to the possibility of belief in miracles has been very great. It has at once become an easy matter to accept many of the healings recorded in the Gospels and in the legends of the Saints, as perfectly normal cases of suggestion-treatment. And though this explanation cannot be applied in all cases to the narratives as they stand, it is easy to see that in an age which had not made the distinction between the organic and the functional, the undoubted occurrence of the most startling functional cures would lead to an uncritical belief in any cure, however improbable, which might happen to be recorded. It would have been impossible too, for narrators, however honest, to tell the story of these cures without introducing details inconsistent with their functional character. Thus while the scepticism of the early critics as to the general trustworthiness of the narratives is now seen to be unjustifiable, it remains true that the story of the miracles must henceforth be read with a new understanding. But this is not all. The mere invocation of the words 'functional' and 'suggestion' does not end the matter. We have already seen that suggestion is no mere mechanical mental operation. It works between and in persons, and it is powerless without at least the beginnings of faith. Neither the Saints, nor our Lord Himself, used a considered psychological technique. We can interpret something of the psychology of their healings in perhaps the majority of the cases recorded, but what is significant is that these healings flowed naturally and inevitably from their personality, as it was brought into contact with those about them. As we come to understand the personality of our

Lord more and more fully we find there resources of love and faith, and a knowledge of God, utterly transcending those which have ever been possessed by any other healer. In the light of that understanding it would be sheer presumption to assume that we, who know so little in our own lives what love and faith may be, are in any position to say what is or is not possible in the Gospel story.

Two considerations must be taken into account if we would appreciate rightly the present position. In the first place the term 'mind' has no clear meaning. The idea that we possess a sort of superior, non-physical, structure called the mind, and that this is capable of strict scientific study and liable to its own disorders, parallel in type to those of the body, has led to endless confusion. The most serious result of this belief has been the conviction, still widely held, that psychotherapy can become a science in the same sense in which medicine is a science, dealing with the minds of patients on principles as impersonal as those of the surgeon when he removes an appendix, or, for that matter, of the butcher when he carves up a sheep. In that case all that would be necessary would be a correct diagnosis and the correct application of the appropriate mental stimulus. The most disastrous failures of psychotherapy have been due directly to this belief, and nothing is so necessary, if progress is to be made in this direction, as the recognition of the fact that patient and healer alike are persons, and that all that goes to make up personality, on both sides, is directly involved in the treatment. In medicine the ideals of the physician are a thing indifferent, provided that he knows his work and makes no mistake in his dealings with the body. There is no such thing as a mind which can be used so cavalierly. In the treatment of all so-called mental cases person and person meet, and the ideals and moral standards of the healer count for at least as much as his technique. Let those who feel

themselves called to so responsible a practice give good heed to themselves.

And, secondly, the distinction between functional and organic, however useful, is so obscure that it creates difficulties at every turn. Certainly it is true that such external circumstances as the loss of a limb, or the invasion of the body by a multitude of micro-organisms, are in themselves independent of our thought and purposes. Yet even under such definitely physical circumstances man makes response not as a mere mass of chemical substances or of living tissues, but as an organism. It is the whole person that is involved, and the whole person, freedom, purpose, and love included, which makes response. The resultant symptoms and the progress of the disorder are in each case a blending of the functional and the organic, and both must have due consideration in its treatment. Doctors and nurses know well that they must not distress their patients. They have seldom thought out clearly all that is implied in so elementary an aspect of their profession. Similarly the so-called functional disorders are, one and all, expressed in physical condition or in physical behaviour. Even in such cases as the phobias the distress of the condition is largely a physical matter. The glandular reactions, the breathing, the heart, the digestion, may all be involved. The cause of the disorder, as matters now stand, may, to all appearance, be utterly remote from external conditions. Memories wholly or partly hidden, purposes which have failed to secure a direct expression in life, are found upon investigation to be the most vital factor in producing the symptoms. Yet one case will be cured by diet, another by bromide, and another by psychoanalysis. Who is to say where the functional ends and the organic begins? In some cases there is no functional disorder, until a lowered physical condition causes, as we most inaccurately name it, a nervous breakdown. In

others there is grave mental aberration except when under the stress of some severe physical ailment a temporary sanity supervenes.

What then, in this confusion of terminology, becomes of the common belief that spiritual healings, including the miracles of the Gospels, are mere cases of functional disturbance cured by suggestion? Translated into the essential meaning of the terms all that has been said is that a disordered life has been enabled to adapt itself to its conditions, and that this has resulted from a response to the person of the healer. We have come back once more to faith made strong by love.

The nature of the factors concerned in such healing may be illustrated from the methods employed in modern psychotherapy. These are, broadly speaking, three.¹ There is the simple and direct attack upon the symptom by suggestion-treatment, whether some degree of hypnosis is employed or not. There is the appeal to the reasoning power of the patient, in the effort to enable him to face his problem sanely and without fear. This method of rationalization is, of course, in its elementary forms almost universal. We all use it daily in trying to help our friends. But it has been reduced to a system and given a scientific status especially by Dubois of Berne. And there is the still more complex method of mental analysis, developed in its pure form by Freud, but very widely used, sometimes in combination with one or both of the other methods, by psychiatrists who differ widely from Freud both in theory and in the aim of their treatment. In particular Adler and Jung have used analysis in support of the individual

¹ W. Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, gives perhaps the best general account. Hadfield, in *Psychology and the Church*, pp. 249 ff., adopts a division similar to that employed above. The fullest account is Janet's *Psychological Healing*, but this, though monumental in scholarship and in detail, is too empirical to form a good basis for theoretical discussion.

and creative tendencies of the patient. They seek not simply for the past conditions under which the disorder appeared but for the attempted solution of life's problem which the disorder represents. This is the line of attack now taken by the majority of psychotherapists in this country. It does full justice to personality, to free individual possibilities, and seeks by a process of re-education to adjust these to the patient's everyday life.

We notice at once the same phenomenon that appeared in the study of religious healings. Each of these methods can claim its long list of successes. Suggestion-treatment especially, under the leadership of Coué, assumed almost epidemic proportions, and has developed into various schools of 'New Psychology' which offer a ready treatment for all diseases, either through a course of lectures or through sessions at which corporate suggestions of health are offered indiscriminately (though not without a fee) to all who come. Psycho-analysis at one time threatened to have an almost similar vogue, but, fortunately for itself, was at once too scientific and too expensive in time, effort, and money. So, in the past, have hypnotism, magnetism, and many much stranger modes of treatment had their indisputable triumphs. It is a necessary inference that the prestige of the system, and still more of the particular healer, has much to do with his success. Coué might sing the praises of auto-suggestion, and teach his patients how to treat themselves, but to the end it was in auto-suggestion as taught by Coué that they trusted.¹ True auto-suggestion can be used as a treatment, but it has proved to have only a very narrow range of usefulness. It is obviously helpless against any of the graver neuroses. The analytic methods, again, guard

¹ W. Brown, *Science and Personality*, p. 97. The evidence of Coué's own book, *Self Mastery by Conscious Auto-suggestion*, with its long series of personal tributes to Coué himself, is amply sufficient.

against suggestion in every possible way and yet there is no question that their efficacy is largely dependent upon the assurance of the patient that he will be cured if only he can recover the lost memories relevant to his condition. 'The whole procedure of psycho-analysis,' says Rivers, 'is calculated to bring into play the agencies of faith and suggestion.'¹ In treatment by rationalization success is made to depend entirely upon making the patient accept the point of view of his mentor. Dubois, its most thoroughgoing exponent, laid down as the law of his method the principle which actually underlies, in some degree, all modes of mental treatment: 'The nervous patient is on the way to health as soon as he has the conviction that he can be cured; he is to be considered as cured on the day when he thinks himself cured.'² But this conviction depends again upon faith in the treatment and in the person of the healer.

Faith then, even if it is only at the primitive level of credulity, seems to be a prerequisite of all forms of healing that rise above the crude physical level. And we can go further still. The methods and results of psychotherapy furnish a strong indication that the degree and quality of the faith are of the highest significance. A study of these methods is not without its lesson for those who would press the Church to set healing in the forefront of its work.

The general purpose of treatment is to enable the patient to face the facts of life and to react to them in a better way. This definition holds alike for medicine, for psychotherapy, and for religion. Of the three main methods used in psychotherapy that of suggestion can show the most rapid results. It offers the patient exactly what he wants, relieving him, if he is sufficiently suggestible, of the undesirable symptom and giving him assurance and hope. It does nothing whatever to remove the cause of the symptom. If

¹ *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 183.

² *Die Psychoneurosen und ihre psychologische Behandlung*, p. 202.

that happens to be a serious and progressive physical disorder it may easily leave it to develop unchecked until there is no hope of a cure. The records of Coué's work are almost terrifying in the blindness of their optimism.¹ To encourage elderly folk with unclassified disorders to trot round the garden,² to tell the paralytic that he can move his limbs, without asking why they are paralysed,³ will certainly produce cures. Who can say how many disasters have resulted as well? And with the hysterics who respond most readily to such treatment there is no cure of the hysteria itself. Suggestion-treatment ignores the fact that the disorder is itself the patient's attempt to secure some end, some victory over life's problems. To cure the symptom only invites the appearance of other symptoms which may be at least as serious. The story is told of a doctor who by repeated suggestion cured a patient of the conviction that he was a dog. The cure was reported triumphantly with the appended note, 'Unfortunately he now believes that he is a water-rat.' Of an enormous number of religious healings the same criticism must be made. It is of the very first importance that in any development of spiritual healing the Church should go far beyond the crudities of mere suggestion. The great danger of missions of healing is that by their very prestige and by their impressive setting they act with immense power along these lines. They attract and profoundly affect hysterics of all kinds. But they give little guarantee that the cures so achieved are radical. Even if the patients develop a new and an edifying piety, this may easily be nothing more than a new phase of their hysteria, as far removed from true religion as fantasy is from fact. 'This man was a sinner and

¹ The statement may be too strong, but the accounts of Coué's work show little trace of diagnosis, and there is no doubt of its complete absence in many of his followers. I can only give the impression produced upon me by, e.g., the account of the Nancy clinic given by Brooks in *The Practice of Autosuggestion*, an account authorized by Coué himself.

² *Op. cit.* p. 28.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 21.

he is cured. Unfortunately he now believes that he is a saint.' The old weakness of which the sin was a symptom is but written large in the new Pharisee. And there is always the disturbing possibility of relapse.

Those who undertake such missions should be very careful on two main points. Everything should be done that those who come for healing are not led to dwell only upon the hope of cure in some specific and direct form. They should be prepared for a new realization of the love and power of God, and be told that they are to try for a time to forget themselves and their troubles in His presence. The whole mission should be essentially an act of worship, expressing and evoking faith, and faith not in cure but in God. And, secondly, nothing is so important as the following up of the mission by the steady education of those who have been helped. They have to learn to make their cure real by understanding the facts of their life, and supremely the fact of God whom they must learn not only to trust but to love. And if they cannot at first love God, let them begin by loving and serving their fellowmen. Only in a mission conducted in such a spirit can we be sure that the devils cast out will not return with seven other devils worse than themselves.

This means that we must add to methods of suggestion something at least of rationalization and re-education. Nor will it suffice to be content, as Dubois seems to be, with the production of a strong conviction, a 'fixed idea,' of the possibility of a cure, or of its achievement.¹ There must be a real attempt to understand, to face the facts as they are, and above all the facts of personal relationship. There is no condition of life, however physically crippled or hampered of opportunity, through which love cannot express itself. Often there is only need of a little understanding to set the way free for love.

¹ For a criticism of Dubois see Pfister, *The Psychoanalytic Method*, pp. 441 ff.

It is this need for understanding which makes analysis peculiarly significant among therapeutic methods. Here at least there is a thorough and a drastic facing of facts,¹ including those so completely hidden from the patient himself that they can only be revealed by long and patient investigation. We are not now concerned with a criticism of the different schools of analysis. Attention has already been called to the element of faith and suggestion which is involved. Even more important is the element of love. It is generally agreed that while the recall of hidden memories and the release of pent-up emotion may be necessary in some cases as a preliminary to recovery, the actual cure is accomplished through the transference,² the personal relationship which is set up between the analyst and his patient. Here the problem of adjustment to life is fought out upon a small scale. The analyst is for the time being in the position of parent,³ and the patient works out anew the difficulties and possibilities of the 'love-life,' facing his fears, his selfishness, his

¹ On this aspect of Freud's work see Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, pp. 166 ff.

² The term 'transference' was originally used by the magnetizers, and later by Charcot, to denote a phenomenon of 'major hypnotism' in which cataleptic seizures affecting one side of the body could be transferred to the other side by the application of a magnet. In modern psycho-analysis it is used in the manner described above. See Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 407 ff.: 'The physician has himself become the object of the unconscious libido. If this is not the case, or if the patient will on no account acknowledge the fact of transference, or again, if the physician either does not understand the phenomenon at all, or does so wrongly, then violent resistances make their appearance, which aim at completely breaking off relations with the doctor. . . . But if the transference to the physician takes place and is accepted, a natural channel has thereby been found, which not only replaces the former, but also makes a discharge of the energetic process possible, and provides a course that is relatively free from conflict.' Cf. Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, pp. 368 ff., and Pfister, *The Psychoanalytic Method*, pp. 464 ff. There are abundant discussions of the term in the Freudian literature. See also W. Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, pp. 108 ff.

³ Not necessarily as a 'father-substitute' (see Jung, *op. cit.* p. 409). There is a wide field of usefulness for women doctors who can take the mother relationship to their patients.

obsessive appetites, the impossible and devastating demands of his own ego, until, if the treatment succeeds, he attains his own adult freedom. He is a child no more and can face the world again without disaster.¹

Undoubtedly where analysis is successful its results are more permanent and satisfactory than those of any other mode of treatment. That it is not always successful is due not only to its difficulty and expense, and to factors, physical or mental, which lie beyond our knowledge and control, but also to the immense demands which it makes upon the analyst. For it is, unfortunately, by no means always true that the physician can heal himself. The patient may be grievously hampered, especially in the later phases of the treatment, by the inadequacy of the analyst's own moral and spiritual standards and ideals, a danger which has been partially recognized in psycho-analysis by the almost universal requirement that the analyst shall himself undergo an analysis as part of his training. But this is usually understood to be merely the best way of acquiring the technique, and of making sure that there are no serious repressions which might distort the analyst's own view of the problems brought to him. We must make bold to ask much more. If we are indeed to submit ourselves and our difficulties to the methods of psycho-analysis, we are trusting to that which begins with faith and reaches its solution through love. We must demand that faith and

¹ The goal which is sought in the final dissolution of the transference is stated by Pfister (*op. cit.* p. 444) in a passage worth quoting: 'While Dubois leads his medical authority into the field full tilt, Freud allows the patients to find the truth themselves as much as possible. The former holds his patients in the father-complex, the latter sets them free. The former wishes to free by a "fixed idea," the latter by re-education to have the patient find for himself the law of his own inner self and the best possible realization of his capabilities. . . . Thus the beautiful word, self-education, has with Freud a much deeper significance than with Dubois: the man does not force and persuade himself to a larger life, he loves himself into it.' The disciple here puts the matter more truly and more finely than the master has ever done.

love have their perfect work. We cannot trust any who do not find in faith and love the key not only to problems of personal adjustment but to reality itself. In a word, psycho-analysis must be firmly grounded upon religion. It may, if it will, destroy for us our religious fantasies, but only if it does so in the name of religious truth.¹

It is when we ask what precisely is meant by the term 'cure' that we perceive the incompleteness of psychotherapy and its need for something more than a technique. The patient is to be set free from symptoms and restored to health. But even in the physical sense it is difficult to define health clearly. In the field of social conduct and personal relationship we see at once that mental health is something different for each person. Moral standards and ideals have to be considered. It may be necessary to set social usefulness against perfect physical balance, love against comfort. And upon these things psychotherapy proper has nothing to say. As a science it has no moral standards, and though among those who follow Jung and Adler great attention is paid to the life-purposes and ideals of the patient these are not criticized and developed by comparison with any higher standard, except in so far as the psychiatrist goes beyond his scientific rôle and assumes that of a moral or religious adviser. The climax of absurdity is reached in Coué's famous formula, 'Every day in every way I grow better and better,' for the interpretation of the standard of health to be attained is left entirely to the patient's imagination. And Christian Science is little better with its curious supposition that God, being love, must provide whatsoever His children may desire, regardless apparently of any higher end than their convenience and ease.

¹ Pfister, *The Psychoanalytic Method*, p. 408: 'Psycho-analysis gives no explanation of the content of truth in religion, although it eliminates neurotic forms of religion which do not hold their own against the reality-thinking.'

It is here that religion comes into the field. We saw in an earlier lecture that the psychological account of the development of the ego seemed to postulate a reality of exactly the type to which religious faith also looks. So the systems of psychotherapy are found to be incomplete, and threatened with ineffectiveness, unless they are allied with an outlook essentially religious.¹ For psychotherapy, like religion, is concerned with persons and not with mental disorders.² The adage, 'There are no diseases, there are only sick persons,' holds true. And in dealing with persons we come into touch not merely with their memories or their instinctive reactions, but with their whole system of moral choices. Above all, as Freud himself has taught us, we are concerned with their most intimate and vital personal relationships. It is only in the religious account of the world that these find their full significance. For the love of man, which is the key to all moral and spiritual value, is a thing transient, a shadow that departeth, unless it rests upon love undying, real, eternal, the love of God.

We may add one final psychological point. It seems to be more and more clear that we cannot study organic structure simply as a mechanism, without reference to its function or purpose. It is at least as true to say that the function determines the structure as that the structure determines the function. A very considerable school of psychologists is now urging the dynamic significance of

¹ Hadfield, in *Psychology and the Church*, pp. 255 ff. See also his essay in *The Spirit* (ed. Canon Streeter), pp. 113 f., and the references there given: 'I am convinced that the Christian religion is one of the most valuable and potent influences that we possess for producing that harmony and peace of mind and that confidence of soul which is needed to bring health and power to a large proportion of nervous patients. In some cases I have attempted to cure nervous patients with suggestions of quietness and confidence, but without success until I have linked those suggestions on to that faith in the power of God which is the substance of the Christian's confidence and hope.' Cf. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 277.

² H. Anson, *Spiritual Healing*, chap. i.

patterns, or functional schemata. Head, in his great work on aphasia, has shown that the functions of the brain are not as rigidly determined by its structure as the older anatomists thought, and that there is definite evidence in cases of injury of the partial modification of the structure to meet the needs of thought and speech.¹ MacCurdy² has argued in detail that exactly the same dynamic patterns reveal themselves in man's physiological and in his psychological development. The *Gestalt-psychologie* of Köhler³ and Koffka⁴ is moving along a parallel line of thought. But if this approach to the problem of life proves to be sound we at once begin to see something of the mechanism operative in suggestion-treatment and in psychotherapy generally. The pattern of health suggested in the treatment may have difficulty in establishing control in an organism long held in the domination of other, less adequate, patterns, but at least it will have power. And where earlier patterns have failed to establish organic control, where, in other words, there is sickness or mental disorder, the new suggestion may well prove effective. Function will react upon organism, and cures of the most unexpected kind may result.

But we see, too, that upon such a theory religion must be the most powerful curative force of all. For it is in the sphere of religion that the highest patterns of human freedom and human purpose reveal themselves, as men find their lives by losing them in God. Here we have, perhaps, the key to the immense efficacy of methods of religious healing which, although they are open to all manner of psychological criticism, yet produce results which do seem

¹ H. Head, *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*. For a general summary see vol. i. pp. 533 ff. The statement above is based upon his clinical material and upon his conclusion stated on p. 549.

² *Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology*.

³ *The Mentality of Apes*.

⁴ *The Growth of the Mind*.

to have permanence and to bring peace.¹ But the real effectiveness of the religious solution will not be found mainly or most significantly in the crude miracles of suggestion and credulity which any charlatan can in some degree copy. It will rather appear in that ordered development of personality which is found in those who see life steadily and see it whole, whose whole character is built up by the progressive establishment of sentiments which rise through the love of man to the love of God. Here there may well be healing, and I should be sorry if I should be thought to have set bounds to its possibility. But, beyond all healing, there will be health, for the power of the higher life will be upon them, body and soul, and whatever external circumstance may befall them, even though it be a Cross, all will be fashioned to the perfection of the Pattern of the Service of God, 'unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.'

¹ 'It has been said that religion is only a form of neurosis which, for some reason, is not regarded as pathological. There is, however, a good reason why the religious redirection of the libido is not considered to be pathological, for, unlike the neurotic symptom, it provides a permanent and satisfactory solution of the erotic conflict. . . . This would seem to suggest very strongly that the religious solution of the erotic conflict is different in kind from the neurotic solution, and that when the soul which has found no earthly satisfaction for its love directs that love to God, it is doing something very different from the creation of a phantasy love-object in place of a real one. It has found a satisfactory resting-place for its love, instead of finding an unsatisfactory solution of the conflict between desire and reality in the neurotic symptom or in the phantasy. . . . That there is this difference between the effectiveness of these two ways of dealing with his desire, seems to suggest that such different effects do not proceed from the same cause. . . . It seems reasonable to suppose that the genuine satisfactoriness of the religious solution of the erotic conflict is the result of the fact that its object is a real one—that God is not merely a phantasy creation of the worshipping mind' (Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 277 f.).

ADDITIONAL NOTE

COLERIDGE ON ANIMAL MAGNETISM

It is interesting, in view of the difficulty of estimating the modern evidence for miraculous healings, to compare the impression made by the 'magnetisers' upon so shrewd an observer as S. T. Coleridge, and recorded by him in an annotated copy of Southey's *Life of Wesley* (as quoted in a footnote to his *Table Talk*, under date April 30, 1830. The passage must have been written before 1834. The vogue of magnetism increased until about 1850. It came under destructive scientific criticism from 1840 onwards. See Janet, *Psychological Healing*, pp. 37 ff.): 'The coincidence throughout of all these Methodist cases with those of the Magnetists makes me wish for a solution that would apply to all. Now, this sense or appearance of a sense of the distant, both in time and space, is common to almost all the magnetic patients in Denmark, Germany, France, and North Italy, to many of whom the same or a similar solution could not apply. Likewise, many cases have been recorded at the same time, in different countries, by men who had never heard of each other's names, and where the simultaneity of publication proves the independence of the testimony. And among the Magnetisers and Attesters are to be found names of men whose competence in respect of integrity and incapability of intentional falsehood is fully equal to that of Wesley, and their competence in respect of physio- and psycho-logical insight and attainments incomparably greater. Who would dream indeed of comparing Wesley with a Cuvier, Hufeland, Blumenbach, Eschenmeyer, Reil, etc.? Were I asked, what I think, my answer would be,—that the evidence enforces scepticism and a *non liquet*;—too strong and consentaneous for a candid mind to be satisfied of its falsehood, or its solvibility on.

the supposition of imposture or casual coincidence ;—too fugacious and unfixable to support any theory that supposes the always potential, and, under certain conditions and circumstances, occasionally active, existence of a correspondent faculty in the human soul. And nothing less than such an hypothesis would be adequate to the *satisfactory* explanation of the facts ;—though that of a *metastasis* of specific functions of the nervous energy, taken in conjunction with extreme nervous excitement, *plus* some delusion, *plus* some illusion, *plus* some imposition, *plus* some chance and accidental coincidence, might determine the direction in which the scepticism should vibrate. Nine years has the subject of Zoo-magnetism been before me. I have traced it historically, collected a mass of documents in French, German, Italian, and the Latinists of the sixteenth century, have never neglected an opportunity of questioning eye-witnesses, ex. gr. Tieck, Treviranus, De Prati, Meyer, and others of literary or medical celebrity, and I remain where I was, and where the first perusal of Klug's work had left me, without having moved an inch backward or forward. The reply of Treviranus, the famous botanist, to me, when he was in London, is worth recording : —“ Ich habe gesehen was (ich weiss das) ich nicht würde geglaubt haben auf *ihren* erzählung,” etc. “ I have seen what I am certain I would not have believed on *your* telling ; and in all reason, therefore, I can neither expect nor wish that you should believe on *mine*.” ’ ¹

No criticism could be more obviously honest than such a casual note. The problem of evidence has changed very little in a hundred years, and the parallel between religious and pseudo-scientific healing is as perplexing as ever.

¹ *Table Talk of S. T. Coleridge*, ed. Morley, p. 72 n.

LECTURE V

SIN AND SPIRITUAL DIRECTION

SYNOPSIS

THE Christian account of sin can be summed up in the formula that sin separates the sinner from God. This includes all that is essential in the various theological statements, of which the most important are those which describe sin as a disorder and as self-love.

The tendency of psychology is to treat sin as a phenomenon of mental disorder, and to explain it as due to the formation of faulty sentiments or complexes. It is urged that it cannot be separated from undoubted cases of a pathological type and that 'sins' should be regarded as symptoms of a condition which can be treated on scientific lines. The sense of guilt is explained as due to a displacement of the 'affect.' Psychologists therefore tend to criticize both the religious outlook and the traditional religious methods of dealing with sin.

There is much truth in the psychological view, but it is incomplete (1) in its failure to account for moral valuation, (2) in the understanding of the personal relationships upon which sentiments and complexes depend. When these are taken into account the religious view of sin is seen to be its necessary complement, though psychology cannot provide a proof of the truth of that account. Though sin cannot be simply written off as 'moral disease,' moral disease is, perhaps, never wholly dissociated from sin.

The development of a right system of Spiritual Direction depends upon a clear understanding

- (1) of the essential character of sin and of its relationship to mental disorder ;
- (2) of those elements in psychological treatment which throw light upon the work of pastor and priest. Especially important are the general insight into character and an appreciation of the 'transference' ;
- (3) of the dangers which attend amateur psychotherapy ;
- (4) of the true function and character of the Church.

LECTURE V

SIN AND SPIRITUAL DIRECTION

Verily, verily, I say unto you, Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin. And the bondservant abideth not in the house for ever: the son abideth for ever. If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.

St. John viii. 34-36.

GOD is Love. In love He created man. In man's love God would have rejoiced; in God's love, man would have been blessed. And man, made in God's image, refused God, refused his own true good. He sought a separate life, and found it death. This is SIN. . . . ALL SIN in its degree, *separates* the Soul from God: and whatever *separates* from God is SIN.¹

So Aubrey Moore defined the essential Christian conception of sin. It is not merely slavery, or the corruption of our nature, or guilt. Fundamentally it is the refusal of that love wherewith God draws us to Himself. How man can make so terrible a refusal remains an unsolved mystery. But the beginning of the conquest of sin comes when we can first say 'It is no more I that do it but sin which dwelleth in me.'² And the final victory is to be found when we say 'Not I, but Christ,' or, to quote Aubrey Moore again,

¹ Aubrey Moore, *Some Aspects of Sin*, pp. 65 f. The capitals and italics, here and in the following quotation, are as in the original.

² Rom. vii. 17 and 20. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 242, takes this verse as referring 'to a state of degradation in which the idea of personality conveys no longer any meaning.' While I do not doubt that such a state is possible I cannot believe that St. Paul is referring to it here. He seems rather to be alluding to that awakening of the true self as it first becomes aware of possibilities other than those determined by the sinful condition. There is no freedom, but there is at least the desire to be free, from 'the body of death.'

' in the Christian reading of the teaching of the Muslim mystic—

' One knocked at the door of the beloved, and a voice from within said, "Who is there?" The lover answered, "It is I." The voice replied, "This house will not hold *me* and *thee*." So the door remained shut. The lover went into the wilderness, and spent a year in solitude and fasting and prayer. Then again he returned and knocked at the door. And the voice of the beloved said, "Who is there?" The lover answered, "It is thyself." Then the door was opened.'¹

This conception of sin as separation from God falls at once into line with the psychological theory of the development of the personality through the formation of sentiments. That the eternal and ultimate reality of Love, which is God, draws us ever upwards and onwards to the goal of our being is, as we have seen, a belief for which that theory prepares the way, and it remains the strangest and darkest fact of human nature that man is capable of refusing to respond to that love. It is sadly untrue that

We needs must love the highest when we see it.²

For this spiritual or metaphysical fact there is no explanation in terms of psychology at all. With its results both psychotherapist and pastor have to deal continually, and though a knowledge of the methods of a sound psychotherapy is of the greatest practical importance, those methods will be profoundly affected by the recognition of the ultimate character of sin as the disorder not of psychological mechanisms but of human freedom and love.

A very brief sketch of the theological conceptions of sin must here suffice. We may note in the first place the agreement, for practical purposes, of our formula with the definition given by Dr. Kirk: ' Sin is any action or habit inhibiting or delaying the soul's progress to perfection, of

¹ Moore, *op. cit.* p. 138.

² Tennyson, *Idylls of the King* : *Guinevere*.

the danger of which the soul is, or ought to have been, conscious.' ¹ From the pastor's point of view this may be allowed to suffice, especially with Dr. Kirk's further comments that 'sinful habits are more dangerous than sinful actions' and that 'it is not when an act has been committed that the danger to the soul begins, but when the thought of it has been favourably accepted in the mind.' ² The definition well expresses the connection between sin and faulty sentiment-formation, resulting in separation from God because the failure is a failure of love. From the theoretical point of view it is important to note that behind both action and habit there lies the sinful disposition, the ego or self that is formed by a love other than the right love of man and, through man, of God. In dealing with this disposition it is, of course, necessary to find out which of the fundamental instinctive impulses is primarily concerned, and to provide for them new channels of a more desirable kind.³ But it does not follow that this cure is radical unless the re-direction is re-direction not so much of energy as of love. It was not by the Sermon on the Mount but by the Cross that Jesus saved men. Those who carry on His work may not ask an easier way.

It is one of the great marks of the spiritual genius of the Hebrew prophets that they saw clearly this essential character of sin. From the time of Hosea, whose own personal tragedy was a tragedy of love, the vision of the prophets is clear. Disobedience to the ancient law, ritual transgression and uncleanness, are but symptoms of a deeper disorder still. Hosea puts it in a phrase, they

¹ Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 228.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.* p. 264, and the references there cited to Lecky, *Map of Life*, p. 264, and Hadfield in *The Spirit*, pp. 96 ff. See also Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 112, and *passim*; W. Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, pp. 12 and 81; *Mind and Personality*, p. 140; McDougall, *Character and the Conduct of Life*, pp. 95 ff. For a full discussion on Freudian lines cf. E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 603 ff., and *passim*.

'became abominable like that which they loved,'¹ and the only healing that can avail is the healing of love: 'I will heal their backsliding, I will love them freely.'² 'Yea, I have loved thee with an everlasting love: therefore with lovingkindness have I drawn thee.'³ But the full revelation and the full cost of that love were only seen at the place called Golgotha.

The two main streams of theological speculation about sin, distinguished by Dr. Williams as the 'medical' and the 'forensic,'⁴ find their meeting point in this view of sin as the wilful and morally guilty acceptance of a disposition in which the full development of character through the sentiments is refused. We may take first the conception of sin as a disease or corruption. So far as this rests upon the view of evil as something physically inherent in human nature it is a mere counsel of despair. Certainly it is not inherently Christian and it is impossible to reconcile it with the belief in creation by a loving God. It has its roots in ancient Indian and Persian speculation, though it has doubtless arisen independently in other areas. In Jewish thought it is to be seen in the Rabbinic conception of the evil impulse, the *yetser ha-ra'*, implanted in man, together with the good impulse or *yetser hattobh*, by God Himself.⁵ It is impossible to doubt that this mode of thought has profoundly affected St. Paul's doctrine of the 'flesh' as the vehicle of that inherited taint which resulted from Adam's sin and which was passed on, almost in the manner of a physical contagion, until the Law revealed its universal and terrible effects.⁶ The idea that matter, and therefore the body, is evil was characteristic of some Gnostic sects and of Docetism in general, but does not appear in orthodox

¹ Hos. ix. 10.

² Hos. xiv. 4.

³ Jer. xxxi. 3.

⁴ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, pp. 73, 133, 292. Full illustration of these views can be found in Dr. Williams' book, and it is unnecessary to do more than refer the reader to some of the more important passages.

⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 59 ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.* pp. 123 ff.

Christian circles until the fourth century. In an almost pure form it is found in Lactantius, who is by no means a Docetist, but who not only uses the dangerous later term *depravatio* but explains this depravity as arising from an 'admixture of earthly weakness' in human nature.¹ With Augustine, rightly accused by the Pelagians of being still, in this respect, under Manichaeian influence, the *vitium*, or corruption of man's nature, revealed in the baneful power of *concupiscentia*,² is almost wholly physical in character, though Augustine was too good a psychologist not to perceive its connection with man's instinctive life, identified by him, in a manner disastrously Freudian, with the immense power of the sex-impulse.³ The influence of Augustine remained powerful throughout the Middle Ages in the use, not without confusion, of the term concupiscence, and also in the conception of human nature as *fomes peccati*, that tinder which requires but a spark to kindle the flame of actual sin.⁴ It comes to its full logical conclusion in the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity,⁵ a doctrine repudiated in the Thirty-nine Articles in language still tainted with Manichaeism,⁶ and in modern times by the general consent of a world which will tolerate such pagan nightmares no longer. Its last survival is to be seen in the common popular belief that original sin is in some way to be identified with man's inheritance of instincts from his animal ancestry, a belief from which even Dr. Tennant, despite his vindication of the appetites as morally neutral,⁷

¹ Williams, *op. cit.* pp. 297 f.

² The use of the term *concupiscentia* goes back to Tertullian. *Op. cit.* pp. 243 f.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 365 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 403.

⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 431 ff.

⁶ Art. IX.

⁷ In his *Origin and Propagation of Sin*, fully discussed by Williams, *op. cit.* pp. 530 ff. So, in principle, Aquinas, *Summa*, ii. 1. Q. 24, e.g. Art. 1, *Conclusio*: 'Passiones animi prout subjacent imperio rationis et voluntatis bonae vel malae moraliter dici possunt; non autem ut motus quidam sunt irrationalis appetitus.' So Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 235: 'No instinct, however sinful be the actions that result from it, can be in essence evil.'

does not wholly escape, since he appears to regard not only pain but evil as 'necessarily incidental' to God's purpose in Creation, akin to the 'physiological anachronisms' such as the 'troublesome wisdom-tooth and the dangerous caecum' which are capable of causing so much distress.

It is only when we turn to some of the very ablest of the thinkers who have used this analogy of disease or corruption that we find its real connection with the psychological point of view. As we might, perhaps, have expected, it is Plato who first makes the connection clear, when, in the *Republic*, he discusses the disorder which results if the appetites are not brought under rational control. There can be no true manhood in the service of the many-headed beast which peeps out when we sleep.¹ Athanasius, who alone in the East shows any real affinity with the later Western view, is undoubtedly influenced by the Platonic tradition when he speaks of sin as resulting in a kind of spiritual disintegration, more far-reaching even than physical death, the sinner 'not merely dying' as he says, 'but abiding ever in the corruption of death.'² 'For transgression of the commandment was turning them back to their natural state, so that just as they have had their being out of nothing, so also, as might be expected, they might look for corruption into nothing in the course of time.'³ This idea of evil as resulting in a disintegration back to the non-existent from which man came reappears in Aquinas,⁴ and psychological theology has perhaps devised

¹ Plato, *Republic*, ix. 571 ff. The importance of this passage is not affected by the subsequent argument for the indestructibility of the soul in x. 609 f. This argument is hardly compatible with the account of the soul as composite, ix. 588 f.

² Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, c. 3.

³ *Ibid.* c. 4. It is difficult to say how far Athanasius presses this conception of disintegration. The two passages cited suggest different answers. He goes beyond Plato in his recognition that the disorder of appetite affects the unity of the soul itself, but the principle of his discussion is Platonic, though it seems to issue in a doctrine of conditional rather than absolute immortality.

⁴ *Summa*, ii. 1. Q. 79. Art. 2.

no better term for the effects of sin than *inordinatio*,¹ the word by which he describes the disorder and confusion of the soul.

The conception of disorder again underlies the tradition which uses forensic language about sin. The primary conception is that of disobedience to God, and according as God is regarded as Law-giver, Judge, King, or Father, so we get differing theories of sin and atonement. It is unnecessary to quote examples of this type of thought,² which has been continuously represented in the Church since the time of St. Paul and indeed since the Old Testament prophets denounced 'a disobedient and gainsaying people.'³ All that concerns us here is that this disobedience is felt to be, as Athanasius puts it, something monstrous,⁴ creating a great gulf within God's purpose in creation, since God made man for perfection and within that perfection there is no place for sinful men. So for Anselm, to whom sin is simply that disobedience which fails to render God His due,⁵ the result of the sin is that something is left disordered, *inordinatum*, within the sphere of God's sovereignty, which may not be.⁶ In conceptions of this kind the disorder is cosmic and not psychological, and the whole difficulty of forensic systems of theology, whether they result in theories of atonement dependent on retribution or upon satisfaction,⁷ has been the difficulty of relating

¹ *Summa*, ii. 1. Q. 73. Art. 8. Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 12.

² Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 231, and passages there cited, esp. Aquinas, *Summa*, ii. 1. Q. 72. Art. 1, and ii. 1. Q. 109. Art. 4. Cf. also Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 21.

³ Is. lx. 1, cited in Rom. x. 21.

⁴ Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, c. 6. Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat. xiii.* 33.

⁵ *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 11.

⁶ *Ibid.* i. 12.

⁷ The Penal Theory and the Satisfaction Theory depend directly upon the principles of criminal and civil law respectively. See my *Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*, pp. 121 f., and references there cited; also p. 298 for the decisive discussion between Crell and Grotius.

this cosmic disorder to the disorder in the soul of man.¹ It is only when the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God is given its fullest significance, and the key to the mystery of the man's relationship to God is found in that conception of his being which sees its origin in creative love and its fulfilment in redeeming love, that the two theological traditions are seen to be one. Chaos in the Universe and chaos in man's heart are one and the same thing.

One final and fundamental account of sin may be noted here. 'Whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's shall save it.'² Men turned away from God, says Athanasius, 'when they began to give heed to themselves.'³ Augustine identifies sin with the love of self.⁴ Dr. Williams has argued that the underlying principle from which sin arises is to be found in 'the self-assertion of the individual against the herd, a principle which we can only designate by the inadequate titles of selfishness, lovelessness, and hate.'⁵ And Dr. Kirk declares that 'sin may be said to begin with self-regard.'⁶ There is no doubt that we are here very near the root of the whole matter. The identification of sin with self-love certainly does not cover the whole range of sin in its full development, when the state of separation from God is accepted with complete and conscious acquiescence. But it indicates clearly the point at which we should look for the occasion of sin in man. It comes just at the stage where consciousness passes over into self-consciousness, a term rightly used in common speech with more than a suggestion of reproach. It would seem to be inherent in

¹ As appears very clearly in the very lame ending to Anselm's argument, *Cur Deus Homo*, ii. 19. The Penal Theory fails just at this point, as is shown by its gradual decline in the period of the arid discussions as to the 'active' and 'passive' obedience of Christ and its twofold efficacy.

² Mk. viii. 35.

³ *Contra Gentes*, 3.

⁴ *Confessions*, iii. 8; *De Civitate Dei*, xiv. 3 and 8.

⁵ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 521.

⁶ *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 267.

the very process whereby man became aware of himself as an individual. That 'Our wills are ours, we know not how,' is the supreme achievement of creative evolution, but it remains sheer disaster unless it is also true that 'Our wills are ours, to make them thine.'¹

The view that sin and self-regard are in principle the same thing has been highly characteristic of Christianity. From the first it set Christianity in sharp contrast to its strongest rival in the field of ethics, Stoicism, and it is as directly an interpretation of the utterly selfless love and sacrifice of Jesus as the Stoic doctrines of self-sufficiency and self-control are an interpretation of the Platonic Socrates. The opposition between the two points of view is as evident to-day as it was in the time of Seneca and St. Paul. It is not only in the horrible figure of Nietzsche's superman that we see the challenge to the ethics of Jesus, but in far more persuasive expositions of the view that self-realization is the end of life. McDougall may be taken as typical of this attractive modern Stoicism, with his theory that we must look to the self-regarding sentiment if we would understand the development of the ego.² He terms this 'self-respect,' and is careful to distinguish it from self-love, which he regards as comparatively rare. Self-love is 'the self-regarding sentiment of the thoroughly selfish man, the meaner sort of egoist.'³ It is developed not in isolation, or through the mere satisfaction of impulse and appetite, but through 'the influence of rewards and punishments administered more or less systematically by the social environment,'⁴ and, later, as rational control enables purpose to hold its own against the stimulus of

¹ Cf. Selbie, *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 228 f.: 'It is the possibility of being tempted which shews the real greatness of human nature. Apart from it we should be merely unmoral creatures. . . . It is with the capacity to choose between ends and the actions leading to them that the possibility of sin emerges.'

² McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 161 ff. See also his *Character and the Conduct of Life*, where the same thesis is developed at length.

³ *Social Psychology*, p. 161.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 181.

the moment, 'by the anticipation of social praise and blame.'¹ Thus arises the moral ideal, the ethical self, its own authority in conduct, escaping, as Tansley puts it, 'not indeed from the obligations of membership of the herd, but from the immediate pressure of the herd, as it is normally exercised on the average man.'² The goal of moral development, as McDougall sees it is the formation of a character 'in which conduct on its highest plane is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment.'³

In this account of the self-regarding sentiment full account is taken of the relation of man to society and McDougall does not deny the existence of the 'truly altruistic sentiment of love,'⁴ both in the family and in wider social groups. But he especially emphasizes what he terms 'quasi-altruism,'⁵ in which, by a process of projection and identification, the self-regarding sentiment is extended by parents to their children and by the growing child to the home, the school, the town, the country or nation as a whole. And it is a true and important fact that much that passes by the name of love is merely a distortion of self-regard. Even self-sacrifice of the most heroic kind may rest upon self-respect.⁶ We may note further, at this point, that McDougall regards religious conceptions as exercising their great influence in developing character simply through mechanisms essentially social in character.⁷ When, in *Character and the Conduct of Life*,

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.* p. 181.

² A. G. Tansley, *The New Psychology and Its Relations to Life*, p. 185.

³ *Social Psychology*, p. 181.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 201.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 206.

⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 201.

⁷ *Op. cit.* p. 196, note: 'I leave out of account here the religious sentiments, which for many, perhaps most persons play this all-important part in developing the self-regarding sentiment: not because they are not of great social importance, but because the principles involved are essentially similar to those dealt with in this passage.'

he depicts his ideal of human personality, it is a figure strong, self-reliant, adequate, in all essentials the ideal of the ancient Stoic.¹ It will be an ill thing for the world if this ideal, the best that a sinful world can show, can ever hold its own against the higher ideal of Christ.

But in saying this we must not overlook the essential truth of the analysis upon which it all rests. We may believe that the ideal depicted is not the highest and yet recognize that the whole process by which, in the long evolution of the human race, the individual has come to a dignity and a freedom of his own, and has attained in fact to the possibility of true moral choice and therewith of moral responsibility, is of the kind thus described, and plays a very necessary part in the evolution of the highest type of all. As a matter of detail we may be inclined to ask whether sufficient weight has been allowed to true altruism, the real sentiment of love. And here we have the weighty support of Freud, who points out that McDougall's theory does not really take into account the personal character of the whole process.² Freud, in fact, finds the superman not at the end but at the beginning of human history, and, which is more important and more obviously true, declares that it is through love that civilization was able to break his power and so proceed upon its way.³ When Dr. Williams sees the probable beginnings of sin, historically speaking, in a failure of the herd-instinct,⁴ he is definitely joining issue

¹ *Character and the Conduct of Life*, especially chaps. v. and x.

² *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 26 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 93.

⁴ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, pp. 476 ff. and 516 ff. Dr. Williams seems to regard the condition resulting from the Fall as 'congenital weakness or shallowness of herd-instinct': 'This weak saturation with psychic energy of the social complex can only be due to the weakness of the herd-instinct, which feeds it' (p. 480). This view undoubtedly agrees well with his idea of a Fall prior to all human sinning, but nevertheless it seems to deprive sin of its essential character. It was the relation of the ego to its object, in the region of the true moral choice, that we

with McDougall's point of view. We may prefer to make a sharper distinction between herd-sentiment and herd-instinct, in order to avoid a confusion of thought which would involve us in giving moral value to instinct upon the animal level, but substantially his thesis is an assertion of the principle of altruism or love. And it is in that possibility of a group-life which is increasingly personal and increasingly loving that the hope of man and of civilization lies.

Considered impartially we must admit that there is much truth in both accounts of the way in which moral responsibility has developed. And at least they agree in this, that they reveal the moral problem precisely as a problem of individuation. It is in the sheer necessities of the case that we should connect the appearance of sin with the appearance of the individual, conscious of his own individuality and therewith free. And we have, in the facts of human experience, at least a hint that the two views are not as diametrically opposed as they appear at first sight. It is simply untrue that the Christian type of character, self-denying, built up in service, and fashioned in self-forgetful love, is any less individual, any less practical, or any less creative than the efficient and self-reliant figure of the Stoic ideal.¹ History has been made by the supermen, but it has been saved by the saints, and if we must judge by sheer effectiveness and power, the saints unquestionably have the day.

May we not suggest that the solution lies in the existence of a sentiment deeper and more fundamental

must seek to understand not only the gravity of sin but also its origin. It does not help matters to transfer the issue to 'this deep level in the structure of the soul, beneath the area of the pre-conscious and lying in the obscure recesses of the Unconscious' (*ibid*). It is not in the instinctive life as such, but somewhere in the process whereby instincts are built up into sentiments, that the problem lies.

¹ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 326 ff., esp. p. 376.

than either of those of which we have been speaking? If there is a God at all His being is the ground of all being, individual and corporate alike, and the God-sentiment, as we may term it, will not be something parallel to, and distinct from, the sentiments which are turned outwards to the world and inwards towards the self. It is perhaps misleading to term this higher thing, the love of God, a sentiment at all, since it is that which links the sentiments into a final unity, as the sentiments link the emotions. Not only self-love but even the love of others can be a hindrance to the full development of the ego. We must look further than the self, and further than our fellow man, to that ultimate Reality in which both we and they 'live and move and have our being.' It may be that, despite the mystics, man cannot come to God directly, but only through these lesser loves. To attain the lesser love is right and good. To linger in it, as though that could suffice the child of God, is sin.¹ Even while we love our neighbour as ourselves, we are to love the Lord our God with all our heart and soul and mind. 'He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.'²

When we turn to the psychologists we find that they have but little to say about sin. So far as it is mentioned at all it is normally regarded as another name for mental disorder. But this involves a confusion of diagnosis which completely ignores the special characteristics of sin. For sin occurs most typically in those who are, in all ordinary senses of the word, normal enough. It is the sane man, with full capacity for moral choice, that is most capable of sinning, and most guilty of his sin. So soon as a patho-

¹ The point is sharply made in the remark that when the devil would tempt an Englishman he takes the shape of his wife and family.

² Mt. x. 37; cf. 1 Cor. vii. 32, 33.

logical element enters in the degree of sinfulness is to that extent diminished. The plea of insanity is a complete defence to any charge. It does not, of course, preclude unpleasant social consequences, but it silences all moral criticism.

For the psychology of Freud the term sin has in fact no meaning at all. The development of personality through love which he describes is a process wholly mechanical in its operation, and, if it has a goal, as Freud seems to conceive,¹ it is a goal which means nothing for the individual and in which the individual has no place, save perchance as a fossil in some dead museum of the universe. And the creative possibilities of the libido described by Jung are equally non-moral. It is only in systems of psychology which take account of both freedom and purpose that sin has any place, for only here has a moral standard any meaning.

The problem for the psychologist of this latter type is that of making a clear distinction between sin proper and conditions in which moral freedom is in abeyance. The distinction is not difficult to draw in theory, though psychological writers have seldom troubled to make it. It is stated clearly by Hadfield: 'Sin is due to *wrong sentiments*, moral disease is due to *morbid complexes*² giving rise to uncontrollable impulses. The full and efficient cause of a sin is a deliberate and conscious choice of the will moved by a "false" or wrong ideal. The sinner and the morally

¹ See p. 52.

² There has been much confusion as to the terms 'sentiment' and 'complex.' The distinction is purely artificial, but the majority of modern writers use the term 'complex' only for dispositions in which there is an element of pathological repression. It is better to adhere strictly to this usage, which at least provides a suitable terminology for the discussion of the psychology of sin. Hart, Tansley, and some others use the term 'complex' in a broader sense which includes the 'sentiments,' and it is essential to bear this in mind in reading their books. For a full discussion of the subject cf. the important symposium in the *Journal of Psychology*, xiii. 2.

diseased both see the ideal: but whereas the former does not, the latter cannot, under ordinary circumstances, respond to it.'¹ This statement is perhaps the clearest which professional psychology has given us, and we may accept it provisionally with two notes of interrogation. In the first place the phrase 'moral disease' is a little confusing, since a condition in which no response can be made to an ideal seems to lie outside the sphere of morality. It may, however, be retained, since the effects of this condition are at first sight indistinguishable from wrong moral acts, and since, even though now stereotyped and non-moral, it may be due in part to causes which lay within the sphere of moral freedom. In the second place we may note that a symptom of moral disease may be moral blindness, in which case it cannot be said that there is any real consciousness of the ideal at all. But in principle the vital distinction is that which Hadfield makes between a sentiment, in which a wrong ideal is consciously and wilfully accepted, the 'Evil, be thou my good' of Milton's Satan, and a complex in which the wrong ideal, though superficially rejected, remains strongly in control in the unconscious life of impulse, all the more powerful because the rational and conscious self has ceased to pass judgment upon it.

In ordinary psychological practice the distinction is usually ignored. The sinful acts and habits with which moral theology is concerned are for the psychiatrist symptoms of a disorder to be treated on scientific lines and their moral status is a secondary matter. It is urged, not without reason, that the distinction between habitual sin and cases of an undoubtedly pathological type may be possible in theory, but is completely unworkable when it comes to treatment. The moral judgments of the patient are certainly factors to be taken into account, but only

¹ Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 48.

in the scientific sense. They are an important part of the whole system of symptoms, because they represent the patient's own attempt to establish a rational point of view, and indicate the lines upon which a more adequate solution of his problems is most likely to be achieved. In psycho-analysis of the Freudian type it is assumed that as the treatment continues the patient will come to understand the origin of these moral ideals in the old childish relationship to parents or teachers, or in the later adjustment to social life. Conscience is seen to be merely the subconscious mechanism by which the prestige of the social group, or of the father, asserts itself. In the end it is no more than the shadow of the Oedipus-complex.¹ The sense of guilt is explained as arising from strong primitive emotions of fear and desire, repressed, distorted, and detached from their original object. As all this is realized the patient is set free to make his own readjustment. We may well ask, and to this the Freudian system seems to provide no answer, whether he is not set free from morality altogether.

The analysts who follow Jung or Adler in their general method of treatment lay far more stress upon the moral and religious ideals of the patient, since they recognize that these result not only from his past environment as a child in the family or the social or religious group, but also from his own creative effort to establish and express his individual personality. But though there are many

¹ Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 45: 'The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more intense the Oedipus-complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of discipline, religious teaching, schooling, and reading) the more exacting later on is the domination of the super-ego over the ego—in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt.' Cf. p. 73. Also *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 358, and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 68 f., where a rather different turn is given to the analysis, stress being laid on 'the original narcissism in which the childish ego found its self-sufficiency'; cf. pp. 10 and 75.

among them who supplement their psychology by a belief in an ultimate moral standard, whether they state this in terms of religion or not, this belief does not relate itself directly to their psychological theory. As psychologists they look to causes and to results within the sphere of their science. It is the pathological and not the spiritual condition which concerns them, and their whole treatment is adapted to the recall of memories, the release of repressions, the redirection of the energy of instinct, appetite, and emotion in channels individually and socially practicable. They are concerned with citizens and not with saints, and where the Church might well be ill at ease they must perforce be content.

On the whole it would be true to say that psychologists are critical both of the religious view of sin and of traditional religious methods of dealing with sin. They find the typical religious mind at once superficial and censorious. A more scientific approach, they feel, would at least show how little it is possible for man to pass judgment upon man on the evidence of his outward acts. A very little knowledge of analysis and its results would reveal to us the range and complexity of circumstance and motive which forms the full history of the so-called sins to which we so readily affix our scale of condemnation. The psychologist is thus apt to regard the advice given by priest or spiritual director as an unscientific and even dangerous administration of crude suggestion resting upon an authority unsupported by real knowledge. Often enough it is a scarcely veiled appeal to self-interest, and, in the past at least, the threat of the wrath of an all-seeing and angry God has been used with devastating effect. Even to-day the preaching of the terrors of Hell is one of the most constant sources of neurosis.¹

¹ Bunyan is a typical example of such 'religious' fear. Cf. James, *Varieties of Religious Belief*, pp. 157 and 187. I have myself, in a very limited experience of psychological treatment, come across more than

And the attempts to awaken the sense of guilt, in an overmastering and emotional penitence, which have been characteristic of so much revivalist preaching,¹ are to the psychologist not merely misguided but dangerous. They substitute a mere primitive affect for a true and rational judgment, and hinder rather than help the soul in its progress towards true autonomy.

Doubtless much of this criticism rests upon misunderstanding. Obviously it is not in the least degree applicable to the work of Christ. There is no appeal to self-regard in His teaching, for what He offered men was contempt, persecution, and at the last a Cross. And the command, 'Judge not, that ye be not judged,'² goes even further than the psychological plea that understanding should precede judgment. So far as it is true that the proclamation of the wrath of God formed part of His teaching, and has any right place in the teaching of His Church, it must be remembered that the psychologist never has to deal, as He did, with the open and wilful sinner. The cases seen in the consulting-room are cases where there is already conflict and distress. The patient of the psychotherapist is seeking the way of peace, even though he may have the vaguest ideas as to where that peace is to be found. In other words, he is not a sinner in the gravest sense of the term. But Christ came not only to comfort the distressed, but to call sinners to repentance, and the task of His Church has not greatly changed. In this task the psychotherapist has little or no experience, and though his criticism of the results of our preaching must be given due weight, it must be remembered that he only sees our failures and not the immense company of those whom that preaching has

one case in which this teaching has been a predominant factor in producing a neurotic condition, and friends engaged in psychological practice constantly tell me of others. There are always, of course, other factors involved, but to admit this does not justify the preaching.

¹ Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 178.

² Mt. vii. 1.

brought through shame to peace. Even in those cases which he sees there may be more factors than the preaching to be taken into account, factors physical, mental, and social with which the preacher cannot concern himself directly.

Before we pass on to consider the great element of truth in the psychological point of view, and the lessons which it holds for pastoral theology, we must notice its incompleteness in two vital particulars. The first is its failure to account for moral valuation. The difficulty which we saw in the Freudian explanation of conscience and moral responsibility is inherent in every attempt to transform psychology into a strict science. The fact that in actual psychotherapy it is continually necessary to treat the moral and religious ideals of the patient as relevant and, for that matter, as true, is one to which the psychologist might well pay more attention. The second point is closely related to the first. The whole theory of sentiments and complexes, upon which the modern analysis of mental conflict rests, remains incomplete so long as its explanation is sought within the system of the emotional life. The usual account of the formation of a complex depends upon the principle that a system of impulses directed towards some object desired by the ego may either be integrated into the main stream or tendency of development, or may be repressed and linger on, divorced from consciousness but exercising a powerful and disturbing influence upon mood and conduct. If the resultant disharmony becomes too serious, psychological treatment may be necessary to reveal its causes. The theory is obvious enough, and has been abundantly vindicated by its application in practice. But those who use it constantly in the treatment of patients are apt to forget that it has explained very little. The reasons why the integration should take place in one case and not in another remain hopelessly obscure, precisely as obscure, in fact, as the explanation of the existence of sin and evil.

The two problems are one, and this becomes clear when we remember that no account of character formation through the sentiments is complete unless the personal relationships upon which it depends are fully recognized. And so we touch once more the central thesis of these lectures. The problem of life is the problem of love in all its phases. Psychology deals with its mechanisms upon the lower and intermediate levels. Beyond those levels we pass into the sphere of religion, and it is for this reason that while psychology as a science may have a pseudo-completeness of its own, such completeness as is in fact possible to any science within the sphere of its self-imposed limitations of matter and method, psychology as an art or practice of life can never be complete unless it takes religion into account. In particular the religious conception of sin is the necessary complement of the psychological analysis of its effects upon character, and in the treatment of moral and mental disorder there is likely to remain a disastrous margin of error until the religious point of view is given full value. Sin, if it be sin at all, can never be simply written off as moral disease, and it may well be true that there is no case of moral disease which has not in its origin and history some failure of personal adjustment, some disorder of love. And for this there is no better name than sin.

It is when we accept the religious account of sin and turn to the study of its effects upon character that we are able to appreciate the value of the work done by the psychologists and the great help which they can give towards the right ordering of spiritual direction. For though sin is a fact more fundamental than the disorder in which it results, that disorder is perfectly capable of psychological study and analysis. A brief account of sin from this standpoint will serve to throw into relief the respective tasks of priest, pastor, and psychiatrist.

Sin, then, is in its essence a disposition formed by love

of a wrong object. An object is wrong when it hinders the development of the love of God, which is the true end of personal being. It is therefore an object which ought not to be loved, and the introduction of this moral conception places sin outside the immediate range of psychology. But it still remains true that psychology can discuss the behaviour which results from the sinful disposition, and its effects upon character.

Particular sins are acts proceeding from a sinful disposition. They are therefore secondary and symptomatic. No moral judgment can be passed upon them directly, since rightness and wrongness inhere in the disposition and not in the act. A society and even a Church may have, for practical purposes, to form a code of sins, but such codes have no ultimate validity. The judgment of man's heart rests with God alone. We note, further, that we cannot limit sin to conscious acts of wrong-doing. Any act, however unconscious, which springs from a wrong disposition is a sin, and must be held to deserve moral censure, even though that censure relates in reality to the disposition itself. This is the element of truth in Augustinianism and Calvinism, and in the terrible picture which St. Paul gives of the decadence of mankind at the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans. And indeed it is a thought which might well give pause to the blindly amiable and pleasure-loving world of to-day. Amiability and good-fellowship carry no guarantee whatever of moral worth.

We may assume that every individual is in some degree a sinner, with a character not wholly unified by love of the highest. This can only mean that there are sentiments wrongly formed in his life, attached to wrong objects, and destroying the unity of his personality. The inevitable result will be an inner conflict, upon the issue of which the real achievement of his life depends.

Ideally it is conceivable that he may achieve perfect

sainthood, a character which at every point turns in love to the highest object and so moulds every impulse, every emotion, and every association to the service of that love. Thus our Lord could be truly tempted, yet without sin, for His sinlessness was not a mere absence of sinful acts, but was simply identical with His unbroken communion with the Father.¹ Equally conceivable is the possibility of perfection in evil, a character resting upon the complete and unbroken choice of some object known to be wrong, and the unhesitating rejection of the higher moral choice. At first sight it might appear that this also would be a way of peace. But in fact such a personality as an Iago, knowing neither compunction nor remorse in the unswerving choice of evil, is impossible. The conception raises insuperable difficulties for moral philosophy, since evil cannot be chosen save as a good, and for theology, since the whole impulse of life, in every instinct and appetite, is of God, and therefore there must needs be war to the death until the choice of God is made. The Hound of Heaven may not leave the sinner to the peace of his sin.²

These are the extreme cases. With the normal sinner we find a partial choice of a wrong object, a conflict of sentiments, a divided disposition, and distress. Here we move within a region of which psychology can give account,

¹ It is impossible to prove (or to disprove) the sinlessness of our Lord by any application of moral standards to the series of actions recorded in the Gospels. The attempt to do this has led to quite unnecessary problems, *e.g.* as to the cursing of the barren fig-tree, and the denunciations of the Pharisees. The problems simply do not arise if we start from His unique Filial consciousness.

² These difficulties apply with even greater force to the problem of the existence of a personal devil. The very possibility of the devil's existence seems to be bound up with the possibility of his loving and being loved, that is with the possibility of his salvation. It is not absurd logically to suppose that there may be a spiritual being who will, in fact, continuously and consistently reject that possibility. But this is in no sense a necessary postulate for the explaining of evil and its strange power. Milton's Satan, with his 'Evil, be thou my good,' is actually more tragic than evil.

and we find that the development of the sinful character takes place along lines familiar to the student of neurotic patients. The distress may take very various forms, according to the type of mentality of the sinner concerned.

(1) The conflict may continue in the open, no decision being reached. This condition is alien to the anxiety type of neurosis,¹ the least amenable of all to direct psychological treatment, though it may be possible to discover factors which have led to a general hesitancy in making effective decisions. Cases of this kind have the great advantage of honesty. They do not refuse to face their problems. There is little for the psychologist to do. There is nothing to analyse and suggestion is useless unless it can vindicate itself rationally. In such cases the direct stimulus of the religious appeal gives by far the best hope of success, and by this religious appeal is meant the presentation of an ideal so reasonable and so powerful that the hesitancy and indecision are overcome. The moral choice becomes possible not in the sinner's own strength, but in the strength of God drawing him upwards and onwards through love made manifest in Christ.

(2) More commonly there is some degree of repression. The conflict continues, but with reduced intensity. The

¹ The distinction between anxiety-states and hysteria is of the greatest practical importance, since quite different treatment is demanded in the two cases. It is bound up with Jung's distinction between introversion and extraversion; cf. his classical discussion in *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 287 ff., developed at length in his *Psychological Types*. Freud has sought to give an explanation of anxiety in terms of hysteria, but his views have undergone considerable modification (for a good summary see E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 500 ff.), and both in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* he recognizes that the psychoses proper present problems not readily explained along these lines. The problem is confused by the undoubted fact of hysterical anxiety (*Angst*), but this should hardly have the same name as the anxiety of the psychasthenic. Those who desire a detailed account of the symptoms of different types of disorder should consult Henderson and Gillespie, *A Text-book of Psychiatry*, or the brief outline in W. Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy*.

gravity of the issue is not fully felt, and though conscience is still active its keenness is dulled. The trivialities and needs of current daily life are allowed to occupy the foreground of attention. A low ideal of character is accepted as sufficient and the claims of God are avoided rather than refused. Here everything depends upon the degree and quality of the repression. In the vast majority of cases what is most effective is a sharpening of the conflict through the presentation of the religious ideal. With the re-awakening of love the repressions are broken down, and true repentance makes recovery possible.

(3) In some cases the repression is complete. All consciousness of sin is lost. Pathological complexes are formed, and sin has become moral disease. Frequently there are grave physical and mental symptoms, such as insomnia, or morbid anxieties displaced from their true source and attached to trivial occasions. Phobias, sometimes of the most absurd kind, are common, and their unfortunate victim clings to them with astonishing tenacity, rather than face the moral issues upon which they really depend. Unquestionably these are cases where psychological treatment can be of the greatest benefit, though there will be no cure unless there is a real desire for recovery on the part of the patient. But no psychology can create this desire. Religion, whether it is recognized as religion or not, must give driving force to the mechanisms which psychological treatment employs. This is the significance of the transference,¹ the personal relationship between healer and patient which is recognized as the effective element in all types of psychotherapy.

(4) A special case of this repression is to be seen in hysterical alternations of consciousness.² These again

¹ See p. 119.

² The literature of this subject is enormous. For extreme cases cf. James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. pp. 379 ff.; Janet, *L'Automatisme Psycho-*

lighten the conflict, but in a different manner. At times it is felt in its full severity. At times there is an apparent peace. For a season temptation has no power and there is even a high degree of spiritual exaltation. And then there is an interval of moral disaster, mastering its victim almost without resistance. Such cases are the despair of the pastor, but they are of a type familiar enough to the psychologist. They occur in persons of a naturally hysterical mentality, under the stress of the emotions aroused by specially painful occasions or by a peculiarly difficult environment. Here once more we are dealing with a form of moral disease, and without suitable treatment of the mental factors by methods now well known and usually effective, ordinary spiritual methods are likely to have little result.

Even from this short analysis it is clear that the tasks of the spiritual director and the psychotherapist can hardly be separated. What should be the terms of alliance upon which they are to be undertaken? From the point of view of the Church there is an increasing demand that ordinands, in the words of the Committee which reported to the Lambeth Conference in 1920, 'should be equipped by training in psychology, and be given some acquaintance with methods and principles of healing. Only so will the clergy be enabled rightly to direct the thought of their people on the subject and to discriminate between truth and error.'¹ The general attitude of the doctors is on the whole that expressed by Janet: 'I fancy it would be better, would be both more dignified and more useful, if each were to keep

logique; T. W. Mitchell, *Medical Psychology of Psychical Research*, pp. 69-218. A very interesting case, admirably illustrating the argument above, is that of 'Mlle. Vè,' described by Flournoy in *Archives de Psychologie de la Suisse Romande* for 1915, usefully summarized by Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 242 ff., and more fully and critically by Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 226 ff.

¹ *Report of the Lambeth Conference, 1920*, p. 125.

within his own sphere, and if doctor and priest were to render one another reciprocal service.'¹ The priest has every reason to desire this new knowledge. The doctor has every reason for suspecting the amateur, a suspicion which the long history of religious healing does nothing to allay.

Unfortunately the problem cannot be solved quite so simply as Janet and the doctors might desire. Medical service in this matter is utterly inadequate. The ordinary general practitioner is at least as ill equipped as his parish priest, and treatment by specialists or in institutions is long and costly. More than that, a very large proportion of those mentally disordered seek the aid of religion rather than that of the doctor, and it is frequently the priest who is first in touch with cases in their early stages, when wise treatment offers a good hope of success. For such cases the doctors have no time, and neither the patients nor their friends see the need for expert advice. A serious factor in such cases is the danger which results from the stigma of being regarded as 'mental,' and a skilled pastor can often give real help without involving the patient in this risk, which cannot easily be avoided if he is taken to consult the expert.²

¹ Janet, *Psychological Healing*, p. 136: 'When the doctor thinks that religious instruction is indicated, let him send the patient to the priest, who can speak of religion as a priest without intruding into the domain of medicine. When the doctor thinks that enough religious instruction has been given, and that more might become dangerous, he can withdraw his patient. The priest will not have to bother about dosage, or to nip faith in the bud. If the religious instruction fails to cure the patient, neither the priest nor the religion can be blamed for this, seeing that the doctor is responsible.' In which Janet shows a lamentable misunderstanding both of religion and of psychology. He completely ignores the inevitable complications of the 'transference.' Nevertheless his warning is of real weight. For a far more adequate statement of the difficulties, together with an entirely sympathetic desire for co-operation, cf. W. Brown, *Science and Personality*, pp. 170 ff.

² It may be added that those suffering from some of the most severe and dangerous disorders frequently, and perhaps even usually, come first to parson or priest, viz. the cases of melancholia, of persecutorial or delusional paranoia, and of so-called 'religious mania.' The doctors,

Nevertheless it is true that the primary task of the Church is strictly her own. The real question is not whether the Church should interfere in the task of the doctors, but whether the doctors can safely do their work without the aid of the Church. For when doctors leave on one side the essential character of sin they are condemning themselves and their patients to a very restricted view indeed of their problems. The direct commission of the Church is to preach Christ, and to proclaim the forgiveness of sins. The value of the preaching of Christ from the point of psychotherapy will by now be abundantly clear. If rightly performed it is the presentation of an object capable of drawing all the powers and impulses of man into the unity of His service.¹ 'I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me.'² And the proclamation of forgiveness, a very different thing from the pronouncing of judgment upon sins,³ is the first and greatest need of

in actual practice, get the easiest part of the work. When these severe disorders reach them it is usually too late to do much more than send the case to an institution. It is a matter of real urgency, from the medical side, that the clergy should have the knowledge which will enable them to understand the nature of these difficult types, and should be in the closest touch with doctors who also have this knowledge.

¹ So Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 48: The treatment for sin is 'the persistent presentation of a higher ideal.'

² Jn. xii. 32.

³ It is undoubtedly the original view of the Anglican Reformers that the function of the priest is to declare God's forgiveness. In the Exhortation inserted into the Communion Service the penitent is told to 'open his grief' to the 'minister of God's Word' that 'by the ministry of God's holy Word he may receive the benefit of absolution,' and this language is an intentional reply to the claim of the Council of Trent that the priest not only confers a benefit but acts as a judge; cf. esp. *Conc. Trid.* sessio xiv. c. 5. Unquestionably a secondary judicial function remains in the obligation to exclude from Communion 'open and notorious evil livers,' but this is not the 'judicium' intended by the Council of Trent. Even the very definite 'By His authority committed unto me, I absolve thee,' in the office for the Visitation of the Sick, was not meant in the Roman sense, but is simply an extension of 'He pardoneth and absolveth all them that truly repent,' as in the Order for Morning Prayer, and its directness is intended as a support and assurance to the dying. All this is entirely sound psychologically, as well as spiritually (cf. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 223).

those who are involved in moral distress. It corrects faulty conceptions of the universe and of God, and sets love free to do its work. Psychology, for all its outward appearance of charity, knows no forgiveness, and is therefore harder and less true to reality than the sternest Calvinism. For science is a matter of law and not of mercy, and the doctor who is not something more than a scientist has nothing to say to sin.

These things should never be forgotten by the priest who finds himself intrigued by the new and inviting possibilities of psychological treatment. His first task is that of being true to his office, and in such faithfulness he should go forward with a good courage. He is already doing more and not less than the doctors in their own field. Psychological medicine is no substitute for the Gospel, and it is incomparably less powerful to heal than the love of souls.

When this has been said it remains true that a knowledge of psychology is a most valuable possession for the would-be spiritual director.¹ It is the standing tradition of the Church that the priest is asked for advice, penance, and absolution, and even in quarters where sacramental confession is deprecated the pastor finds the same demand made upon him, with less formality but with no less urgency. Of absolution we have spoken and there is no need to make a sharp distinction between its efficacy as a means of grace and its power to touch into action the hidden impulses of love. Of penance we need only say that its theological significance is bound up with the secondary forensic conception of sin. It has its value in certain cases, but should be used with the strictest discretion, and with due regard to its psychological effects. That God demands or desires it is simply incredible, save in so far as His love must always desire the healing of the soul. And there are cases where

¹ A valuable contribution on this side is *Spiritual Direction*, by T. W. Pym.

a sharp surgery is seen by both priest and penitent to be the way of love.

In the giving of advice even a little psychological knowledge is better than none. It is not here a matter of the means of grace, but rather of a general insight into character. It will save the priest from accepting accounts of sin at their face value. He will be better able to perceive the working of the powerful instincts, appetites, and emotions, and to suggest methods of redirecting their energy into channels of service and so to check their essential self-reference. Incidentally it will make it impossible for the priest to be emotionally disturbed, or shocked, at anything which he may hear, for he will know that no sin, however grave in its social effects, is more than a symptom. At the same time it will guard him against the more obvious dangers. He will know the shallowness of treatment by crude suggestion, and when he uses, for good reasons, the prestige and authority of his office, he will be very careful to build up true freedom, the movement of individual faith and love, in the soul, just as the physician, in dealing with hysteria, must not only cancel the symptom but deal with its cause by faithful re-education. Above all he will be warned of the dangers of amateur analysis. The priest is concerned with the sins of which the conscience is afraid. If he has reason to suspect serious mental disorder, he must insist upon skilled psychological advice. The ordered structure of the unconscious may not be lightly disturbed and he will know that a little experimental dream-interpretation, or any attempt at awakening old memories by free association, may set forces in motion which he may have neither time nor skill to control.

A specially important piece of knowledge is that of the mechanism and potency of the so-called transference. It is by no accident that the priest has so commonly been given the title of 'Father.' Inevitably the close personal contact

of spiritual direction establishes that relationship which, as we have seen, is a powerful driving force in psychotherapy of all kinds. The priest will find himself forced into a position which is more than official and more even than friendship. He will have to guard himself at every point against its undesirable development, and here the Roman Church in its ordering of the Confessional has been far wiser than the Church of England, which has signally failed to control the zeal of those who have, rightly enough, pressed for its adequate recognition once more. But he will know that it is through this living and vital relationship that he is able most deeply to touch the problems of his penitents. The psychotherapist seeks to secure the transference, but he seeks also to resolve it in the light of reality. In the course of the treatment the patient may take up a most difficult attitude of admiration and affection. At its close he should be no more than friend, free to live his own life. The priest will resolve the transference as rapidly as it arises, for his own life will be so wholly turned to God that he will never fall into the snare of welcoming and holding for himself the affection, admiration, or love, which, when the cure is complete, must be God's alone.¹

So only shall the spiritual director be safe, and perchance so only the physician, if he loves God first, and man second, and himself last of all.

¹ On the whole question of sin and its psychology cf. Hodgson, *Essays in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 15-23.

LECTURE VI

GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH

SYNOPSIS

THE discussion of the nature of authority in the Church has passed through two phases and is entering upon a third. The first phase was the defence of an external and objective sanction, akin to the political belief in the Divine right of kings. The second has been the assertion of the responsibility of the individual, by whom authority must be accepted if it is to be valid. The third involves the discussion of the inherent character of group-life.

It is here that recent psychology has a definite contribution to make to the problem. The analysis of the group, in its primitive and in its more permanent and organized forms, shows that the development of the principle of authority is only another aspect of the development of personality. A comparison of the discussions of Le Bon and McDougall shows how the developed sanctions of organized groups, which raise the ethical autonomy of the individual to a higher level, rest upon, even while they transcend, the powerful and primitive 'herd-impulses.' The difficulty of the problem of authority rests upon the confusion of these two aspects.

Freud has shown the importance of a still more fundamental question: What is the nature of the bond which links the group together? Clearly this is personal, and thus the structure of the group is seen to depend upon the same principle which leads to the formation of the sentiments in the individual. In this connection the question of group-leadership is especially significant. In all groups there must be a leader, though the leadership may be expressed symbolically, whether through sacraments or otherwise. Freud's own theory of the basis of this leadership is mythological, but his analysis provides the key to the essential structure of the group.

As applied to the Church this mode of approach enables us to reconcile, at least in principle, the two opposing views of authority from which we started. The basic principle of the Church is seen to be faith, developed through love. But this is not mere subjectivism. Faith is not individual but corporate, and it looks to Christ. And it is meaningless unless God, through Christ, is drawing man to himself.

LECTURE VI

GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH

That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us : yea, and our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ.

1 John i. 3.

‘As to the affairs of conscience and eternal salvation,’ wrote Bishop Hoadly, ‘Christ hath left no visible, human authority behind Him.’

‘My Lord,’ replied William Law, ‘is not this saying, that He has left no authority at all? For Christ came with no other authority Himself: but as to conscience and salvation, He erected a kingdom, which related to nothing but conscience and salvation; and therefore they who have no authority as to conscience and salvation, have no authority at all in His kingdom. Conscience and salvation are the only affairs of that kingdom.’

‘Your Lordship denies that any one has authority in these affairs; and yet you take it ill to be charged with asserting that Christ hath not invested any one with authority for Him. How can any one act for Him but in His kingdom? How can they act in His kingdom if they have nothing to do with conscience and salvation, when His kingdom is concerned with nothing else? . . .

‘Your Lordship thinks this is sufficiently answered, by saying you contend against an absolute authority . . . but, my Lord, it is still true, that you have taken all authority from the Church: for the reasons you everywhere give against this authority, conclude as strongly against any degree of authority, as that which is truly absolute.’¹

¹ William Law, *Defence of Church Principles*, pp. 62 f. (The references are to the 1893 edition, in *The Westminster Library*. The introduction to this edition gives a useful account of the ‘Bangorian Controversy.’)

Hoadly's plea that individual sincerity is all that God asks was easily answered by Law :—

‘ You are as strictly obliged to allow that man to be sincere who mistakes the grounds and principles of true sincerity, because he thinks himself to be sincere, as to allow that person to be justified in his religion, who mistakes the true religion, because he thinks himself in the true religion.’ ¹

Thus faithfully dealt the Non-juror with the dangerous Bishop of Bangor. Law's *Defence of Church Principles* has become a classic, while Hoadly held, mainly *in absentia*, four bishoprics, and is to-day unread.² But who, looking at the Church of to-day, could say which of the two was on the winning side? No reader of Law's letters can question their devastating effectiveness, and yet it still remains true that the principles for which Hoadly contended are among the most vital forces in modern religious development. His case held some truth at least that was more than his arguments.

These quotations from one passage-at-arms in an age-long controversy will serve the purpose of throwing into relief the issues which are raised in connection with the problem of the relation between the Church and the individual Christian. The technical discussion of that problem is no part of the design of these lectures. All that we can attempt is a brief survey and then we may turn to the humbler task of enquiring whether the researches of modern psychology cast any light upon the nature of the Church and of that religious authority which it unquestionably exercises over its members.

Historically the discussion has passed through two main phases, and is now entering upon a third. The first phase, beginning in New Testament times and continuing, though not without modification, to the present day, has been the defence of external and objective sanctions. Down to the

¹ Law, *op. cit.* p. 331.

² *Op. cit.* p. 35.

Reformation it was the unquestioned belief of all Christians that the Church, with its obligations of faith and practice, rested upon an ordinance of Christ. The authority vested in the system was thus derivative from its source. 'Nothing could be further,' wrote Canon Mason, 'from the mind of all early Christendom, whether Catholic or otherwise, than the idea that each Christian was an independent unit responsible only to God for what he did and for the views which he expressed.'¹ 'The mild anarchy of early Christianity is a figment of modern imaginations.'² This recognition that all authority is of God, and that it is mediated through Christ and in His Church, is as fundamental to the charismatic ministry of the prophets as to the ordered development of the monarchical episcopate. There is no trace of any confusion of the issue by the suggestion that the group, or society, or Church, may exercise an influence through its own inherent group-nature, and that this influence is very hard to distinguish in its effects from the sanctions of an external authority. That the authority of the Church rests upon the command and purpose of Christ, recorded in the Gospels and vested in a living tradition, is a belief common to Cyprian, Optatus, and Augustine, to Wycliffe and Calvin, to William Law, and to the advocates whether of Papal infallibility, or of schemes for reunion in South India. So little question was there of the nature of this authority that political and ecclesiastical theory went hand in hand. 'The powers that be are ordained of God.'³ The famous 'No bishop, no king' of James I was no barren jest. In the last resort it was true that the spiritual authority of bishops and the Divine right of kings were, in principle, the same.

With the political upheavals of the Reformation the second phase of the discussion began in earnest. It need not be questioned that the direct allegiance of the individual

¹ In *The Early History of the Church and the Ministry* (ed. Swete), p. 40.

² *Op. cit.* p. 43.

³ Rom. xiii. i.

believer to Christ has been recognized in every period when religion has been a living power in the world. But the appeal of George Fox and the Quakers to the guidance of the 'Inner Light,' of Bishop Hoadly to individual sincerity, or of the Free Churchman to the right of private judgment, breathes the spirit of the modern democratic revolution, which vests authority in the individual members of the State, and seeks anxiously, and with but very moderate success, for means whereby to make popular representative government effective. We look in vain for such a spirit in earlier times. When Hort, in his lectures on the Christian Ecclesia, argued that the 'ill-defined but lofty authority' wielded by the Apostles 'in matters of government and administration' was merely moral in character, resting upon 'the spontaneous homage of the Christians' of their day, and that the New Testament shows 'no trace of a formal commission of authority for government from Christ Himself,'¹ he drew, at least by implication, a dangerous inference from a half-truth. The early Christians, apart possibly from a few Montanists, were no Modernists, claiming the right to be a law unto themselves,² whether in the name of reason or in the name of a special inspiration. Their homage was indeed spontaneous, because they were utterly, and without self-consciousness, part of a living and growing Church. There was no William James, or Bergson, or Bertrand Russell to preach to them of the supreme and creative values of their own individual personalities. They could not have understood why anybody should wish to make proclamation of 'A Free Man's Worship.' This view of the spirit of the early

¹ Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 84.

² Traces of this spirit certainly appear at Corinth (*cf.* 1 Cor. viii. 1, 9; x. 23-30), but it is little more than general rebelliousness. The challenge to St. Paul's authority comes from quite another side, and there is no attempt to found a theory of the Church upon such individualism.

Church is not in the least affected by Canon Streeter's recent researches into the vagaries of administration through which order was gradually reached.¹ Such vagaries were a matter of life and growth. Neither individual Christian nor local Church was conscious of self in the sophisticated modern way.

Nevertheless the awakening, in the seventeenth century, of interest in the true status and significance of the individual has affected the problem of the nature of the Church at least as profoundly as it has affected political theory. We have only to turn to one or two recent vindications of the authority of the Church to see how the individual has come into his own. It is a symptom of the times, theologically speaking, that Dr. Rawlinson should recently have delivered Paddock Lectures with the title of *Authority and Freedom*, in which the whole stress is laid upon the development of the individual response in faith to the objective claims of goodness and of God. External authority, whether in Church or State, is to be reduced to the very barest minimum. The one appeal is to be that of a loving service. Dr. Rawlinson borrows from Heiler² the moving picture of the *Papa angelico* that might be, going forth from the Vatican in the habit and the spirit of a new St. Francis and winning a world 'not by self-assertive insistence upon the authority of Christ, and not by the assumption of spiritual or temporal power, but solely in virtue of humility and utter discipleship to Christ.'³ To such an authority, says Heiler, man might indeed respond. But the response would be a response of free love, utterly unlike the self-assertiveness of that

¹ In *The Primitive Church*. The essential features of Streeter's position have been recognized for some time, e.g. by C. H. Turner in his essay in *The Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, and by Rawlinson in *Foundations*, pp. 408 ff.

² *Der Katholizismus seine Idee und seine Erscheinung*, pp. 334-340.

³ Rawlinson, *Authority and Freedom*, pp. 48-53.

lawless, if often amiable, individualism, which has brought confusion upon the Church, and is like to bring ruin upon our modern civilization.

Canon Quick ¹ has challenged the practicability of such a vision, but upon grounds rather pessimistic than ultimate. He sees no final and absolute authority save that which man is under an obligation to accept, and this obligation is the obligation of reason and conscience. For 'absolute authority is nothing' else than the claim made upon us by absolute value,' and it is through reason and conscience that the absolute values of truth and goodness are apprehended. The authority of persons, institutions, or doctrines is secondary, and must rest upon our belief that reason and conscience require our obedience. That this authority of reason and conscience must in fact be exercised through Church or State does not alter its essentially individual character. Canon Quick questions this emphasis, dreading individualism in politics as much as he dislikes, in philosophy, Troeltsch's doctrine of polymorphous truth. And he is clearly right in pointing out that nothing can be recognized as conscientious or rational which is not 'in some sense felt to be of universal authority and application.' But when he appeals to the facts of history and experience as constituting the main case of Socialism in politics and Catholicism in religion, his opinion, in itself based upon an individual and private judgment, is in no real conflict with the view that the object of all authority should be freedom. 'If we identify absolute authority with the obligation imposed by absolute value . . . we find that in principle authority does not conflict with freedom at all, but rather implies it. It is far more strongly opposed to compulsion than to liberty.' It is an authority which is of God, because the existence of absolute values depends upon the

¹ The quotations in this paragraph are from an article by Canon Quick in *The Pilgrim* for April 1925, entitled 'What is Authority?'

being of God, but each man must judge and accept it for himself. 'He must use his reason and conscience to check and criticise every message or command which purports to come even from God Himself.' And 'even though the inward authority which a man takes for his reason or conscience does make mistakes, he must nevertheless treat it as infallible.' We are not far from Hoadly's much-abused doctrine of individual sincerity once again.

Rather a different turn is given to the discussion in the latest defence of Anglo-Catholicism.¹ Mr. Knox and Mr. Milner-White say quite frankly that 'the second authority in Christianity is, and always must be, the private judgment of the individual.'² 'No "authority" in the sense of an ecclesiastical system with a fixed set of beliefs can ever get rid of the need for an act of private judgment which will accept the claims of the system.'³ But here the reconciliation between the two aspects of authority is not found in a philosophy of absolute values, but simply and directly in personal relationships. 'The ultimate authority in the Christian religion, if by the word "authority" we mean "that which gives us reason for believing," is the Person of Christ.'⁴ It is not a teaching or a tradition about Him, but a living and direct relationship, into which men enter through the living fellowship of the Church. Thus authority is seen to be simply and directly inherent in the life of the social group, and it arises spontaneously and freely just in so far as the social group is a spontaneous and free manifestation of the natural development of personal life. The real basis of every association, as Bishop Strong has pointed out, is friendship, and 'all the higher possibilities of man's existence emerge

¹ Knox and Milner-White, *One God and Father of All*, a reply to V. Johnson, *One Lord, One Faith*.

² *Op. cit.* p. 83.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 84.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 82.

through his social character.' ¹ 'Authority is one outward form which the claim of the race upon the individual may take : it is a function of the social nature of man.' ²

We are doing no injustice to modern tendencies of thought when we take such statements as characteristic of the modern defence of the principle of authority. Whether the argument will issue in a peaceable acceptance of the existing order, or in a libertarianism which justifies itself by an appeal to that better order which is to be, is largely a matter of individual choice and temperament. There has ever been need for radical and conservative in the State, for prophet and priest in the Church. But the essential argument remains the same. And since it is an argument which depends upon the analysis of human nature

¹ Strong, *Authority in the Church*, p. 9. The passage is worth quoting in full as illustrating the background of the modern psychological discussion : 'There is no question that, from the ethical point of view, men are related not only as independent rivals, but as friends. They have intercourse one with another in which their purposes are at one : they unite for various ends : they cannot, indeed, exist without combination. The individual, as Aristotle said, is not *αὐτάρκης* : *αὐτάρκεια*, so far as that is ever achieved, comes by combination. Moreover, as life develops and becomes fuller, it appears that all the higher possibilities of man's existence emerge through his social character. Even conscience itself could never attain any very lofty result or occupy any very wide range of man's life except through the enlightenment which comes to it through the experience of social evolution. . . . But this is only another way of saying that just in so far as man is really intended by nature to be moral, so far he must express himself in social forms. That is, society is not merely an accidental co-partnership between a number of individuals who have separate lives and purposes : it is the necessary atmosphere of moral life.' So again the authority of reason depends 'on our confidence in a sense of unity' with those whom we trust in the field of knowledge (p. 35). We may add one further quotation to those made in the text of the lectures : 'If our previous arguments have been valid, the authority of the Church in matters of truth is paternal rather than judicial : it is exercised rather by persuasion and explanation and individual instruction than by quasi-legal judgments. . . . The authority of the Church is best declared by the vindication of its truth to the reason and consciences of men ; and this is best carried on by individual work amongst them, which is, after all, the method by which Christ and His Apostles laid the foundations of Christianity' (p. 132).

² *Op. cit.* p. 36.

and not upon the existence of absolute objective standards, whether revealed or self-authenticated, it at once raises the question of the special character of religious authority. Can we find here, as we have found in other aspects of human life, any indication that the ancient claim of the Church is true, and that in the end all authority, and not religious authority only, is no mere by-product of human life, but an expression, however broken and imperfect, of that love whereby the Creator draws His creatures to Himself?

We can set our problem in the clearest light by the aid of a further quotation from Bishop Strong: 'Authority is, in the Church, a concrete effect or embodiment of the fundamental principle of its social unity. The fact that men have the tendency to unite involves the principle of authority; and the real claim of the authority to command lies in the necessary social character of men. The revelation in Christ of a still deeper unity in mankind, the admission of men through Him into the closest union with God, gives to the authority of the spiritual society a more august, more commanding power; but it is, we may say, the same in kind.'¹ Granting this, and few reasonable people will be disposed to dispute it, what defence can be given of the special claim of the Church to a peculiar authority, arising 'out of its peculiar relation to God through Christ'?² There is no doubt of the claim:—

The peculiarity of the Church as a society of men, is that by it men are admitted into fellowship with God. . . . That this is achieved only through Christ is beyond all doubt the doctrine of the New Testament. Nor is there any sign of an expectation that an individual could attain this result except by becoming a member of the Body of Christ. . . . The case of the individual who calls himself a Christian but stands outside the Body is, we may safely say, entirely absent from the New Testament.³

¹ Strong, *op. cit.* p. 78.

² *Op. cit.* p. 79.

³ *Ibid.*

But similar claims are inherent in other religious systems, and the direct defence of Christianity appears at first sight to involve us in a circular argument from which there is no refuge. It cannot satisfy us to vindicate the authority of the tradition and the system on the ground of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture on the ground of the tradition and the system.

There are three ways of escape. We may point to the living and historical experience of the Church as embodying values which transcend those embodied in any other social expression of human development. Or we may follow out Canon Quick's reasoning in exposition of the objectivity of the standards of truth and goodness, and so argue from philosophy to Christ as the supreme vindication of those standards upon the plane of history. Or we may turn to the more careful analysis of the personal relationships involved in the very existence of human societies, and see whether these are complete and self-explanatory, or whether they bear the marks of a process in which both the individual and the social group find their consummation in the Kingdom of God.

The last of these alternatives is that with which we are now concerned, and in its discussion we come to the third and most recent phase of the controversies as to the nature of authority, the phase in which the inherent character of group-life is analysed upon biological and psychological lines. Obviously we cannot expect to establish upon this basis a proof of the special claims of Christianity, or even to secure theistic belief beyond all contradiction. But if we can show that these claims and this belief form the natural climax of processes displayed in the natural order of animal and human life, we have gone far towards the vindication of a faith which can never, to the end, be the same thing as knowledge. Christianity asks no more than a free field for faith.

It is here that recent psychology has its definite contribution to make to the problem. It has sometimes appeared indeed that this contribution is negative and destructive, reducing all authority to the mere pressure of the so-called herd-instinct, and relegating reason and conscience to a secondary place, but those who take such a view fail to realize the full significance of the development of the herd-instinct in human life, and its transformation through the herd-sentiment into love. For in love authority and freedom, reason and goodness, meet.

The beginning of this last and most critical phase in the discussion of the problem of authority was marked by the apparently irrelevant circumstance of Galton's visit to South Africa in 1851.¹ His observations upon the curious power of the gregarious impulse in the Damara oxen² paved the way for the long series of studies by naturalists and psychologists, who have drawn freely from animal and insect life to illustrate the strange, primitive, and non-rational influence which the group seems, by its own inherent nature, to exercise over its members. The recent studies of Trotter,³ McDougall,⁴ and others have firmly established this herd-instinct as fundamental to human behaviour, and its relation to the moral and rational aspects of that behaviour has been freely discussed. On the descriptive side the work has now been carried through with some completeness. 'Crowd-psychology' has become an established term of current speech. The art of the demagogue is being transformed into a science. Themistocles and Cleon are at school in Harley Street, and, unless religion can hold its own, the world bids fair to evolve politicians no more scrupulous and far more dangerous than Athens, Westminster, or even Moscow, have ever known.

¹ Galton, *Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa*.

² Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, p. 72.

³ Trotter, *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*.

⁴ McDougall, *The Group Mind*.

But description and explanation are very different matters. Some popular presentations of modern psychology might well lead us to ask whether man is indeed better than oxen. That there is an irrational element in the behaviour of the crowd is obvious enough, nor is this in any way a new discovery. But to attempt to reduce all the sanctions of the social order, of Church and State alike, to this basal, instinctive factor is to ignore all that is most characteristic of man. The problem of authority cannot be solved without some reference to reason, to freedom, and to the moral values.

Nevertheless this contribution from the side of animal psychology has done much to clear the ground. It is now possible to see that authority, like every other expression of human life, is not something simple, fixed, and always the same. It has a lower and a higher, a growth from primitive, hardly human, beginnings to the glorious liberty of the sons of God. There are compulsions in the lives of men that are not far removed from the blind necessities of animal instinct, and these compulsions form the actual sphere within which the higher authority develops, coming upon them as it were from without, and so enabling man to find at once his freedom, his dignity, and himself. The transformation is utterly inexplicable if we look simply to instinct itself. No interplay of instinctive compulsions explains the autonomy of the developed human life. The interaction of the group and its members is no mechanism, but living and creative, and unless we regard it as proceeding from a Reality that is living and creative we make no sense of it. There is room here, and more than room, for the hypothesis of a God.

Perhaps the first modern writer to draw the threads together, showing that the ecclesiastical discussion of the nature of authority and the biological description of the social group with its non-rational compulsions form parts

of a single problem, was Lord Balfour, whose *Foundations of Belief*, first published in 1895, marks the transition to a psychological treatment of the whole subject. Few writings of recent times have so altered the trend of discussion as his short chapter on 'Authority and Reason.'¹ Here, to the dismay of the philosophers, who have, indeed, been loud in their objections,² authority is throughout contrasted with reason, and the term is used as standing 'for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.'³ Balfour's description of what he terms 'psychological climates' is more than convincing.⁴ It is an obvious fact that in any given period and social order a whole world of beliefs and sanctions lies utterly beyond the reach of criticism. Philosophers give different reasons for the wrongness of murder, but they arrive with a curious certainty at the same result.⁵ Ethical systems are obscure, complex, and hotly disputed, and yet, in any given social group, men walk with assurance and in harmony over wide fields of human conduct. Custom holds far more strongly than any consciously accepted or rationally defended law of God or man.

Nor is it strictly accurate to say that we accept many of our beliefs because we recognize that others, our teachers, our family, our neighbours, 'are truthful persons, happy in the possession of adequate means of information.'⁶ The conscious recognition of the dependence of our beliefs and obligations upon the prestige or knowledge of others is but a very small part of the truth. 'Early training,

¹ Balfour, *Foundations of Belief* (1901 edn.), pp. 206 ff.

² *Op. cit.* p. 244, where Balfour answers the objections of Pringle Pattison, defending his use of the word authority for 'those causes of belief which are not reasons and yet are due to the influence of mind on mind.' Quick, in the article quoted above (p. 166), has also criticized the use of the term in this sense, while fully accepting the facts described.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 232.

⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 210 f.

⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 218 ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 233.

parental authority, and public opinion, were causes of belief before they were reasons; they continued to act as non-rational causes after they became reasons; and it is not improbable that to the very end they contributed less to the resultant conviction in their capacity as reasons than they did in their capacity as non-rational causes.¹ There is, in fact, inherent in the very nature of the group a power of constraining its members which is prior to all consciously accepted authorities; religious, political, or social, and until this power has been appraised and understood all attempts to deal with the problem of authority must necessarily be superficial and self-contradictory. For in the earlier phases of the discussion the individual and the group stood over against one another, with the concept of God loosely formulated in a relationship very uncertainly apportioned between the two. Theories of social contracts and of Divine sanctions and rights were thus inevitable, and inevitably unsatisfactory.² In actual life the individual and the group are not and have never been thus separate. Both develop together in a single complex unity, primitive, personal, and unquestioned. And as each successive child grows into the discovery of his own personality, so and by the same stages he grows into the discovery of his group-environment, and with that twofold growth the implicit and non-rational sanctions of the group-life, as necessary and as unchallenged as the air the child must breathe, develop into the rational and moral sanctions of the social order, within which alone the spirit of man is free.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 234.

² The recent theories of such writers as Durkheim and Lévy Bruhl come under the same criticism (see pp. 57 ff.) and do not concern us here. They do no justice to the significance of the individual, or to the organic inter-relationship of the development of the group and its members. Even for the earlier phases of this development the 'collective consciousness' of Lévy Bruhl is not an adequate category. Still less does it cover such a conception of the Church even as that outlined by Freud: see pp. 187 f.

The study of the group is inevitable for psychology, since the behaviour of man is at every point related to the various groups of which he is a member. It is only by the most drastic abstraction that he can be considered in isolation, and such consideration is more proper to physiology than to psychology. Even the behaviour of a Robinson Crusoe has far more reference to the social order from which he has been sundered, and to which he hopes to return, than to the immediate and transient ends of his island life. And if psychology must thus borrow freely from sociology and political science for its understanding of the individual, it makes ample repayment, since it is upon an understanding of the individual that the wider study of his corporate life must rest. So alone can we be delivered from such unreal and misleading fictions as the 'economic man,' the 'ordinary citizen,' and the 'modern woman,' or 'the social will,' 'the collective consciousness,' and 'public opinion.' Nor have the terms 'Church' and 'State' any more meaning unless we take full account of the individuals of which they are composed and of the fact that these associations arise from the needs and possibilities inherent in the individual life. And to say this is not to deny that all ultimate authority may be of God, since it is in Him alone that such possibilities have at once their source and their fulfilment.

The primary fact, upon which all else depends, is the fact of the existence of the group itself. And here we have to enquire at the very outset into the exact process by which the group is formed, for even a crowd, casual and temporary as it is, is something more than a large number of people in a restricted area.¹ An individual in a London street may be utterly unrelated to the hundreds of people about him. And when we come to a descriptive analysis of the various types of group, ranging from the accidental

¹ Selbie, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 150—a curiously exact parallel to what I had, quite independently, written in the above paragraph.

and unorganized crowd to the most complex and permanent social structures, we find an exact parallel to the development of personality in the individual. There is everywhere the same striking appearance of Otherness, of a creative impulsion which comes upon man from without. From the first shock of attention to some street accident, or fire-bell, or passing show, through which the crowd is born, up to the broadest of the creative ends which mould the ordering of human history, the whole story of group development reveals the group looking to that which lies beyond itself, drawn ever upwards and onwards, creatively and inexplicably. And just as in the individual there is a strange resistance to this growth, the tendency to seek static security instead of living adventure, *das Ich* looking back longingly, like Lot's wife, to *das Es*, in which is peace, and death,¹ so in the organized group we see this same tendency to seek persistence instead of life, to look to the good in past and present, to refuse the creative work wherein Reality reveals itself as more and not less than man.

The characteristics of the simple crowd have been well described by Le Bon.² It produces in those who form it a singular transformation both of conduct and of feeling.

However like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come into being, or do not transform themselves into acts except in the case of individuals forming a crowd.³

These are explained as arising through the release of the powerful unconscious motives which underlie our

¹ See p. 25.

² Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 29; cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 171 ff.

individually acquired personalities.¹ In the sheer pressure of the crowd the individual is lost, ordinary, rational self-control is in abeyance, and the average racial type comes into view. There appear, further, certain special characteristics. The sense of personal responsibility vanishes, since the numbers and the anonymity of the crowd allow to each of its members a free satisfaction of 'instincts which had he been alone he would perforce have kept under restraint.'² There is a curious contagion or suggestibility, swaying the individual members of the crowd with a compulsion which at times becomes completely irresistible. 'In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such an extent that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest.'³ 'He is no longer conscious of his acts. In his case, as in the case of the hypnotised subject, at the same time that certain faculties are destroyed, others may be brought to a high degree of exaltation. Under the influence of a suggestion, he will undertake the accomplishment of certain acts with irresistible impetuosity. This impetuosity is the more irresistible in the case of crowds than in that of the hypnotised subject, from the fact that, the suggestion being the same for all the individuals of the crowd, it gains in strength by reciprocity.'⁴

Most striking of all is the reversion of the crowd to primitive types of behaviour, far below the level of the individuals which compose it. 'By the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation. Isolated, he may be a

¹ Le Bon, *op. cit.* p. 30.

² *Op. cit.* p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 34. Le Bon goes on to define, as the principal characteristics of the individual who forms part of a crowd, 'the disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance of the unconscious personality, the turning by means of suggestion and contagion of feelings and ideas in an identical direction, the tendency to immediately transform the suggested ideas into acts' (p. 35).

cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings.’¹ The picture is familiar enough to any reader of history, and we need not stay to complete it in detail. The behaviour of the individual who has come under the influence of a crowd is that of a primitive savage, or of a child. There may be in it something of the impulsive tenderness of childhood, something of the swift generosity and heroism of the savage, but even the exaltation of the crowd lacks the true and controlled autonomy of the individual at his highest, and the summary given by McDougall is entirely justified :

We may sum up the psychological characters of the unorganised or simple crowd by saying that it is excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments; extremely suggestible, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgment, incapable of any but the simpler and imperfect forms of reasoning; easily swayed and led, lacking in self-consciousness, devoid of self-respect and of sense of responsibility, and apt to be carried away by the consciousness of its own force, so that it tends to produce all the manifestations we have learned to expect of any irresponsible and absolute power. Hence its behaviour is like that of an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation, rather than like that of its average member; and in the worst cases it is like that of a wild beast, rather than like that of human beings.²

Freud is clearly right when he points out that we must not be content with this description of crowd behaviour.³ It is not in the least adequate to say that the sheer pressure of the crowd, its strength of numbers, in which the individual at once feels himself omnipotent and at the same time

¹ Le Bon, *op. cit.* p. 36.

² McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 45.

³ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 13.

freed from all danger of being called to account, and the noise and haste which overrides all the slower processes of reason, are in themselves sufficient to explain the transformation which it works upon its members. The contagion of which Le Bon speaks is doubtless closely akin to the effects of the herd-instinct, as seen in the animal world, but this is not the whole story. The parallel with hypnotic states in itself suggests that we must look to something more specifically characteristic of man if we would understand this strange possibility of reversion to the primitive and the childish. We are dealing throughout with a problem of personality, and it is in terms of living and growing personality that the special phenomenon of the crowd must be explained. And we shall do well to remember that the unorganized, or disorganized, crowd is, comparatively speaking, a rare phenomenon, at any rate in its extremest forms. The social group as we know it always shows some degree, however slight, of organization, and it will simplify our problem if we examine some of the features of more complex groups before we attempt to interpret the significance of the crowd itself. For the complex group is highly characteristic of human life, and it may well be that the crowd, as described by Le Bon, is very far from being the simple material out of which the complex group is formed, and that its true analogy is not with the primitive and the childish, but rather with a disturbance or even a neurotic disorder in an adult and normally sane individual.

McDougall has laid down five conditions¹ as 'of principal importance in raising collective mental life to a higher level than the unorganised crowd can reach, no matter how homogeneous the crowd may be in ideas and sentiments, nor how convergent the ideas and volitions of its members.' It is noteworthy that although, as he says, these 'favour and render possible the formation of a

¹ *The Group Mind*, pp. 49 f.

group mind,' they are in themselves merely descriptive of some of the general characteristics of human society. They do not explain how they arise or how they operate in moulding either the group itself or its members.

The first condition is some degree of permanence in the group.

The continuity may be predominantly material or formal, that is to say, it may consist either in the persistence of the same individual as an inter-communicating group, or in the persistence of the system of generally recognised positions each of which is occupied by a succession of individuals. Most permanent groups exhibit both forms of continuity in a certain degree; for, the material continuity of a group being given, some degree of formal continuity will commonly be established within it.

In any highly developed group, such as a Church or a nation, it is clear that both forms of continuity are always strongly marked.

The second condition is 'that in the minds of the mass of the members of the group there shall be formed some adequate idea of the group, of its nature, composition, functions, and capacities, and of the relations of the individuals to the group.' The importance of this is that 'as with the idea of the individual self, a sentiment of some kind almost inevitably becomes organised about this idea and is the main condition of its growth in richness of meaning; a sentiment for the group which becomes the source of emotions and of impulses to action having for their objects the group and its relations to other groups.'

The third condition is 'interaction (especially in the form of conflict and rivalry) of the group with other similar groups animated by different ideals and purposes, and swayed by different traditions and customs.'

The fourth is 'the existence of a body of traditions and customs and habits in the minds of the members of

the group determining their relations to one another and to the group as a whole.'

The fifth is the 'organisation of the group, consisting in the differentiation and specialisation of the functions of its constituents—individuals and classes of individuals within the group.' This may be based upon tradition and custom, or 'it may be in part imposed on the group and maintained by the authority of some external power.'

Freud has pointed out ¹ that in this description of the organization of the group McDougall is in effect seeking to equip the group with the characteristics of the individual, which had been submerged in the crowd, and McDougall toys dangerously with the highly mythological conceptions of the collective consciousness ² and collective will.³ It is more relevant to our purpose, and more relevant to a true understanding of the function of all society, to note that these five characteristics are those whereby society secures to the individual his full dignity and responsibility. It is

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 31.

² *The Group Mind*, pp. 31 ff.; cf. pp. 70 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 53: 'The collective actions of the well-organised group . . . become truly volitional actions expressive of a high degree of intelligence and morality, much higher than that of the average member of the group—i.e., the whole is raised above the level of its average member; and even by reason of the exaltation of emotion and organised co-operation in deliberation above that of its highest members.' This conveys no meaning to me at all. Such actions are surely carried out, and such emotions felt, by individuals and by individuals only. Nothing more can be meant than that individuals become capable of higher achievement in a developed social system. The system itself has neither will nor emotion. Bicknell, in *Psychology and the Church*, pp. 266 f., rightly stresses the effect of the group upon the individual, but still seems to hold that the collective will 'is more than the direction of the wills of all the individuals who compose it to the same end. Rather it is motivated by impulses awakened within the sentiment for the whole to which they belong.' But these impulses are still impulses actuating individuals, however closely they may be inter-related or welded into a social organism. Perhaps in this passage he is only echoing McDougall. In the following pages (pp. 278 ff.) he borrows from Miss Follett, *The New State*, a much more satisfying standpoint: 'The unit of society is the individual coming into being and functioning through groups of a more and more federated nature.'

precisely because the individual has a certain permanence and ends which he seeks in common with his fellows that the structural organization comes into existence, with its interrelations of mutual service and its complexities of greater and lesser social groups, thus making possible his separate and personal achievement of purposes which would be utterly unattainable to him in isolation. The student of the group, be it State, or Church, or some lesser institution, such as a college or school, is always in danger of believing that the group is the true object of his study. By his very attention to it it secures an interest of its own, which is readily mistaken for an entity, and the elemental fact that it only exists in its living members tends to be forgotten. Yet when the members are taken away all that remains is embodied in stones and statutes, as truly dead as their predecessors, the idols of past religions and the ruined relics of forgotten cultures.

A far more fruitful line of approach to the analysis of group life is to be found in the suggestion made by Trotter, who noted that groups, both in animals and in man, may be distinguished as either peaceful and defensive, or as aggressive.¹ The bitter political feeling which disfigures his discussion must not blind us to the importance of this mode of treatment. For here the purpose or end of the group-structure is seen as fundamental and, though the nature of that end is viewed crudely enough as consisting in the biological preservation of the species, a wider extension of the method can readily be made. It is, indeed, a matter for surprise that McDougall, who has come to stress the purposive character of the instincts and the distinctive importance of the ends which they serve,² has not made an adequate application of this principle in dealing with the group. We are entirely at liberty to turn it to our own

¹ This is the main thesis of his *Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*.

² *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 119, and *passim*.

use and to claim that the only true end of the social organism is to be found in the fullest development of individual personality. But though society can and should accept that end, it cannot, even when it takes the form of a Church, predetermine the direction of that development. There is a widespread social theory, most vividly expressed in modern Russia, but by no means unknown elsewhere, that the State should decide upon the type of citizen most useful to its ends, and should mould all its institutions and its educational system with a view to the production of this type. Nothing could be more completely subversive of the true function of the State. Such a view presupposes an end and an entity of the State other than those of its members. It regards that end as fixed and therewith denies the creative possibilities of personal life. It makes true education an impossibility. And, which is most serious for itself, it must in the last resort be at war with the living God.

But if our view is right the true analysis of the State and the true psychology of the individual are quite inseparable. Both take their place in the system of the sentiments, through which the person comes to his full stature. For love and faith are not only individual but corporate. The crude suggestibility characteristic of the crowd has already within itself the seeds of faith.¹ In ordered and responsible citizenship we see this faith shaped and developed, and it is not difficult to trace the influence of love as the one constructive factor in that development. And this love is not simply the love of man, or of that elusive entity which we term the State. The true being and strength of the State are indeed to be found in the love and faith of its members. But if the State is to live and grow this love and faith must be directed not primarily to the State itself, in a patriotism which is in the end self-consuming and self-destructive, but to the creative Reality which lies

¹ See p. 90.

beyond and to which our finite being is ever drawn. So is that which is explicit but imperfect in the Church implicit in the State as well. So at the last shall Church and State both be one, and both cease to be, in the fulness and perfect freedom of the Kingdom of God.

The whole difficulty of the problem of authority, from which we started, is that in all group-life, and not least in the life of the Church, this higher authority of a living creative purpose is bound up with the instinctive compulsions of the elementary herd impulse. In our quest for the liberty of the Kingdom of God we are always members of human societies, and often members of a mere temporary crowd, and the sanctions and impulses proper to such membership are strong upon us. And sometimes it is hard to say whether we are being held, like children, under the sheer compulsion of the crowd or the tradition, or whether some higher purpose has made us and the group its own and is moulding both to some fulfilment beyond our vision.

Here we may find real help in the acute analysis which Freud has applied to Le Bon's description of the crowd. At the very outset he asks a question which is as pertinent to the most elementary beginnings of crowd-formation as to the complex and persistent social structures. 'If the individuals in the group are combined into a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond might be precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group.' He points out, rightly enough, that neither Le Bon nor McDougall really answers this question.¹ The latter, it is true, stresses the importance of the leader as the means by which the action of the crowd becomes consistent, effective, and controlled.² The leader must have qualities which fit him for his task, and this becomes more and more true as the group becomes more and more

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 7.

² *The Group Mind*, p. 133.

organized. 'If a people is to become a nation it must be capable of producing personalities of exceptional powers, who will play the part of leaders; and the special endowments of the national leader require to be more pronounced and exceptional, of a higher order, than those required for the exercise of leadership over a fortuitous crowd.'¹ But McDougall appears to view this appearance of the leader almost entirely as a biological or racial phenomenon. He discusses the matter in terms of cranial capacity and development, and seems almost to suggest that the occurrence of a Mahomet or a Napoleon, a Shakespeare, a Newton, or a Ruskin, is an accident, immense in its results but in itself unpredictable and unexplained.² Two questions at once cry out for an answer. What is the significance of the faith which such leaders inspire, faith which is something far more than the primitive suggestibility of the crowd? And what is the true source of the ideals and purposes which they express? For though in some cases their genius seems to attain nothing more than some racial end already seen and struggling for fulfilment, and in some cases they actually, by some material achievement, stultify and degrade the ideals of those who follow, there again and again appear men in whom is born a new vision and a new splendour of hope and love which is stronger than success and transforms the lives of men with a power and a peace which passes understanding.

To the first of these questions Freud has given an answer in terms of his own psychological theory,³ and though his

¹ *The Group Mind*, p. 133.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 136-8. McDougall quotes the very interesting evidence given by Le Bon in his *Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples*, where it is shown that a collection of skulls from one of the unprogressive races differs 'not so much in the smaller average size of the brain, as in the greater uniformity of size, that is to say, the absence of individuals of exceptionally large brains.'

³ In his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Certain aspects of his theory are developed elsewhere, mainly in his *Totem and Taboo*.

history appears to be untrue and his psychology incomplete, he has perhaps done more than any other writer to place the problem of the group, and therewith the problem of authority, in its proper proportion and setting. His theory can be stated very shortly. He connects the whole structure of the group with the development of the emotional ties which are characteristic of the family. It is a problem, as he says, of libido, and we have only to refuse his unnecessary limitation of this term, a limitation which he himself sometimes repudiates,¹ to find his theory in harmony with an entirely Christian emphasis upon love. 'Love relationships,' he says explicitly, 'constitute the essence of the group mind.'² It is unnecessary to introduce at this point, as he does, the entirely mythological conception of the primitive horde, with its band of brothers forced into equality by the strength of the father.³ All that his theory needs is the sufficient fact that the family is, for practically every individual, the basis of his wider group life. The personal relationships which exist naturally in the close intimacy of the family are the first sphere within which the instinctive life is built up into the permanent dispositions of the adult personality. All true national life must have within it a principle of brotherhood which is directly based upon the simple equalities, the friendships and rivalries, of the child. And similarly all leadership has inherent in it something of the relationship of father to child, and the true national leader is rightly termed the Father of his people.

It is thus that Freud explains the strange semi-hypnotic influence which the group, especially in moments of primitive impulse, exercises upon its members. It is due to the awakening of what he calls the 'libidinal tie,' the intensely strong emotions inherent in the childish response to the

¹ Freud, *op. cit.* p. 38.

² *Op. cit.* p. 40.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 90 ff.

father's authority and love.¹ And this is the basis, further, of their essential equality, which is not merely arithmetical but personal. The common relation to the love of the leader drives them to identify themselves ideally with him, and so with one another. They have 'substituted one and the same object for their ideal ego, and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.'² 'Many individuals, who can identify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all—that is the situation that we find realised in groups which are capable of subsisting.'³ The group demands, and must have, a leader, and it is through the leader that the love-relationship of the family becomes the key to the wider relationships of the group-life. We find, in fact, the continuance of the principle of sentiment-formation, which is so closely akin to the Christian principle of faith made perfect in love.

It can hardly be accident that Freud, sceptic and determinist as he is, has seen in the Christian Church the supreme example of group-formation. It is true that he declares it to rest upon an illusion, but that is strangely called an illusion which is drawn from the fundamental necessities of human life, and we must acknowledge, even though it be with wonder, the insight and sympathy of his account of Christianity. It would be well for the Church if all Christians understood their own fellowship as clearly as this would-be critic of their faith.

In a Church the illusion holds good of there being a head who loves all the individuals in the group with an equal love. . . . This equal love was expressly enunciated by Christ: 'Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.' He stands to the individual

¹ For the Freudian theory of hypnosis cf. E. Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, pp. 334 ff.; Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 77–80.

² Freud, *op. cit.* p. 80.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 89.

members of the group of believers in the relation of a kind elder brother; he is their father-surrogate. All the demands that are made upon the individual are derived from this love of Christ's. A democratic character runs through the Church, for the very reason that before Christ everyone is equal, and that everyone has an equal share in his love. It is not without a deep reason that the similarity between the Christian community and a family is invoked, and that believers call themselves brothers in Christ, that is, brothers through the love which Christ has for them. There is no doubt that the tie which unites each individual with Christ is also the cause of the tie which unites them with each other.¹

And even further :

Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feels himself united with all other Christians by the tie of identification. But the Church requires more of him. He has also to identify himself with Christ and love all other Christians as Christ loved them. At both points, therefore, the Church requires that the position of the libido which is given by a group formation should be supplemented. Identification has to be added where object-choice has taken place, and object-love where there is identification. This addition evidently goes beyond the constitution of the group. One can be a good Christian and yet be far from the idea of putting oneself in Christ's place and of having like him an all-embracing love for all mankind. One need not think oneself capable, weak mortal that one is, of the Saviour's largeness of soul and strength of love. But this further development in the distribution of libido in the group is probably the factor upon which Christianity bases its claim to have reached a higher ethical level.²

No Christian could wish to challenge such a description. Not only is it true, but we note at once that it passes far beyond the realm of illusion. Freud himself finds its key in what he terms 'object-choice' and 'object-love,' and objects so chosen and loved may be misinterpreted, but they cannot be unreal. There may be mistakes in an

¹ Freud, *op. cit.* pp. 42 f. (abridged).

² *Op. cit.* p. III.

historical tradition, and mistakes in a description of reality, but such mistakes do not affect the ultimate existence of facts of history adequate to explain them, or of a reality which somebody has at least attempted to describe. As in our account of the development of personality through sentiments directed towards a personal object, so in our account of the development of the group and its members we move always in a real world. And if we call the truth of that reality by the name of God, and see in Christ the occasion of its historical expression among men, we are simply stating the Christian faith once more.

Strictly speaking, Freud's analysis supplies an answer only to the first of the two questions which were suggested by McDougall's account of the group leader. But we may easily see that we have also, in effect, gone far towards answering our second question, as to the source of the ideals and purposes which he embodies. At least it is now clear that no impersonal or mechanical explanation will suffice. We have already suggested that the most illuminating analysis of the various types of group is to be sought in a study of the ends which the group serves, and that those ends are individual and personal. The leader of the group is one in whom those ends find free and adequate expression. Such leadership may be of many kinds. It may be the direct action of one who takes the lead in some crisis. It may be one who in loneliness establishes an ideal unrecognized by his fellows until, long afterwards, some new world of achievement opens up and men know him for the pioneer that he was. Often such leadership will be expressed symbolically, in the flag of a people, or the creeds and sacraments of a Church. Sometimes men may even believe that they are linked in the service of some great abstract principle, an ideal embodied in some formula such as the 'freedom of conscience' or 'the rights of man.' But always the abstract sentiment will be found, upon analysis,

to have a concrete and a personal basis.¹ The freedom of conscience means the freedom of particular consciences, and unless we have such particular consciences in mind, the formula does not hold our interest. The rights of man are the rights of men whom we know. Unless there are men, known to us, whose rights lack recognition, we cannot maintain the abstract proposition in any living sense.

Life, in short, as we see it, wears far more the appearance of a creative purpose moulding man, than of some measurable and finite biological end which man, by his institutions and groupings, seeks to achieve. Personal throughout, it seeks the fulfilment of personality. Purposes have no meaning in the abstract, and to speak of them as satisfied is a mere misuse of words unless the satisfaction of personal and purposive reality is implied. And thus the analysis of the group leads us again to the same conclusion as that which we reached from the analysis of the individual, with which, indeed, it is one. We have not demonstrated the existence of a God, but we have shown once more the central importance of the basic principles of faith and love, expressing themselves through ever widening purposes, made concrete in ever new leadership. And there is no explanation whatever of this creative factor in individual and social history unless we take the final step of faith, 'believing where we cannot prove.' Creative love at least is real, and it is more than man. Need we mean more, or less, when we say that 'God is love'?

If we apply this analysis to the Church we see at once that it enables us to reconcile, at least in principle, the two opposing views of authority from which we started. Clearly the Church is of God, and all authority in the Church is the expression of the love wherewith He fashions it for Himself. Institutions, ministries, priesthoods, sacraments, symbols, are the modes through which the power of that love is

¹ See p. 34.

mediated. They are the meeting place of God and man, and for the Christian they rest secure upon the Person of Jesus Christ. It is not simply that He instituted these things. To make that the final claim is to expose the basis of the Church to an historical criticism in which there can, in the very nature of criticism, be no finality. And the Church rests, not upon historical enquiry, but upon faith and love. But this is no mere subjectivism. Faith is not individual, and it is not self-creating. It is corporate, living, and personal, and it looks to Christ, because in Christ God awakened man's response to His own love. It is the free response of each new individual soul, but that response is only possible as man through man comes to his own individual manhood. And through the changing and yet continuous fellowship and authority of the Church that manhood is moulded to the fashion of the manhood of Christ, in whom that fellowship was born and in whom it lives. 'We love Him, because He first loved us'—the words are meaningless, spoken across the long spaces of history, if that love is nothing more than the love of man, meaningless unless by faith in Christ we make answer to the love of God, who, through Christ, draws all men to Himself.

LECTURE VII

OBJECTIVITY IN RELIGION

SYNOPSIS

THE discussions of the last four lectures have served to throw into relief the principle that the development of personality depends upon its orientation to that which lies beyond itself. It is this that is expressed in the religious emphasis upon faith and worship. Spiritual healing, whether in its effects upon the body or in the forgiveness of sin, was seen to rest upon the response of faith to some object or ideal. And the structure of the group and its authority suggested the same principle. It remains to enquire whether this objective and creative reality can be equated with God.

As a first step we have to consider the claim of the mystics to a direct experience of God. This claim takes many forms, but its essence is a special sense of significance and reality attached to certain experiences. The evidence of the mystics themselves is to some extent discounted by their very diverse interpretations. And the evidence for a less specific 'sense of presence,' though striking, is at least equally obscure.

Otto, in his theory of the 'numinous,' has analyzed out a 'non-rational' element as essential to all true religious experience, having as its core this 'sense of presence' and characterized, in its primary forms, by mystery, awe, and fascination. The value of this theory lies in its stress upon the personal as underlying objectivity. Its difficulties lie in its vulnerability to psychological analysis.

The psychological evidence proper is concerned with the heightening of the sense of reality in certain mental conditions and its lowering in others. Examples can be seen in nitrous oxide exaltation, and in melancholia. But these do not affect the evidence for a real objectivity of personal values, but only shew their distortion. And these distorted forms are a real clue to the values underlying more normal experiences, both those of the mystics and those of everyday religious life.

An examination of the 'reality-principle' of the psychologists reveals its essentially personal character. It also suggests a certain

truth in theories of 'degrees in reality.' At the highest level come the personal and the creative, but modern psychological theory has not adequately combined the two. Religious experience, to which it is essential that its object should be regarded as real, effects this combination, and there are good grounds for accepting the validity of this highest level of reality, with its full significance for theism.

LECTURE VII

OBJECTIVITY IN RELIGION.

And Jacob awaked out of his sleep, and he said, surely the Lord is in this place; and I knew it not. And he was afraid, and said, How dreadful is this place! this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.—Genesis xxviii. 16, 17.

IN each of the last four lectures we left our argument in an unfinished state. It was as though we drew near some goal, and then, at the last, the way became uncertain, and we spoke of a vision that might perchance be the truth, rather than of an achieved and logical security, from which but a few further steps would bring us to the end of our journey. It will be convenient at this stage to pause and to consider what progress we have actually made.

The main and outstanding fact is the obvious truth that the journey is not complete, and this is equally true whether we look at the situation as psychologists or as theologians. We began by stating the form which the attack upon theistic belief has taken in the hands of the psychologists, but though it was clear enough that the attack is formidable, it was equally clear that the psychological position, if there be such a thing at all, is not one from which a comprehensive view of reality can be obtained. The writers who gave the most adequate account of the facts of human behaviour spoke of a creative adaptation to reality, but they were wholly obscure as to the meaning of this process. Freud's reality-principle means nothing more than the hard facts of life, viewed with a pessimism which is rather temperamental than scientific.¹ Jung's creative libido is as blind

¹ See p. 23.

as the racial unconsciousness from which it springs.¹ Both Freud and Jung alike find no end in the process save the crude biological ends, transient in the individual, and only a shade less transient in the species. All else, the glory of nature and art, the splendour of sacrifice, the age-long structure of man's religion, with the mythologies and churches in which all that is highest in human life have been enshrined, is a mere phantom-world, in which man clings for a little space to eternity, until time, the blind, unhasting lord of life and death, closes a door, and he is not.²

Yet it was these same writers who forced us back to an explanation of human development that was personal, and so not wholly blind. In their stress upon the love-life they did not rest content with narrow biological interpretations, but extended the term love to cover the whole field of personal relationships.³ And we found other writers, notably McDougall and Shand, using this principle as the key to personal development. So we pass to a whole series of facts for which psychology, as a science, provides no explanation at all. Consciousness itself wholly resists its analysis, and the most thorough-going empirical psychology of the moment has been forced to write it off as a mere

¹ See pp. 28 and 54.

² Leuba has made a statistical enquiry in his *Belief in God and Immortality* as to the extent to which psychologists retain a belief in immortality. He finds that among 'lesser men' 26.9 per cent. are believers, and among 'greater men' 8.8 per cent. 'One may affirm, it seems, that in general, the greater the ability of the psychologist as a psychologist, the more difficult it becomes for him to believe in the continuation of individual life after bodily death.' Leuba repeats these statistics and this conclusion in his *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 324 f. No apologist for religion ought to ignore such results, but we may be permitted to point out that an excessive attention to psychological interpretations of behaviour is not likely to encourage belief in conclusions which lie altogether outside the scope of psychology. We should expect in advance that the most fully equipped psychologists would be the most sceptical. Nor would the figures in this country, as yet not seriously affected by Behaviourism, be at all similar to those given by Leuba. The highest percentages of belief were found among historians and physical scientists.

³ See pp. 33 and 184.

irrelevance.¹ And why these fantasy-structures of love should carry so intense a conviction of worth for those minds in which they are formed remains a mystery. Yet this mystery is as much a part of the truth of life as the crudest necessities of Freud's reality-principle. That man is capable of fashioning and dwelling in so fair a world of his own is at least a fact, and its full significance is not seen as yet.

When we turned to consider some of the phenomena of religion we found ourselves moving in the same world of values and of incompleteness. At every point our discussion ran parallel with psychological explanations, and there was common ground throughout in the principle that the development of personality depends upon its orientation to that which lies beyond itself. And if psychology is obscure when it comes to the definition of this reality upon which its processes depend, religion has not been much less obscure when it has endeavoured to set before men an intelligible, and even tolerable, concept of the God of their worship. For that man must worship is beyond all question. He can dispense with formal creeds, and he may not recognize the object of his worship by the name of God, but the fact and attitude of worship is one of the most fundamental things in his life, and has been in history as well as in theory a prime condition of his growth to such manhood as is his.

We started therefore from faith, upon which worship depends and of which it is the expression, as the basic fact of the religious life, and we found it so closely akin, in its rudimentary forms, to that suggestibility of which psychology speaks that it was difficult to separate the two.² If there is much suggestion in religion it is equally true that there is much faith in psychology. And the whole process of faith, as of suggestion, revealed itself as personal throughout, developed at every point of love. But love cannot exist save between persons. The love of things, whether

¹ See pp. 7 and 47.

² See pp. 92 ff.

it be that felt by hedonist or scientist, is never and can never be a love of things for their own sakes. Always behind the thing, even though more than half hidden in the shadows, stands the person. All the evidence of psychoanalysis bears witness to this truth. The problems of life are problems of the self and of other selves. Our world is one in which love is indeed creative and in which faith leaps in response to love.

We came next to consider spiritual healing, perhaps the most continuous and persistent claim which man has made upon the unseen world of his faith. And here, amid a great confusion as to the facts, two things stood out clearly: first, the unquestionable evidence of the creative power of faith in restoring health and peace of mind; and secondly, the remarkable and seemingly unquenchable belief of man that it must be so. The psychologists were critical and talked of the optimism which rests upon compensatory fantasy, but when we turned to the cures wrought by the psychologists themselves we found the same principles everywhere operative. Under the most diverse names and in the most violently opposed systems of treatment, faith and love were the effective weapons in every technique.¹ It is not as cases, certified and written down under some psychological label, that patients come for their healing. Throughout the whole wide range of functional disorder, a range so wide that the organic is being included ever more and more within its scope, person seeks help from person. And where faith and love fail the treatment fails.

Yet our facts were incomplete and difficult. There still remains the great problem of the sheer physical evil of the world. There appears to be much in our own human life, as well as in the world about us, intractable to the power of faith. In many things we may and must have recourse to simple physical means, which seem to operate in their

¹ See especially p. 119.

own right as things. Drugs, and the surgeon's knife, as we know them, have no personal properties. And to seek the way out by demanding miracles, so that we may escape from this bondage of the physical by a short cut in which reality denies its own fundamental rationality, is to evade the claim of love upon us.¹ Yet, apart from miracle, reality does not as yet wear the appearance of a God wholly loving and wholly personal. Our suffering lies too near the heart of things for that.

But again we note that the psychologist is no nearer a solution than the religious man in his worst perplexities of faith. For both alike the one aspect of life that counts is personal, and the laws of creative personality, whatever the Behaviourist may say, remain its own. Whether it be in the despair of our problems, or in the triumph of our overcoming, we challenge the rigid world-order of the scientist. And the last word is not spoken. We do not know what faith has yet in store for man.

Our discussion of sin passed to some extent over the same ground, serving in the main to reveal the fundamental character of our problems as resulting from a failure of faith and a refusal of love. The psychologists do not escape from this view of sin when they deal with it as moral disease, for their one hope of treating such moral disease successfully rests in an attempt to awaken the latent personal resources of the ego, through processes in themselves personal.² Where, as in certain of the major psychoses, this appeal cannot be made, there is no human hope of a cure. The key to psychological healing lies in the transference, and there is the closest possible parallel between this and the Christian way of forgiveness. Both methods are wholly personal, both depend upon a readjustment of relationships which begins at priest or physician and passes out into every relationship of the social environment. But it still remains to ask whether man's forgiveness,

¹ See pp. 99 ff.

² See pp. 143 f.

creative as it is of new and personal life, is, as the Christian Church proclaims, more than the forgiveness of man. It is true, and the fact is suggestive, that the sinner demands just this assurance. But the ground upon which we can give it is not yet made plain.¹

This led us to the fourth stage in our collection of material. Do we reach such an objective sanction, higher than that of any individual man, in the life of the Church? Is the power of religion upon the believer simply the power of the organized group upon its members? And here the facts of group-psychology were striking enough, but it soon appeared that the group does not explain its own existence.² The Church has indeed authority because as a Church it is a social group,³ and its sanctions have all the characteristics which the psychologists analyse out so clearly. There is the primitive and compelling dominance by which the crowd renders its members at once suggestible and heedless of all save the emotion of the moment. There is the more subtle and abiding influence of prestige, all the more powerful for its enshrinement in traditions and symbols, with an ever-changing wealth of significance which sets them well-nigh beyond criticism. And there is, from time to time, the strong link of a common purpose, based upon ideals which at any rate in part rank high in moral worth. But all this does not explain the existence of the Church. The simple explanation that it is the work of God amongst men does not appeal to the psychologist, since he has already analysed God away as a fantasy arising within the life of the group. Perchance he is right, as touching such gods as he knows. And yet it may be that behind the shadow-gods of his analysis there moves a Reality that his criticism does not touch. For the life of the group shows once more a strangely creative quality. Like the individual it seems in every case to owe at once its origin and its development

¹ See p. 155.

² See p. 184.

³ See p. 168.

to that which lies beyond itself.¹ In this characteristic Church and State, and every human society, are at one. And so once more we are forced back upon the mystery of reality itself, for which psychology offers no solution that is more than a bare negation or an empty acquiescence. The evil of the world is not only seen in individual suffering and individual sin. It dominates the life of the group as well, and if we are to judge by history alone we may well ask whether the creative power of which we have spoken can possibly be either rational or good.

Yet once again the psychologists give hints of a solution. It was Freud who pointed out to us that the very existence of the social group seems to depend upon the same principles of love and faith which we found everywhere to be the conditions of personal development.² That in many groups love has not developed far, and faith remains at a low level of suggestibility, so that irrational and impulsive forces dominate the group-life, bears witness less to the power of evil than to the immaturity of man and of nations. If there be a Creator-God, His work is not yet done.

So far, then, as our discussion with the psychologists is concerned, we have little need to quarrel with them so long as they keep within the limits of their science. Their criticism of religious beliefs and systems, if at times severe, has been a help and not a hindrance, 'the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that have been made, that those things which are not shaken may remain.'³ When they deny the objectivity of our fantasy-structures, and tell us that much of our religious practice is mere suggestion, they still do not invalidate the essential facts which we claimed as true at the outset, the facts of personality itself as real, of values which exist for and in personality, of freedom, now seen more clearly as love which can

¹ See pp. 176 and 183 ff.

² See p. 186.

³ Heb. xii. 27.

make response to love, and of reality itself as something other than ourselves. At that point psychology leaves us, but all the evidence which we have brought forward goes to show the central importance of faith and love in the world of personal being. That the solid, resistant world of things has existence too we need not doubt, but to declare that this existence of thinghood is ultimately dominant is to make nonsense of psychology as well as of religion. Even as the worship of the Church would be empty without a God, so the theories of the psychologists are incomplete unless there is something within the inner character of reality itself which underlies the creative appearance of life and explains this predominance of faith and love.

There remain, then, two questions for our enquiry, and then our task is ended, so far as the limits of these lectures permit. Is there any direct empirical evidence for the existence of this objective, creative reality which we have postulated? And does it agree, sufficiently for faith, if not wholly for understanding, with the claims of Christian theism? The second of these questions will be the subject of our final lecture. For the answer to the first we must turn to the mystics and to the psychologists who have commented upon their experiences, and their evidence must be our next concern.

The mystics unite in declaring that their experience lies beyond all description, and then pass on to describe it with a singular fluency and freedom. Nevertheless they agree that at the last their words fail.¹ Sometimes they move in the imagery and symbolism of the emotions. Sometimes they pass over into the abstractions of a philosophy which finds no positive terms adequate to embrace its concepts. But in either case there is no question of the intense reality of the experience. Alike in its intensity and in

¹ Conviction and reserve are very strikingly combined in St. Paul's account of his own mystical experiences in 2 Cor. xii. 1-7.

its isolation it is closely akin to feeling, and very far removed from our commonplace approach to the realities of every day. 'In this knowledge,' says St. John of the Cross, 'since the senses and the imagination are not employed, we get neither form nor impression, nor can we give any account or furnish any likeness, although the mysterious and sweet-tasting wisdom comes home so clearly to the inmost parts of our soul. . . . This is the peculiarity of the divine language. The more infused, intimate, spiritual, and supersensible it is, the more does it exceed the senses, both inner and outer, and impose silence upon them.' ¹

Yet, despite this overmastering and ineffable character of these experiences, they seem to the mystic to open a door which leads to new realms of knowledge. 'They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time.' ² The mystic cannot explain, but he knows that he has known and not merely felt, and often that knowledge remains an abiding possession which no criticism can ever touch. Two examples must suffice, one from a letter of James Russell Lowell:

I had a revelation last Friday evening. . . . I never before so clearly felt the Spirit of God in me and around me. The whole room seemed to me full of God. The air seemed to waver to and fro with the presence of something. I knew not what. I spoke with the calmness and clearness of a prophet. I cannot tell you what this revelation was. I have not yet studied it enough. But I shall perfect it one day, and then you shall hear it and acknowledge its grandeur. It embraces all other systems.³

¹ *The Dark Night of the Soul*, bk. 2, c. 17.

² James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 380 f.

³ *Letters of James Russell Lowell*, edited by C. E. Norton, i. 69. The passage is quoted both by James (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 66) and Leuba (*The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 239), but James omits the very suggestive last sentence.

And a second, from St. Teresa :

One day, being in orison, it was granted to me to perceive in one instant how all things are seen and contained in God. I did not perceive them in their proper form, and nevertheless the view I had of them was of sovereign clearness, and has remained vividly impressed upon my soul. . . . The view was so subtile and delicate that the understanding cannot grasp it.¹

This sense of illumination is the special characteristic of those mystical states which are significant for our purpose,² and the determination of its real character is of great importance for the study of religion. For though the mystics seem to be unable to convey to others any body of truth which cannot be reached by more ordinary channels of experience and reasoning, it is nevertheless possible that the intensity of their special apprehension of reality may serve, as extreme cases serve to test the truth of some general geometrical theorem, to set our fundamental problem in a clearer light.

James, in his description of mystical states,³ gives two further marks by which they are usually characterized. Their transience does not specially concern us, except that it seems to indicate a connection with physical conditions which, upon any theory, might have been anticipated as probable. The definite sense of passivity is more important. Sometimes it is a mere luxury of self-abasement, almost without spiritual or ethical worth, as in some of the ecstasies

¹ Quoted by James, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

² James, *op. cit.* p. 408 n., where a careful distinction is made between the essential experience of illumination, and the phenomena, alleged and real, of 'visual and auditory hallucinations, verbal and graphic automatisms, and such marvels as levitation, stigmatization, and the healing of disease.' For a warning as to the confusions inherent in the term 'mystical' cf. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 225 ff., where a short but admirable account of classical mysticism is given, on the lines laid down by St. Teresa and developed systematically by Poulain in *The Graces of Interior Prayer*.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 380 f.

of St. Marguerite Marie Alacoque.¹ Sometimes it is an overwhelming sense of the presence of God, to which the soul yields in what St. Teresa calls 'The Sleep of the Powers.'² This is no sleep, but a most intense and conscious peace of the whole being. 'The powers of the soul are incapable of occupying themselves with any other object than God; they are altogether taken up with the enjoyment of this excess of glory.'³ It is from this stage that the mystic passes into the ecstasy or rapture,⁴ in which the senses lose their proper functioning,⁵ and soul and body alike are utterly overcome in the enjoyment of that which is beyond all understanding or telling.⁶ To St. Teresa the rapture is to be distinguished even from the Spiritual Marriage, or the experience of Union. They are the same in essence, but the one exceeds the other as a great fire exceeds a small.⁷

Whatever else may be true of this condition, in which all initiative of the soul is lost and even its very sense of independent being, it is unquestionably an experience of the Other, and it is of the most overmastering quality. And though the psychological critic may easily show motives

¹ Leuba (*The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 109 ff.) gives more than sufficient illustration, with references to the literature, both official and critical.

² *Autobiography*, cc. 16, 17. Cf. *The Interior Castle*, Fifth Dwelling.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Op. cit.* cc. 18-21. Cf. *The Interior Castle*, Sixth Dwelling.

⁵ This is the obvious and natural explanation of the primary experiences of levitation, though these experiences have been greatly improved in the telling, and, indeed, have been developed by unconscious interpretation and suggestion. The loss of the sense of touch which is our surest hold on earth inevitably led to a belief in the possibility of floating in the air. Dreams of flying have often the same intense reality, and for similar reasons. It has been found possible to produce the experience of levitation, with witnesses to its happening, by direct suggestion.

⁶ 'The will is doubtless occupied with loving, but it does not understand how it loves. As to the understanding, if it understands, it is by a mode of activity not understood by it; and it can understand nothing of that which it hears. As to me, I do not think it understands, because, as I have said, it does not understand itself' (*loc. cit.*).

⁷ *Ibid.*

and mechanisms utterly unsuspected by the mystic, and readily illustrated from cases of mental disorder, it still remains necessary to explain how this strong sense of the Other arises. So far from destroying the validity of the mystical experience by pointing to its pathological parallels, the critic may only be proving to us that even under the greatest distortion in which drugs, sin, and moral disease can involve the soul, there are still to be seen traces of the creative and renewing activity of God.

What, then, are we to conclude from this evidence of the mystics? That they have been able to convey to the world any new truth seems to be negatived by all the facts. The actual content of their revelations is never anything particularly new or original.¹ When, as in the passage from St. Teresa cited above there is a vision of some new synthesis, some deeper apprehension of meaning, words and concepts fail as the trance passes.² The modern mystic, the Mlle. Vé of Flournoy, puts the matter with astonishing clearness and honesty: 'All the traditional ideas about God and His action in us seem to me now so weak, insufficient, and limited. And yet if I try to analyse what I know of God in addition to these ideas, I find nothing. I could weep

¹ The most important direct result of mystical revelations has been the *Apostolat du Sacré Cœur*, enjoined in the ecstasies of St. Marguerite Marie. Quite apart from the morbid character of these ecstasies, and the utter irrelevance of the miracles which confirmed them, the revelations themselves add nothing whatever to the sum of theological knowledge. The great scholastic theologians were in several cases mystics, but even in the case of St. Bonaventura mysticism leaves little mark on the theology, and is seldom directly mentioned (see especially *Comm. in sent.*, ii. 23, art. 2, q. 3). St. Teresa is an admirable psychologist and a great administrator, but no more. In general, mysticism may be said to have encouraged Pantheism and Quietism, both of which are of less even than doubtful orthodoxy.

² James (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 410) quotes such a revelation from the life of St. Ignatius of Loyola. But though the visions of the mystery of the divine wisdom in creation, and of the Holy Trinity, are here claimed to have been retained in the memory of the Saint, it still does not appear that there was anything specially new in the revelation, or at any rate that he was able to communicate it to others.

over my inability to describe what I feel again and again. The content is at a minimum.'¹ In fact, the only completely general pronouncement of the mystics is their claim that they have been in touch with the Divine. There they have received a new assurance and conviction as the truths which they had received, possibly unconsciously, from their training and environment, and these truths are sometimes stated with a different emphasis and arrangement as a result of the mystic's reflection upon his experience. But the essence of the ecstasy is not in these truths, but, so all the mystics claim, in the immediate certainty and knowledge of the presence of God. In this, if in nothing else, there is agreement between Protestant and Catholic, Christian and Hindu. The Presence of which they are so profoundly aware may be the God of Christianity, or Jesus, or the Blessed Virgin, or Brahma, or Krishna, or a vague sense of mystery and significance undefined.² The terms change, but the experience is the same. All that is really new is its force and conviction, and the memory of having lived in one moment at least of surrender which admitted no challenge to its absoluteness and authority.

The verdict of the psychologists upon all this varies with their philosophy rather than with their psychology. The direct psychological criticism of the mystical states, and their parallel with mental aberrations is too obvious to be missed, and no serious psychologist could be found who would accept the testimony of the mystics at its face value. But for some, as for Leuba, the whole business of mysticism is a record of man's deluded interpretation of

¹ *Une Mystique Moderne* (see above, p. 153), p. 42.

² Cf. H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, p. 60: 'At times, in the silence of the night, and in rare lonely moments, I come upon a sort of communion of myself and something great that is not myself. . . . These moments happen and they are the supreme fact of my religious life to me; they are the crown of my religious experience.' See also the passages quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 385 ff.

states for which no rational explanation was as yet available, and of his unenlightened efforts to achieve, through belief in the causal activities of the personal gods of mythology, among whom the God of Christianity is included, that which can now be accomplished more securely by the methods of science.¹ For others the mystical experience has real validity, though not in the terms which the mystics themselves employ. If it does not tell us what Reality is, it is at least a testimony to an existence and a significance of Reality utterly unlike the existence and significance of the immediate objects of sense. 'The mystic's consciousness, so far as it is something more than merely emotional, is an intuition of the "Beyond."'²

William James is the pioneer among psychologists in this view of the significance of mysticism. It is true that his interest is in a particular psychological theory. He is seeking to vindicate the special place and importance of the subliminal self, as that border region in which the soul passes out into contact with spiritual forces and values fraught with unimagined and perchance unlimited possibilities.³ Thus his discussion of the sense of presence is confined to a citation of examples, collected with a view to illustrating its mystery, but without even an attempted psychological analysis of the signs and modes by which the sense of presence normally apprehends its object.⁴ As to the more complex mystical conditions James puts his conclusion under three headings : ⁵

'(1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.

'(2) No authority emanates from them which should

¹ Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 330 ff.

² Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 412.

³ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 508 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 58 ff.

⁵ *Op. cit.* pp. 422 f.

make it a duty for those who stand outside to accept their revelations uncritically.

'(3) They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.'

But when we come to ask what exactly it is to which our pragmatic devotion is invited the result is tantalizingly meagre: 'Mystical states, indeed, wield no authority due simply to their being mystical states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us *hypotheses*, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the truest of insights into the meaning of this life.'¹

Leuba, the most drastic of all the critics of mysticism, has dealt with this faithfully, and not altogether undeservedly.² James, he says, 'has erred, not in considering "pure" experience as unassailable, but in unwittingly regarding as such more than the "given." He has confused

¹ James, *op. cit.* p. 428.

² *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 308 ff. Cf. Coe's article 'The Sources of the Mystical Revelation' in the *Hibbert Journal* for January 1908. Here there is a careful analysis of the experiment of self-hypnosis, and a comparison with the mystic trance. The conclusion is that all the special features of the trance are without significance for the supposed revelation: 'The mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical neighbour does, namely, through tradition and instruction grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it.' Pratt, to whom I owe the reference, entirely concurs (*The Religious Consciousness*, p. 450).

pure experience with elaborations of it. It is because of that error that he was a believer in mysticism ; or, one should perhaps say that he has committed that error because he wished to believe in a mystical revelation.' Leuba is undoubtedly right in saying that the terms which James uses, even though they are less definite than the language of a St. Teresa when she speaks of the presence of God, are still interpretations of an experience and are not directly given in the experience itself. They definitely imply a concept of that Other with which the self can come into touch, ' a union of the individual with Someone or Something else.'¹ For Leuba himself the mystical sense of union is produced not by a higher understanding in which two terms of experience are brought under a general principle or included in a larger whole, but by a mere blurring of their individual features until they are degraded to a level of undifferentiated simplicity.² The mystic, he thinks, is reduced in his ecstasy to a condition in which he is no longer able to detect real distinctions and his sense of illumination is due to bare physical release and not to any access of knowledge. His comfort is the comfort of bodily relaxation, and not of the divine peace. His negation of self is merely the negation of the senses with their distracting demands for activity.

But if Leuba is right in his criticism of James, his own interpretation of the mystical experience is open to exactly the same criticism. For he too gives us not the experience itself, but an exposition of it in terms of his own restricted scientific standpoint. He complains that James does not give us ' pure experience,' but the complaint holds equally against himself and, indeed, against us all. Neither scientist nor saint can communicate experience as it is lived, save by a process of sharing which is itself an experience, transformed and slain if we ever attempt to put it into words.

¹ Leuba, *op. cit.* p. 309.

² *Ibid.*

The substance of the whole matter seems to be simply that the mystic is supremely sure of the reality of his experience. He is so sure and so profoundly moved by his assurance that words fail him when he endeavours to pass on to others the things that he has heard and seen. He is apt to make inferences as to the object of that experience, usually identified with the God of his particular tradition, which attach to God the characters of the experience itself.¹ Thus the God of the mystics tends to be an Absolute, ineffable, identically one with all being, as in the unity of the mystic rapture. The tendency towards Pantheism is familiar to any student of historical mysticism. But all this is inference from the primary mystical experience. The essence of the experience is simply its intense reality. That and that alone is the source of its astonishing authority and its 'givenness.' And the value of the witness of the mystics is not that it confirms any particular theology, but that it displays the typical ego-other relationship, characteristic of all experience that can be called personal, in a form which stresses the objectivity of the Other as definitely as certain other experiences, also of an abnormal type, stress the ego.² Mysticism in short gives us with assurance

¹ Here and throughout this paragraph I am mainly following Hocking, especially in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and *The Meaning of Mysticism as seen through its Psychology*, in *Mind*, N.S., vol. xxi. 1912, pp. 38 ff. 'These words, unitary, immediate, ineffable, which at all events apply to the mystic's *experience*, are precisely the words which the metaphysician applies to the mystic's *doctrine*. And I suggest that the misinterpretation of mysticism here in question is due to the fact that *what is a psychological report* (and a true one) *is taken as a metaphysical statement* (and a false one). From the fact that one's experience of God has been "one, immediate, and ineffable," it does not follow that God Himself is merely "one, immediate, and ineffable"—and so a Being wholly removed from all concrete reality" (*The Meaning of Mysticism*, p. 43).

² It may seem strange to compare the intense egoism of the paranoiac with the mystical ecstasy, but the parallel is in some ways very close. It is very difficult indeed to interpret paranoia unless the hypothesis of the ego has real meaning. The undesirability of this most intractable of

a That or a Something, but we must pass beyond the word of the mystic and use our ordinary discursive reason if we would know the meaning of the gift.

Leuba's comment on this position seems to be entirely justified :

When you have said, as Professor Hocking does, that the 'That' of mystical ecstasy has no meaning until interpreted, that it is mind-stuff or 'neutral-stuff,' out of which in an active mind, knowledge issues, logic compels you, it seems, to hold that the same is true of all the 'thats' immediately given in any other experience. The immediately-given in ecstasy is no longer isolated as a unique phenomenon ; it is now properly classified together with the meaningless and yet potentially meaningful Something *which is at the root of every psychological experience whatever*. For, not only in mystical ecstasy but also in every perceptual or affective experience, something unassailable and ineffable is given. Thus, the metaphysical effort to find God is provided with a much broader intuitive basis than that of mystical ecstasy alone ; its basis includes the given in conscious experience generally. In the search for God no position of vantage may now be claimed *a priori* for the immediately given in trance experience.¹

This is indeed well said, but the apologist for theism may rightly use it in a manner very different from that intended by its author.² For Leuba it is a matter of scientific

all mental disorders does not destroy its evidential value. But the paranoiac is quite incapable of interpreting the self-reference of his delusions, and here his case, though far worse than that of even the most aberrant of the mystics, is parallel to theirs.

¹ Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 313.

² Leuba, in fact, completely misunderstands Hocking's argument, as his own citations sufficiently show. He is so anxious to discredit the evidence of the mystical states that he does not see that Hocking is arguing for an interpretation of *all* experience in terms of an intuition which is direct and of which the Object is what men have understood by God. See especially *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 295 ff. : 'We have made all social experience depend upon a conscious knowledge in experience of a being, who in scope and power might well be identified with God . . . our first and fundamental social experience is an experience of God. . . . I shall always be more certain *that* God is, than *what* he is . . . reality from the beginning is known as God. The idea of God is not an attribute which in the course of experience I come to attach to my original whole

concern, and rightly so, that the mystical experiences should not be set in a class apart and allowed an interpretation involving categories of thought over which science has no control. But for the Christian it is a matter of quite equal concern that his faith should not be supposed to rest upon bizarre and supra-normal experiences occurring, with no great regularity, in the lives of certain exceptional persons, who cannot, as it appears, even tell us exactly what those experiences have been. We find ourselves, in fact, again in the difficulty with which we were faced in the discussion of spiritual healing. The claim to miraculous cures was not a help but rather a hindrance to belief in God. But cures that sprang from faith seemed to be a real witness to a creative love upon which that faith might rest. So in this matter of ecstasies. Our claim is that all experience, if rightly understood, carries, in the very fact that it is an experience of conscious personality, a witness to that creative reality upon which all personality depends for its life and growth. And Leuba's argument is a first and a necessary step towards the maintenance of that claim.

But we have still to ask whether we may not be able to find direct evidence for this interpretation of experience without depending upon the obscure and doubtful testimony of the more extreme mystical states. For, after all, we are aware of personal relationships in our ordinary life, and it is stretching logic to its utmost bounds to declare that this awareness rests upon a continuing process of inference, so habitual as to have become automatic and unconscious. In this we are all as sure, and as incapable of fitting words to our assurance, as the most incoherent

idea : the unity of my world which makes it from the beginning a whole, knowable in simplicity, is the unity of other Self-hood. God then is immediately known, and permanently known, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me. Of this knowledge nothing can despoil us ; this knowledge has never been wanting to the self-knowing mind of man.'

of the mystics. When we say that we know those whom we love we do not in the least mean that we can describe them. We simply know, and the That or Something of our knowing is more than all the words which flow from our knowledge. The poet and the lover are as eloquent as the mystic in declaring that they cannot tell their love. In this simple, commonplace, and ever ineffable mystery of everyday life we have touched the very core of our problem. Can we apply this evidence directly, without involving ourselves in difficulties as to trances, states, and the rest, to support assurance in a Presence that is more than man?

The enquiry was effectively opened by James in his famous chapter upon the Reality of the Unseen,¹ to which reference has already been made. Here, in a whole series of examples, he was able to illustrate an undefined sense of presence, of intense but formless clearness. 'In all three instances,' says one of his informants, 'the certainty that there in outward space there stood *something* was indescribably *stronger* than the ordinary certainty of companionship when we are in the close presence of ordinary living people. The something seemed close to me, and intensely more real than any ordinary perception.'² Such experiences are not uncommon, and they have little or nothing to do with the mystical trance. Nor do they at all necessarily involve a belief in God as their source. The writer of the passage just quoted regarded the whole sensation as 'horrible.' And it is obvious that a whole series of gruesome ghost-stories, true enough, whatever be their explanation, could have been included side by side with the more optimistic material which James so obviously prefers. The general conclusion which he reached has been of great importance: 'It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality*, a *feeling of objective presence*, a *perception* of what we may call "something there," more

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 53 ff.

² *Op. cit.* p. 60.

deep and more general than any of the special and particular "senses" by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed.'¹ The passage which follows² has commonly been ignored by James's critics. In it he suggests the possibility that the normal work of the senses begins by the arousal of this reality-feeling, and that anything else, whether an idea or, in particular, a religious conception, which could awaken it would have the same appearance of reality as the ordinary world about us. This is obscure in itself, but important in its correlation of the abnormal experiences which he proceeds to relate with the normal occurrences of daily life.

It was the lure of the abnormal which stirred the interest of critics, and discussion of the problem has proceeded upon two lines. Considerable work has been done with a view to experimental verification of the 'sense of presence,' regarded as a 'sixth sense,'³ and there is now a good deal of evidence for the view that these special experiences are due partly to misinterpretations of obscure sensations and partly to strong emotional associations aroused by causes of which the subject is unaware. On the other hand, the attempt has been made, most notably by Otto, to isolate certain aspects of experience containing this specific quality as a direct, non-rational element in man's psychical life and constituting the primitive ground of religion.

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 58. The passage is quoted and criticized by Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 10 n.

² *Ibid.* : 'If this were so, we might suppose the senses to waken our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by first exciting this sense of reality; but anything else, any idea, for example, that might similarly excite it, would have that same prerogative of appearing real which objects of sense normally possess. So far as religious conceptions were able to touch this reality-feeling, they would be believed in in spite of criticism, even though they might be so vague and remote as to be almost unimaginable, even though they might be such non-entities in point of *whatness*, as Kant makes the objects of his moral theology to be.'

³ A good summary in Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 280.

Otto's theory of the 'numinous' starts from Schleiermacher's suggestion that religion takes its rise in the feeling of dependence.¹ He points out that in religious experience this is not feeling in the ordinary sense of the word. For lack of a better phrase we have to speak in the language of the emotions, and Otto terms it 'creature-feeling' or 'creature-consciousness.' It is the mood of Abraham when he said 'Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes,'² and it is far more than a mere feeling of dependence. 'It is the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.'³

And this emotion is not a feeling which primarily concerns the self. It is here that Otto parts company with Schleiermacher, in whose view, he says,

the religious emotion would be directly and primarily a sort of *self-consciousness*, a feeling concerning one's self in a special determined relation, viz. one's dependence. Thus according to Schleiermacher, I can only come upon the very fact of God as the result of an inference, that is, by reasoning to a cause beyond myself to account for my 'feeling of dependence.' But this is entirely opposed to the psychological facts of the case. Rather, the 'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the Self. But this object is just what we have already spoken of as 'the numinous.' For the 'creature-feeling' and the sense of dependence to arise in the mind the 'numen' must be experienced as present, a 'numen praesens,' as in the case of Abraham.⁴

The next step in the enquiry is to distinguish the special characteristics of the numinous, and these Otto sums up in

¹ Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 9. Here Otto points out that Schleiermacher had already made the distinction 'of pious or religious dependence from all other feelings of dependence.' But he regards this as insufficient. The 'creature-feeling' can only be called 'feeling' at all by analogy.

² Gen. xviii. 27. ³ Otto, *op. cit.* p. 10. ⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 10 f.

a now familiar formula, *mysterium tremendum*. The numinous itself cannot be defined directly. Its nature 'can only be suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling.'¹ The feelings of which the numinous is the object are closely related to feelings familiar as parts of our general emotional life. Otto's analysis falls into two parts. The element covered by the term *tremendum* has the characteristics of awe, of a sense of 'overpoweringness,' and of a sense of living energy or urgency. It is precisely the emotion felt by Jacob when he said 'How dreadful is this place,'² the sense of primitive holiness which the terror of the Lord inspires.³ The awe is akin to shuddering and horror, and the panic dread of the Greeks,⁴ and in the higher forms of religion it becomes the hushed stillness of that ineffable Something which holds the spirit in the 'creature-feeling' of personal abasement,⁵ in the peace 'which passeth all understanding.' Throughout this analysis what is distinctive is the sense of the 'Beyond,' the 'Other.' This is expressed especially in the element of 'majesty' or 'overpoweringness'⁶ but is already contained

¹ Otto, *op. cit.* p. 12.

² Gen. xxviii. 17.

³ Exod. xxiii. 27; Job. ix. 24, xiii., xxi.

⁴ Otto, *op. cit.* p. 15: 'Its antecedent stage is "daemonic dread" (cf. the horror of Pan) with its queer perversion, a sort of abortive off-shoot, the "dread of ghosts." It first begins to stir in the feeling of "something uncanny," "eerie," or "weird." It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting point for the entire religious development in history. "Daemons" and "gods" alike spring from this root, and all the products of "mythological apperception" or "fantasy" are nothing but different modes in which it has been objectified. . . . We ought to go further and add that the natural man is quite unable to shudder (*grauen*) or feel horror in the real sense of the word. For shuddering is something more than "natural," ordinary fear. It implies that the mysterious is already beginning to loom before the mind, to touch the feelings.'

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 18.

⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 20: 'It is especially in relation to this element of majesty or absolute overpoweringness that the creature-consciousness, of which we have already spoken, comes upon the scene, as a sort of shadow or subjective reflection of it. Thus in contrast to the "overpowering," of which

in awe, which is like fear in some of its outward manifestations and yet is utterly distinct from it in the character of the object by which it is inspired. The overwhelming sense of the numinous comes out still more clearly in such experiences as those termed by Goethe 'daemonic,'¹ an element by no means uncommon in mysticism, in which the onset of God's love has been again and again felt, almost literally, as 'a consuming fire.'²

The analysis of the *mysterium* can be summed up in the phrase the 'Wholly Other,' and this passes over into the final element of fascination,³ in which the circle of the numinous is complete. 'The daemonic-divine object may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less Something that allures with a potent charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own. The "mystery" is for him not merely something to be wondered at but something that entrances him; and beside that in it which bewilders and confounds, he feels a something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often to a pitch of dizzy intoxication.'⁴

In all this we are clearly on the border-line of the

we are conscious as an object over against the self, there is the feeling of one's own abasement, of being but "dust and ashes" and nothingness.' Otto (*op. cit.* p. 15) expressly declares his view to be closely akin to that of Marett in *The Threshold of Religion* (*cf.* the section on 'The Birth of Humility').

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 24.

² *Ibid.* *Cf.* Deut. iv. 24; Heb. xii. 29. The thought passes, as in 2 Thess. i. 8, over into that of the apocalyptic 'wrath' of God, but in the mystics the fire of love has become almost a physical sensation. *Cf.* Richard Rolle's *Incendium Amoris*, and the experiences (or symptoms) of St. Catherine of Genoa (Von Hügel, *The Mystical Element in Religion*, i. 187 and 209; ii. 19) and St. Marguerite Marie Alacoque (*Memoirs*, ed. Longuet, 1876 edition, p. 322).

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 37 f.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 31.

experiences commonly described as mystical, but the types of feeling of which Otto is speaking go far beyond the limits of mysticism. They are deeply rooted in common life, and there are few in whom they cannot be aroused from time to time. In their crude forms they are familiar to the savage, and though civilization may transform them it has by no means weakened their power. Thus from the earliest beginnings of human history the mystery of reality has made itself known to men,¹ at first in strange inrushes of emotion, such as that overwhelming daemonic terror that was so completely other than fear, and later, as the rational and the non-rational were interwoven,² in the holy peace of the soul that knows in its ordered worship the Real Presence of its God.

The value of Otto's discussion is beyond question, and its influence has been immense. Yet in detail it seems to lie open to very damaging psychological criticism. The effort to define the numinous by the aid of certain characteristic emotions invites the answer that in the situations specified these emotions are really aroused by perfectly natural and suitable stimuli. And the explanation that they are used only as ideograms conveys no clear meaning, since we have at once to ask why *these* ideograms and no others are specially appropriate. Even the daemonic aspect of the primitive forms of the numinous may be due to a

¹ Otto, *op. cit.* pp. 136 ff.: 'It is not only the more developed forms of religious experience that must be counted underivable and *a priori*. The same holds good throughout, and is no less true of the primitive, 'crude,' and rudimentary emotions of 'daemonic dread' which, as we have seen, stand at the threshold of religious evolution. *Religion is itself present at its commencement*: religion, nothing else, is at work in these early stages of mystic and daemonic experience.

² It is an entire misunderstanding of Otto to believe that he ignores the rational aspect of religion. He stresses its importance at the very outset (*op. cit.* p. 1), and speaks of 'the intimate interpenetration of the non-rational with the rational elements of the religious consciousness, like the interweaving of warp and woof in a fabric' (p. 47). Cf. pp. 113 f., and p. 140.

special type of emotional reaction which occurs naturally in situations where man is utterly helpless against the forces which circumstances unleash against him. It is, in fact, identical with the emotional content of a nightmare, which has as its background the strong desires and the utter dependence and helplessness of the child.

But the most serious criticism of Otto's theory is that which we have already accepted in the case of experiences of a sense of presence. It would in the end be disastrous for religion if its validity were ever made to depend upon the interpretation of certain special types of experience. It may be true that this sense of the numinous which Otto describes has a peculiar quality of impressiveness, but at the most its value is that it calls our attention to an element of Otherness which is present in every part and aspect of our life. Otherwise we are left with a dualism which in the end leaves this ordinary world out of account in God's creation. And that may not be.

Possibly the most valuable comment on Otto is one made unwittingly and in a different connection by Leuba and McDougall. I quote the former :

In the presence of grand, or particularly beautiful, natural scenery many persons ' feel ' the presence of God. As McDougall remarks, this is, no doubt, because the main emotions evoked are those of admiration and reverence—emotions that involve negative self-feeling. Now, negative self-feeling is an attitude referring to persons. Thus, one is led to the thought of a personal power as the cause of the impression.¹

Clearly the criticism applies exactly to Otto's conception of the numinous, but the conclusion to be drawn from it is the very opposite of that intended by its author. It is surely a striking fact that natural scenery, or situations in

¹ Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 291 n., quoting McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 130.

which this sense of littleness or abasement is aroused, should make their appeal to impulses primarily adapted to personal relationship. The obvious inference is that the personal is, at the least, very closely interwoven with these experiences, not simply because a person is their subject, but because the fundamental relationship upon which they rest is itself inherently personal. Thus Otto's theory becomes strong evidence for this personal aspect, at least of certain elements, and those universal, in man's psychic life.

But the theory is only of value if we can go further still. We have already seen that the whole range of man's instinctive and emotional life bears the marks of purpose, and that its ends in man cannot be separated from ends that are personal in reference. At the same time we have seen upon all his experience the marks of reality, the living contact of the spirit with that which lies without and beyond. And if we accept Otto's analysis of the numinous, even in the reduced sense which psychological caution may allow, it is because we would claim that the sense of presence is implicit wherever man rises to any consciousness of reality at all. His world is never dead, save when consciousness fails and his free personal life is merged in thinghood. But where freedom has at all been won it seems incredible that the thing should ever finally become lord again.

An aspect of this problem for which psychological evidence is both proper and suggestive is that which is concerned with the heightening of the sense of reality in some conditions and its lowering in others. The intense and vivid character of the mystic ecstasy, with its peculiar and convincing moments of insight, finds an instructive parallel in the exaltation produced by certain drugs,¹ and by certain morbid mental states. The phenomenon of the curious sense of illumination produced by nitrous oxide

¹ On the whole subject *cf.* Leuba, *op. cit.* pp. 8-36, where a general summary and many references are given.

poisoning,¹ by mescal,² hashish,³ and other drugs,⁴ and in a lesser degree by alcohol, ether, and their allies,⁵ has been fully studied. The same condition is a definite symptom of certain phases in some of the gravest mental disorders, notably in paranoia⁶ in its more highly emotional forms and in the manic phase of cyclic insanity.⁷ Equally important, though less frequently quoted, are the cases where reality seems to lose its normal quality, a symptom characteristic of epilepsy,⁸ of the depressive phase of cyclic insanity,⁹ of melancholia,¹⁰ and of some forms of schizophrenia.¹¹ Tennyson, who certainly experienced the exalted conditions,¹² apparently knew these lowered states also :

. . . weird seizures, Heaven knows what :
On a sudden in the midst of men and day,
And while I walk'd and talk'd as heretofore,
I seem'd to move among a world of ghosts,
And feel myself the shadow of a dream.¹³

¹ James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 294 ff. ; *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 387 ff.

² Weir Mitchell, 'The Effect of Anhalonium Lewinii' in *British Medical Journal*, 1896, ii. pp. 1625-8 ; Havelock Ellis, in *Popular Science Monthly*, 1902, lxi. pp. 52-71.

³ Havelock Ellis, *loc. cit.* ; Dunbar, 'An Essay on Hasheesh,' *Medical Review of Reviews*, 1912, p. 62. Other references are given by Leuba, *loc. cit.*

⁴ For opium De Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium Eater* is the classical example.

⁵ Leuba, *op. cit.* p. 18 ff. The following may serve as an introduction to the large literature upon the effects of alcohol and ether : Rivers, *The Influence of Alcohol and other Drugs on Fatigue* ; Partridge, *Studies in the Psychology of Intemperance* ; Miles, *Effect of Alcohol on Psycho-physiological Functions*. The first important study was Kraepelin's, *Ueber die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgänge durch einige Arzneimitteln*. The evidence is unanimous against any increase in muscular and mental efficiency, despite a certain stage of greater muscular activity and an illusion of well-being. If alcohol has any value it is in inducing relaxation. It never makes for better work.

⁶ See Henderson and Gillespie, *Textbook of Psychiatry*, pp. 225 ff. The paranoid type is very difficult to define exactly.

⁷ *Op. cit.* p. 128.

⁸ *Op. cit.* pp. 360 f.

⁹ *Op. cit.* p. 139.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 161.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 194 ff. The phenomena here are more complex, and this aspect is less clearly marked on its subjective side.

¹² Leuba, *op. cit.* p. 237 f.

¹³ Tennyson, *The Princess*.

Such evidence has been quoted triumphantly by some writers as challenging the validity of the mystical experience. William James, at least in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, accepts them heroically as evidence, sufficient for pragmatic optimism, of the avenue through the subliminal self to the Unseen,¹ though when it comes to the Hegelian revelations of nitrous oxide he can be as contemptuous as any of his sceptical friends.² For Leuba they really end the matter. So disreputable a path cannot lead to God, and the mystic way is for him no better.³

But this set of observations does not in the least invalidate the real objectivity of personal values. All that it proves is that our consciousness of them can be profoundly distorted. And while the exaltation produced by drugs is deeply discredited by its physical and ethical results, it is nevertheless an interesting piece of evidence for the real existence of a sense of otherness and its significance as part of the very basis of our personal life. There is in these facts a parallel, not as remote as might appear at first sight, with the case of those who wish to keep their God to themselves and who worship Him in an esoteric privacy which utterly distorts their whole relationship with Him. But to admit this does not deny or even discredit the God of the open spaces and the fresh air outside their conventicle. The sun which struggles through their stained windows is still the sun.

What does seem to emerge from the confused evidence with which, in this lecture, we have had to deal is simply, once more, the resilient objectivity of life itself. It has appeared impossible to isolate religious experiences as having any peculiar objectivity and certainty of their own. Their vindication in this respect cannot, at any rate, lie

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 389 ff.

² *The Will to Believe*, pp. 297 f.

³ Leuba, *op. cit.* p. 315.

with the psychologist. With their ethical fruits or absolute values we cannot as psychologists concern ourselves. But the reality inherent in religious experience is unquestionably one with that which underlies the whole of life.

And once more we recall that the so-called 'reality-principle' of the psychologists everywhere revealed its essentially personal character. Whether we started from psycho-analysis or from the study of instinct, whether we considered the methods of psychotherapy or the sanctions of the group, in each case we were brought back to purposive and personal considerations. The evidence might, indeed, be held to suggest a certain truth in theories of degrees in reality. Things, the sheer solid objects of the senses, do seem to have a certain curious entity of their own, however abstract this seems to be when we examine it closely. Few of us are really quite convinced by Bishop Berkeley. And yet, if this entity of 'things' has any real meaning, it seems to come to existence as a sort of residue from the personal experience in which we come to be aware of them. It is as though the whole material structure of this world in which the personal adventure of living takes place were left behind as a kind of aftermath of the creative movement of God. But the higher reality is in the adventure itself, the adventure of living, the adventure of Creation. And thus the personal and the creative form a level of reality higher than that displayed in the material order. It is in this level that the material finds its explanation, and, as it seems, its origin, and its existence is so bound up with the personal life of which it forms the setting, as the crude stuff for the creative ends of man and God, that it is perhaps impossible for the living mind of man to give it any exact meaning.

The psychologists have brought us to the point of recognizing these personal and creative elements in reality. The main weakness of psychology as a science is that it has not adequately combined the two. Frequently, indeed, it

has aspired to be a philosophy without taking its own supreme discoveries into account. The creative libido of Jung remains impersonal and blind. The personal love-life of Freud has no purpose beyond itself, and so remains empty and uncreative, seeking, and at the last with success, to sink back to the barren thinghood of death.

Whatever else is true of religious experience it is at least clear that it unites, and gives full value to, these two factors, the personal and the creative. The claim of religion is not only that its object is real, but that it is a Creator-God, capable of being loved. This conviction is the basis of the Christian life, and of the new spirit which infuses the Church, so far as it is Christian and of Christ. The world of the psychologist demands as its substance a creative reality and solves its problems in love. But the process remains as meaningless and void as the shadow procession upon the walls of Plato's cave,¹ unless beyond it all there is a higher level of reality still, self-revealing and yet to be revealed, the Eternal, Unknowable, Ineffable, whose love hardly veils, yet sufficiently for our bearing, a glory of Splendour unapproachable.

¹ Plato, *Republic*, vii. *init.*

LECTURE VIII

THE CLAIM OF CHRISTIAN THEISM

SYNOPSIS

THE central characteristic of Christianity is not belief in God, but belief in Jesus Christ. It accepts the universal quest of man for a creative reality beyond himself, and interprets this in the light of a definite and historical set of facts, viz. those relating to Jesus and those comprising the creative experience which is called the Church. This procedure is entirely scientific, and may be compared with any testing of a hypothesis by suitably chosen experiment. But in this case the hypothesis must be adequate to explain the whole range of personal facts. Science may use sub-personal hypotheses within its restricted range. Christianity, the *scientia scientiarum*, cannot.

This one central hypothesis is what men call God. Christianity claimed inheritance from Judaism, but its actual preaching to the Greek world was a preaching of Jesus. Thus the Christian claim is that His life was crucial for the interpretation of reality. This claim rests upon a value-judgment which psychology can neither justify nor criticize.

The claim involves the interpretation of reality by human categories. These may be inadequate, but sub-human categories are even less adequate. And abstract or negative categories are the least adequate of all.

Thus the revelation in Jesus has two aspects :

(1) His unique Filial consciousness is something more than the mystical experience or the divination of the numinous. His Reality is capable of intimacy. Thus He reveals that Reality as a God of love. Further, His intimacy is a reference of the whole of life to the Father. Thus He reveals a God who is the Other not only in special providences, but in all human experience, so far as it is personal.

(2) He reveals God as acting upon and through humanity, not simply among human relationships, but in them. This is the

essential basis of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and its link with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The revelation came through Friendship and Forgiveness, and these are still the Way, the Truth, and the Life. Thus the love of God and the love of man are one, and it is through our human friendships and in the human community that we come through Christ to God.

LECTURE VIII

THE CLAIM OF CHRISTIAN THEISM

Herein was the love of God manifested in us, that God hath sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.—1 John iv. 9, 10.

Truly the Soul returneth the body's loving
where it hath won it . . . and God so loveth the world . . .
and in the fellowship of the friendship of Christ
God is seen as the very self-essence of love,
Creator and mover of all as activ Lover of all
self-express'd in not-self, without which no self were.¹

At the close of *The Testament of Beauty* the late Poet Laureate has stated the fundamental thesis of these lectures in terms so apt that he has covered in six lines all the essential points of an exposition of Christian theism. For Christianity began with Christ, and is Christ. In Christ was found friendship. In that friendship the fellowship was born. In the terms of that fellowship the hypothesis which men have called by many names, and which, very usually, in our English speech men label 'God,' has been interpreted anew. To say that God is Creator and mover of all is still to speak in terms of a logical hypothesis, the conceptual climax of a cosmological argument. To identify His creative energy with an activity of love is to pass beyond the concept to a claim upon the Universe of Being. It is in the fellowship of the friendship of Christ, and there alone, that the claim is made in all its fullness of meaning, and therein is the whole substance of Christian faith. The great edifice of

¹ Bridges, *The Testament of Beauty*, iv. ll. 1436-1441.

Christian doctrine, whether it be the metaphysical definition of the Trinity in Unity, or its practical application in the ecclesiastical ordering of the fellowship, is entirely interpretation. That is no doctrine of the Trinity which loses sight of love. That which denies the fellowship of Christians is no Church of Christ.

This, then, is the thesis which we are now to maintain in the light of the psychological criticisms with which we have been occupied. And it is at once apparent that the criticisms have very little indeed to do with these central positions of religion. The attacks that have real weight are attacks upon outposts, and when we came to investigate it appeared that many of these outposts were no true concern of Christianity at all. But if we analyse our opening statement we find two and only two elements involved. As to one of these psychology has nothing whatever to say, and as to the other we are entirely ready to take up any challenge which may come from that quarter.

The first element is the plain historical fact from which Christianity traces its origin. That this fact is highly complex does not affect the essential point, which is that it is history and not fantasy. Like all facts of history it has an inner structure, due to its immediacy at a time that is past and to its enduring interweaving with the present, as the present moves on. The Gospels clearly record the life of an historical person, and in the main outline their account gives a sufficiently clear impression of a human life so astonishing, yet so self-consistent in its simplicity and its exaltation, that it has held the attention and drawn the love of men ever since they were written. The Church, again, is a living tradition, going back indubitably to that same Jesus, of whom the Gospels speak. But the New Testament and the Church are not merely witnesses to something that happened. They are themselves facts, bound up inseparably with the fact of Christ. In all this there is

nothing open to psychological criticism. For psychology, like any other science, must start from facts, assuming as facts both the record itself and the certainty that there was a fact to be recorded, whatever the accuracy of the record may be. No record, however improbable or fantastic, takes its rise in nothing at all. And if Christianity does precisely this same thing, there is here no matter for dispute. It is only when Christians claim, as sometimes they have done, a special inerrancy in the record, or special modes of insight and interpretation, thus seeking to solve their historical problems at the outset without the discipline of a true historical method, that the scientist has any cause for complaint.

The second element in the Christian claim is in effect simply the assumption that man's universal search for a creative reality beyond himself is no idle quest, and that we have a right to use in that quest such facts as seem most relevant and most likely to lead us to our goal. That, when we have made this assumption, we take as our cardinal fact the fact of Christ is entirely legitimate as scientific procedure. But the assumption itself may be held to require some defence.

At point after point in our general discussion we have noted in a series of observations the impact of external reality upon man's life. The instincts are called into activity by stimuli appropriate to their structure. The emotions are built up into the dispositions or sentiments which constitute character in a system of personal relationships. In the healing of the sick, or the sinner, the essential principle appeared to be the acceptance of a new pattern or ideal,¹ which imposes itself with the authority of the external and given. And the analysis of the social group seemed to show that its genesis cannot be explained from within. Its origin may be adventitious and accidental, or it may exist

¹ See p. 123.

to serve some purpose of secular continuance and import. In every case we seemed to be brought into touch with driving forces, of curiously creative quality, in that Other, that Beyond, which is the background of all experience. And it was in complete agreement with these facts that we found faith a basic element in personality, not merely in the more formal aspects of religion, but wherever personal life revealed itself, whether in normal and healthy growth or in disorder and renewal. But faith always has reference to that which lies beyond. And faith is always personal.

For these observations a hypothesis is clearly necessary, if we are to study them at all, and this is as much a need for psychology, or for any other science, as it is for religion. The hypothesis, further, must be one, and it must be adequate. No science can possibly proceed if its fundamental laws are liable to change, or if they do not cover the facts. An apparent breach of the laws at once involves their revision and restatement, in terms which brings the exception within their scope. Psychology is no exception to this rule, and the psychologists who challenge the Christian hypothesis must clearly be prepared with an alternative hypothesis of their own. And since their subject is human personality, and not biology or any partial study of human nature, we have a right to ask that their hypothesis shall be adequate to all that personality involves.

It is almost startling to find how completely our question remains unanswered in those systems of psychology which find no room for God. With psychology of the classical type, as we meet it, for example, in Ward, we have no quarrel, for here the facts of personal life are taken honestly and fully into account, whether explanations are offered or not. But when we turn to Behaviourism we find such fundamental facts as consciousness and freedom treated as mere irrelevances. The central hypothesis appears to be

that of the statistical validity of laws of averages, based on superficial and external observation. And it does not at all appear how, upon his own principles, the Behaviourist could ever have become aware that such laws existed. It is the ancient difficulty of all experimental science, that the laws which control its experiments and interpret them cannot be given by the science itself. But while the experimental scientist has a perfect right to work within limits of his own prescribing, and his results have a value exactly proportioned to the recognition of those limits, the Behaviourist can only claim this right if he is prepared to renounce all judgment upon the significance of life and the meaning of the personality which he pretends to study. These things stand clearly outside his self-imposed limitations. He must not ask that we should accept his limitations too.

When we pass from Behaviourism to the other psychologists with whom we have been chiefly concerned we find a much more adequate recognition of the facts, and an almost complete absence of any intelligible hypothesis for their explanation. Leuba, for example, appears to hold the mechanistic conception of man and of the world. There must be no interference with physical causation, and any God who intervenes therein must go.¹ Man must replace his 'illusory belief in such a God by a more accurate understanding of the causes of whatever effectiveness is possessed by that belief.'² Yet at the same time he wishes to conserve religion, emancipated from its God, as a system of ideals. 'It is not a replacement of the religious spirit by science which is indicated here, but the inclusion into religion of the relevant scientific knowledge. The hope of humanity lies in a collaboration of religious idealism with science—the former

¹ Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, *passim*, e.g., 'It is necessary that man should entirely give up the belief in personal, super-human causation. Divided responsibility works no better in religion than in business' (p. 329).

² *Op. cit.* p. 323.

providing the ideal to be attained, and the latter, so far as it can, the physical and the psychological means and methods of achievement.' ¹ How a unified scientific or practical principle is to emerge from all this does not appear. Causation and ideal cannot be treated thus departmentally, and all history bears witness to the immense efficacy of the ideal as itself a cause. Leuba's reality seems to be so utterly cleft in sunder that only the God whom he has banished can ever mend it. It appears, indeed, that it is really only a special aspect of God that moves his wrath. He cannot allow a God of special providences. Perhaps a God more completely Christian might serve his turn, a God at all times and in all things :

Creator and mover of all as activ Lover of all.

The psycho-analysts are no better. Freud, despite his recognition of the love-life, and his strange and unexplained ideal that all men, in some future age beyond our seeing, should live together as brothers,² is purely determinist, applying his unbending canon of law to mind as well as matter. But determinism is a dead, or at least a dying creed to-day. It leaves too many of the facts out of account. If freedom were no more than a dream we should still have to explain so fair and terrible a dreaming. Jung and Adler, abandoning determinism, give us in its place, as Bergson does, a creative chaos, with hints of individual purpose here and there, but no intelligible goal or guiding principle in the whole, unless indeed the crudest biological ends of the individual or the species may be held to suffice. The absolute dominants of a highly hypothetical racial unconscious ³ are a poor substitute for the creative reality of a God who can be loved.

From such confusions as these it is a relief to turn to science proper on the one hand or to Christianity on the

¹ Leuba, *op. cit.* p. 332 ; *cf.* pp. 326 f. ² See p. 52. ³ See p. 54.

other. For in either case the fundamental assumptions are clearly defined. Science, according to its particular interest and purpose, may make what use it pleases of sub-personal hypotheses. The chemistry of the human body is, for example, an entirely legitimate and a very necessary subject of study, and its hypotheses are obviously those of chemistry and not of personal freedom. But Christianity cannot reduce the divine tragedy of Hamlet to a mere chemical transmutation of Shakespeare's breakfast.¹ Man has always sought, in the real world about him, or veiled behind it, an explanation of his being and an end less transient than the mere satisfaction of his momentary need. Christianity accepts, as its first assumption, the view of the universe that this implies. Reality itself is creative and purposive, and this purpose is not a mere chaos of conflicting ends, but is one.

So far our procedure is scientific enough, though our hypothesis is vague in the extreme and difficult to apply generally. Very many of the facts of life seem to show little sign of this creative purpose, and evil and suffering cut directly across it. Christianity therefore passes on, again on strictly scientific lines, to single out a particular group of facts, which have as their centre the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth, and to make these the test of its assumption. It has again and again happened in scientific enquiry that a single carefully chosen experiment has involved the reinterpretation of a whole series of apparently well-established observations. So in physics the Michelson-Morley experiment, whether the observations made in it were finally accurate or not, opened the way for Einstein's transformation of the theory of space. In chemistry the careful study of radium has completely destroyed the 'small incompressible spheres'² of the older atomic theory. In history the crucial

¹ This sentence is based upon a phrase used, I believe, by Ingersoll.

² The phrase comes from Clerk Maxwell's poem quoted above, p. 39.

case stands obvious for our choosing. Jesus of Nazareth holds a place unquestionably supreme, and we make no unnatural choice when we see in Him the test-experiment, by which we may hope best to read the full significance of our human life, and its relation to that creative reality, from which, as we must needs suppose, we have sprung.

Such, then, is the substance of the Christian claim. If in its interpretation we soon find ourselves speaking the language of theology, that, despite the distaste of a world rapidly becoming unused to theological idiom, is natural enough, since theology arose to provide an accurate terminology whereby these matters might be discussed without confusion. As to the creation of an appropriate jargon, as he is sometimes pleased to term our speech, no scientist pot need complain of the theological kettle.

And if, before beginning our interpretation, we have to admit an act of faith at the very outset of the way, that faith is no more irrational than the faith of the scientist, who devotes his life to the study of some group of, let us say, snails or flies, in the belief that they are worthy of his attention, and in the belief that there are definite laws and methods appropriate to his science. But these beliefs are not given by scientific reasoning. The high devotion of the scientist is one in principle with the faith of the Christian. Even flies and snails may lie, for some, about the pathway that leads to God. Yet at least we may claim that in choosing to read the ways of God through man, and through man at his highest, we are choosing for our study and devotion that which is most likely to lead us furthest towards the truth. And, in sheer fact, no science leads anywhere that does not lead to man as its goal. It is the science which forgets this that, as it fondly imagines, has no need for God.

In its historical beginnings Christianity did not put

its claim in this indefinite but far-reaching way. The early Christians did not talk cautiously about a creative reality. They spoke in plain terms of God. They did not think of Jesus of Nazareth as a crucial experiment. They knew Him as Friend and Master, and they flung their whole being into the enthusiasm of His friendship and service. Their preaching was the good news about Jesus.¹ They assumed that men already meant something when they spoke of God, and, without challenging the inheritance which they received from Judaism they set side by side with it the Jesus whom they had known living, and dead, and alive again. They had been through much more than a time of inexplicable miracles, healings, and voices, and a strange mastery over Nature itself, and at the end a conquest of death. If they had told the world, and us, these things alone, they would have been believed. Such stories have always found a hearing. And men would still have known nothing more of the meaning of God.² But their experience had been one of such a Friendship as man had never known, of disastrous failure and a forgiveness beyond all believing, and of a new, a free, a creative life. Nothing of all this was of their own achievement. They knew that they were men remade, and they knew that the mode of their remaking was love. This was a providence, a deliverance, greater and more significant than anything that the Jew had ever claimed for the Creator-God. Yet they could not think of it as other than His work, since God, as all their national tradition taught, is One. It interpreted for them, as we might put it in our more cautious way, the creative reality to which they, with all men, had looked with uncertainty and even with fear. Henceforth the central hypothesis which men call God was known as love, and everywhere He was made manifest just in so far as love had passed out from Christ to the fellowship of the Christian community.

¹ Mk. i. 1.² Lk. xvi. 31.

'Every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God.'¹ All was not yet plain. The world still lay in darkness, and the powers of evil were strong. The human heart was deceitful and desperately wicked. But still by the witness of love, ever new-born and creative in their hearts they knew that they held the key of the mystery. 'God is love.'² 'We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in the evil one.'³ And in the end all shall be well, and all made plain in love, for 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.'⁴

The full exposition of this faith and hope of the early Church, and of its attempts to find words to fit the Person of Him through whom it came, would carry us far beyond the proportion and scope of our present task. What concerns us here is that Christianity is rooted firmly not in fantasy but in fact. That it is concerned with God is in part an inheritance from Judaism, in part a recognition of what under various names, is a general presupposition of human life. Man has never been able to believe that what he sees is the whole meaning and truth of his experience. And certainly, whatever Jung might expect us to claim,⁵ Christianity has never held that its certainty of God is of the same order as the experimental certainty of the senses. For 'no man hath seen God at any time,' even though it is true that 'the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.'⁶ And when the first Christians went to the Greek world it was not with the Jewish God, but with the story of Jesus, written in lives upon which His own victorious life was evident for all to see. St. Paul at Athens was ready to take his cue from the altar to an Unknown God, but his message is the message of the Resurrection.⁷ At Corinth he surrenders even this narrow contact with Greek thought. 'I determined,' he

¹ 1 Jn. iv. 7.

² 1 Jn. iv. 8, 16.

³ 1 Jn. v. 19.

⁴ 2 Cor. v. 19.

⁵ See p. 55.

⁶ Jn. i. 18.

⁷ Acts xvii. 23-31.

says, 'not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.' ¹

We have said that it is strictly scientific to choose a test case or experiment by which to examine a particular theory, and that such a single experiment, accurately made and interpreted, may be sufficient in itself for proof or disproof. But the experiment selected by the scientist in such an enquiry is not chosen at random. A scientist can give good reason for his choice and his reasoning is that appropriate to the methods of his science. The Michelson-Morley experiment was constructed, with immense care and precision, to confirm a particular theory of the ether by measuring a variation in the relative speed of light, which the experiment ought, upon that theory, to have revealed. The failure of the experiment was, in this case, its success. The theory which it was intended to vindicate had at once to be remodelled to fit this unexpected observation.

The Christian, seeking a meaning for this world more profound and more inclusive than any principle of physics, chooses, amid a multitude of facts relevant to his problem, the fact of Christ. Can he, too, give reasonable grounds for his choice?

We have at once to admit that Christians have very often answered this question wrongly, or, at least, incompletely. Many of the objections to Christianity are very reasonable objections not to its essence, but to the ways in which it has been stated and defended. To say that we believe in Christ, so that we find in Him the key to all existence, because He was foretold in prophecy, or because He worked miracles, or because He rose from the dead, or simply because the Bible bids us believe, is to argue within one or other of a series of circles. For, if we really take the trouble to analyse our attitude towards the Old Testament, we only find prophecy where we look back to it from a fulfilment

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 2.

in Jesus. Many things in the Old Testament might have been prophecy, and are not.¹ Or, again, we may or may not believe in miracles, but if we do so believe it is because they take meaning and become humanly bearable in Him. No man's faith is the stronger for unaccountable and irrational happenings in his universe. Even a resurrection gave no assurance to men when it was a return of Nero for which they looked. And a direct and uncritical belief in the letter of the Bible is mere fetichism unless it rests upon a belief in Him of whom it speaks. Scripture cannot be its own warranty, and the search for archaeological facts to vindicate its accuracy is a futile quest if it is supposed that the results of such a search can either confirm or render void its authority.

The reasonable defence of the Christian choice of Christ as the revelation of the mystery of the universe is simply that in His life we see the problems of our own lives wrought out in an achievement of personality incomparable and complete. There is no avoidance of the dreadful, irrational realities of evil and death. There is suffering, and temptation, and the shadow of failure. Yet all these things are so portrayed in the Gospel narratives that they form a self-consistent picture of One who was completely master of His own soul. We know, as we read the story of His life, that this is humanity at its highest level, and, though such heights are utterly beyond our attaining, we know that He has revealed the purpose and possibility of our own immeasurably less effective lives. We claim, therefore, that here, if anywhere, it should be possible to discover the secret of personal being and therewith the secret of that reality within which persons have come to be.

¹ A good example of this retrospective discovery of prophecy is the use in Jn. xix. 36, 37, of Exod. xii. 46, and Zech. xii. 10. The point can be illustrated by a study of Ps. xxii. with its astonishingly close parallels to the Passion narratives, mingled with verses which cannot be interpreted *literally* in that connection.

But though this is reasonable, as a defence of Christianity, a critic of our position may still ask us to vindicate our choice of Christ as the highest human type. We have, after all, only said that we know that this is true. But what of Nietzsche, who saw in Him a weakling; of Binet-Sanglé,¹ who was prepared to certify Him a paranoiac? How shall we answer the challenge of one who offers us Gautama, or Socrates, or Napoleon instead? This is the point at which we have no answer. We have made, and can defend, a reasonable claim. The assured place of Jesus in human history will carry us as far as that. But the Christian goes much further than reasonableness. He affronts the world by being sure. He does not commit his faith to the arbitrament of evidence and of logic. He knows the truth, and bids men disagree with him at their peril.

Certainty of this kind does not depend upon the ordinary processes of observation and logical judgment. It bears no resemblance at all to our certainty of the conclusion of a mathematical proof, or of a scientifically observed fact. For these are certainties which we cannot reject, while yet they demand proof if we are to accept them. But the Christian certainty lies beyond proof, and is obviously not outside the possibility of our rejection. If the ground of this certainty is to be stated in terms of reasoning at all we must use Ritschl's formula, and call it a judgment of value rather than a judgment of fact. But this language, as the difficulties of Ritschlianism have shown abundantly, creates a whole series of problems of its own. And just as it is no matter of salvation that the Christian should be capable of understanding the intricacies of abstract logic, so is his faith something at once more simple and more fundamental than a proper appreciation of the fine points of a philosophy of values. Whatever else it may be it is not the conclusion of a syllogism, but a basic and unresolved response, personal

¹ Binet-Sanglé, *La Folie de Jesus*, ii. 509 f.

and direct. The nearest parallel to it in ordinary life is friendship, in which the element of personal assurance stands out clearly, and it is significant that both in the Old Testament and in the New the supreme vision of the possibility of man's approach to God is stated in terms of friendship. In all the Hebrew tradition there was no figure like that of Moses, with whom the Lord spake 'face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.'¹ And the memory of the discipleship of Jesus recalled no greater moment than that in which He said 'Ye are my friends, if ye do the things which I command you. No longer do I call you servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth: but I have called you friends; for all things that I heard from my Father I have made known unto you.'²

In the last analysis a response of this kind underlies all experience, and not only that in which there is a direct awareness of some person. We are aware of impersonal things too, and this primitive and simple awareness is the central fact of all consciousness, a fact as indisputable and necessary to Behaviourism as to any other psychology, and to psychology as to personal being itself. It is this fact which, as we saw, links religious faith to a principle elemental in all human life, as distinguished from the mere material continuity of thinghood and its wholly external interactions. In the child playing with the toys by which he learns to handle the greater toys of life, in the scientist caught and held by the intense and living interest of some object of his study, in the financier powerless in the grip of the deadly craving which money has the power to excite, we see the crude unshapen or distorted impulse of love and faith. We see too that there is a scale or system of levels in value or worth, which is something fundamental and quite distinct from anything which can strictly be called a judgment. When

¹ Exod. xxxiii. 11; cf. Deut. xxxiv. 10; Jer. xxxi. 34.

² Jn. xv. 14, 15.

value becomes valuation it has utterly changed its character. Our joy in a picture may bear some relation to its price in a catalogue, but it is not the same thing. And so it is in life. We know, without hesitation or proof or the possibility of defending our knowledge, that the love of a friend is more than the love of the glories of nature or the creative beauty of art, and that both stand higher than the love of the meat that perisheth.

It is at this point that we pass beyond the judgment and the criticism of psychology. The descriptive analysis of behaviour, even when it takes the ends and purposes of life into account, cannot by its very nature provide any estimate of its inherent worth. When we assert that love is more than self-regard, that humanity has a dignity utterly other than that of Nature and the living wonders of her making, that 'the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath,'¹ we make statements upon which psychology has no right to an opinion. And this incompetence of psychology, as of science in general, does not mean that no opinion is possible. It only means that the methods and categories of science, admirable in their proper sphere, are not the sole and final arbiters of reality. We make no claim different in principle from the claims of science when we ask that the certainties of faith and love should not be ignored, and find them a more satisfying guide to life and its problems than the laws and systems of even the most accurate empiricism.

The psychologist himself, indeed, makes exactly this same claim, at once truly religious and scientifically indefensible, in his devotion to the study of man. He would not and could not engage in that study unless it had worth for him, and that worth must lie either in himself or in those whom he studies. His world is after all a world not of facts only but of personal values, and apart from the

¹ Mk. ii. 27.

personal values it would go ill with the facts. Among his facts, again, and involved in their analysis at every point, he finds that basic thing which reveals itself most clearly as love. For him, just as for the Christian, love remains primary and unexplained. Even when he reduces it to terms of sex he still leaves unresolved the primary and all-significant fact that in an act physically and biologically determinate spirit and spirit meet, and that this strange masterful impulse is perhaps never, for man, without some touch of the sacramental. And we may press him further back still, to those earliest beginnings in which the object demands and obtains the attention of the subject, thereby awakening it to life and growth. Even here we find the primitive ego-other relationship, fundamental and irreducible. It is the whole task of psychology to describe its effects, but the relationship itself is not so to be analysed away.

Thus psychology demands, and Christianity claims, the interpretation of reality by human categories. The parallels with animal instinct and with the curious possibilities of bio-chemistry do not in the least suggest that the secret of life is to be found in a more careful observation of our less successful competitors in the race of life, or in a more skilful manipulation of reagent, crucible and retort. These things might avail if psychology could stand without the psychologist, if there could be a system of religion which had its essence in something other than the living, quivering, naked soul of man. It may be true that human nature bears all the marks of incompleteness and inadequacy. At every point we find the free and the creative interwoven, as warp crosses woof, with the determinate thinghood in which, to our bewilderment, it is manifested. Yet this bears witness at least as clearly to possibilities inherent in the so-called physical or material world as to limitations and sub-rational explanations of the personal, the creative, and the free.

The Christian appeal to Christ is in its essence simply the claim that man is for man the only measure whereby his universe may be measured. And amid the world of manhood we choose Christ because in Him manhood stands revealed with a fullness unique in human history. Here, if anywhere, its adequacy as a hypothesis is likely to be revealed.

No real rival to this claim is to be found in the artificial and relative postulates of science, which are of positive value only within the restricted and particular fields of scientific enquiry. These fields may be satisfying enough to those content to graze therein. Yet sometimes, perchance, even the cattle may gaze over the hedge and wonder, as once ox and ass stood patient and astonished by a manger where man, their ancient lord and master, lay in the weakness and glory of rebirth.

But it is another matter with the wide negations and abstractions of metaphysics, a pasture as unprofitable for science as it is barren for faith. Here at least we have the claim of a way of thought which leads us past the transient and the occasional, and seeks to find categories wherewith man may gain some hold upon that which lies beyond. But ever the philosopher grasps a shadow, and the reality eludes him. For the terms which he uses are bound by their content to this solid world of sense and of experience, and he cannot escape save by abstractions which empty them of all meaning.¹

This deadly but inevitable philosophical tradition has been the greatest difficulty of Christian theology. Ever since the time of Plato, with his identification of the Good with Not-being, the tendency of philosophy (as of mysticism) has been to create words adequate for its purposes by negation of their positive and limited content. This was the disastrous heritage which Greece left to the Fathers of the

¹ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 199 ff.

Church, with the result that they strove to describe God either by such negations, as in the four great negatives of the Chalcedonian formula, or by words so inclusive that they have lost all contact with ordinary human thought. Such terms as the 'Absolute,' the 'Summum Bonum,' the 'Ens Realissimum' are nothing more than question marks whereby man's problems are indicated. They contribute nothing to the solution of those problems save an emphasis upon the problem itself which prevents man from treating it as negligible. And to speak of God negatively as infinite, ineffable, impassible, or positively as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, is to involve theology in a use of words each one of which is too vast for human thought and too indefinite for the elusive Reality which it strives to grasp. The language of philosophy has, indeed, a certain appearance of spaciousness, yet space itself may be a terror to one who loses touch with all landmarks. And if science, with its restrictions, afflicts the Christian with claustrophobia, philosophy with its abstractions may well result in an agoraphobia no less destroying to his peace. Throughout these lectures we have spoken, for purposes of discussion, of the 'ultimate reality' or 'creative reality,' but such phrases, however valuable for an argument in which nothing is to be assumed, will not suffice us in the end. We do not at the last want a Reality, but a God. We do not want to know that He is almighty, but that He is strong to help us. We do not want to know that He is omnipresent, but that He is at our side. The broader terms of philosophy are valid enough. Doubtless the Absolute and God are one. But it is only through the direct and positive concepts which the Christian faith in Christ supplies that these wide abstractions of philosophy can be made safe for human thinking. The cosmic spaces are well enough, but man must dwell where there is air to breathe.

And so we return to Christ, that we may interpret our

world through Him. We leave on one side as secondary those things which, as the psychologists have shown us, may perhaps be due to our need and our imagining. It may be that our need will be supplied and our imagining draw near to truth, but we must not start our interpretation at this point, lest we be told that our theology turns about in a circle of our own devising. Our argument will move more securely if we take the direct facts of His life as the records stand, and think of Him in the first place not as Saviour but as Man. And with Him we must look to those whose lives He has changed, to the living history and fellowship of the Church which sprang into being through Him, and to the strangely vital and creative records in which His story is told.

At once we see that humanity, as revealed in Him, has two aspects, each of them inexplicable as fantasy.

(1) In Him that ego-other relationship, of which we have spoken so often, attains a fullness and a finality without any parallel. His claim to know God was no prophetic proclamation of a new theology, but a living and personal intimacy with the unseen reality, so close and so direct that, as the writer of the Fourth Gospel tells us, the Jews sought to kill Him, because He 'called God his own Father, making himself equal with God.'¹ We are not now concerned with the interpretations which the Christian Church, rightly, as we believe, has put upon this fact, but with the fact itself. In Christ we see man at his highest and best, and the manhood there revealed has its centre and the source of its being in that which lies beyond all manhood. This is no case of an ego-ideal resting upon the home or the social environment, for the ideal of Christ at once fulfils and challenges every ideal that has ever arisen within human life. There is no explanation of such a life save in that unique Filial consciousness which the Gospels record. He looked to the

¹ Jn. v. 18.

unseen with the freedom and directness of the son in his father's house, and His sinless perfection is the complete response in manhood to the creative and ultimate reality which draws all being upwards to itself.

This is something far higher and yet far simpler than the mystic's experience of union in which all sense of self is lost. Nor is it the occasional and non-rational divination of the numinous of which Otto speaks. It is a life yielded utterly to the creative impulse which streams in upon it, and so yielded it displays that creative impulse in an intimacy wholly free and wholly personal. It reveals reality in terms of what in ordinary human experience could have no other name than love, and the formula 'God is love,' in which it is expressed, is the shortest and the most adequate Christian creed, as it is the profoundest postulate of any positive metaphysic.

His life shows, further, that this creative power of love is not active only in special providences. The God of Jesus is no departmental deity, claiming for Himself some part of human life, revealing Himself in this experience or in that. So it may seem to us, in our imperfect response to Him. It is only in part and dimly that we recognize Him in certain aspects and occasions of our life. But for Christ the whole of life has as its background, its Other, the God whom He knows as Father. The world of things and the world of personal being is real enough, but their meaning and being are seen in the light of the God from whom they came and to whom they go. It is thus that He views and transforms the problems of evil and suffering and sin. There is no denial of their terrible significance and power. They are faced and faced to the death. And yet the key to the mystery is love.

For us, with our imperfect response to God, these problems are problems still, and there is no answer to their urgency in terms of theory, whether it be for scientist, or

for psychologist, or for theologian. We cannot, in our incompleteness and imperfection, see as Christ saw, and no one of us can face the Cross as He faced it. So far as we face it at all it is in a power of love that flows from God through Him, and not in any power that rises up within ourselves. Yet we make no irrational and no fantastic claim when we take His solution as our own. The deepest and richest things in our own experience are those that seem most akin to Him. And even though much in life as we know it must remain unexplained, faith and reason may well walk together, for the guidance of reason alone is vain enough.

(2) The completeness of Christ's intimacy with the Father is not something separate from and other than His love for man. His life was one of the fullest human intercourse and friendship, with its climax in forgiveness, and it was through the personal relationships into which He entered that His own conception of God became possible to others besides Himself. He revealed the Father, not, like all other great religious leaders, by pointing to a truth or fact beyond and other than Himself, but simply and directly in His own life of friendship and service. And so He showed that the way to God is not some separate way, apart from men, but that it is in and through one another, as it was through Him, that we come to God. The love of father or mother, husband, wife, or child, may not be something other than the love of God. If ever we set it in contrast or opposition to that love it loses its own true character. In Christ, and in Him alone, we see it as an expression of the fundamental truth of all being, God making Himself manifest in His world. This is the essential basis of the doctrine of the Incarnation and its link with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The revelation did not come to human souls in isolation, but through the direct and human way of friendship and forgiveness. In these Christ lived and still lives,

and still He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. In these we see that the love of God and the love of men are not two but one. And ever more clearly we see how deeply this power of love is the one power strong enough to build up the life of men and the life of nations. And if we do not as yet find love everywhere and in all things creative and triumphant, love is very patient, and it may be that one day when, in God's good time, we see Him face to face, faith and knowledge shall be one again, and God, who is very love, be all in all.

Our happiest earthly comradeships hold a foretaste of the feast of salvation and by that virtue in them provoke desire beyond them to out-reach and surmount their humanity in some superhumanity and ultimat perfection : which, howe'er 'tis found or strangely imagin'd, answereth to the need of each and pulleth him instinctively as to a final cause. Thus unto all who hav found their high ideal in Christ, Christ is to them the essence discern'd or undiscern'd of all their human friendships ; and each lover of him and of his beauty must be as a bud on the Vine and hav participation in him ; for Goddes love is unescapable as nature's environment, which if a man ignore or think to thrust it off he is the ill-natured fool that runneth blindly on death.¹

¹ Bridges, *The Testament of Beauty*, iv. ll. 1408-1422.

INDICES

I

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ABRAHAM, 53.
 Ach, 18, 30.
 Adler, 26 f., 42, 114, 234.
 Alexander, 83.
 Allport, 82.
 Ames, 57.
 Anselm, 3, 20, 75, 135 f.
 Anson, 99, 103, 122.
 Aquinas, 3, 76 f., 84, 133 ff.
 Aristophanes, 40.
 Aristotle, 8, 20.
 Athanasius, 134 ff.
 Augustine, 3, 4, 75, 133, 136, 163.

BAIN, 15, 17, 79.
 Baldwin, 79.
 Balfour, 173.
 Barger, 41.
 Baudouin, 87, 91.
 Bergson, 56, 164, 234, 245.
 Bertillon, 48.
 Bertrin, 98.
 Bicknell, 181.
 Binet-Sanglé, 241.
 Blake, 69.
 Bonaventura, 206.
 Bradley, 14 f.
 Bridges, 229, 250.
 Brook, 76, 78.
 Brooks, 91, 117.
 Brown, 92, 93, 114 f., 131, 151, 154.
 Bultmann, 72.
 Bunyan, 145.
 Burt, 42.

CALVERTON, 47.
 Calvin, 163.
 Carr, Wildon, 42.
 Catherine of Genoa, 218.
 Charcot, 108, 119.
 Chesterton, 72.

Coe, 209.
 Coleridge, 57, 125 f.
 Cornford, 59.
 Coué, 87, 91 f., 115 ff., 121.
 Crell, 135.
 Cruden, 78.
 Cyprian, 163.
 Cyril of Jerusalem, 135.

DE GRANDMAISON, 105.
 de Quincey, 222.
 Dewar, 94.
 Dibelius, 71.
 Dodd, 73.
 Dubois, 114, 116.
 Dunbar, 222.
 Durkheim, 57 f., 174.

EASTON, 72.
 Ebbinghaus, 18.
 Eddy, Mrs., 104, 107, 108, 110.
 Einstein, 10, 235.
 Ellis, Havelock, 222.

FERENCZI, 31, 92.
 Fisher, 104, 107.
 Flournoy, 153.
 Follett, 181.
 Fox, George, 164.
 Freud, 16, 22 ff., 31, 33, 48 ff., 92,
 119 f., 139, 144, 151, 181 ff.,
 234.
 Frowde, 40.

GALEN, 105 f.
 Galton, 171.
 Gillespie, 151, 222.
 Godley, 40.
 Goethe, 218.
 Grotius, 135.

- HADFIELD, 105, 114, 122, 131,
142 f., 155.
Haldane, J. S., 42.
Harrison, Miss J., 59.
Hart, 142.
Hartley, David, 47.
Head, 123.
Heiler, 165.
Heim, 82.
Henderson, 151, 222.
Herbart, 15.
Herbert of Cherbury, Lord, 73.
Hickson, 100, 107.
Hinkle, 56.
Hirsch, 48.
Hoadly, 161 ff.
Hocking, 9, 211 f.
Hodgson, 158.
Hogben, 41.
Holt, 7, 47.
Hort, 164.
Hubert, 59.
Hume, 14.
Huxley, 56.
- IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, 206.
Inge, 48.
Ingersoll, 235.
- JAMES, WILLIAM, 4 f., 13, 14 f.,
19, 29, 30, 31, 44 ff., 63, 79 f.,
89, 140, 152, 203 ff., 208 ff.,
214 ff., 222 f.
Janet, 88, 93, 98 ff., 104 ff., 152,
153 f.
John of the Cross, 203.
Johnson, Vernon, 167.
Jones, Ernest, 16, 23, 48, 92, 131,
151, 187.
Jung, 27 ff., 48, 53 ff., 59, 92, 114,
119, 151, 234.
- KANT, 14, 32, 41, 81.
Kipling, 82.
Kirk, 129, 130 f., 133, 135, 136,
155.
Knox, W., 167.
Koffka, 32, 123.
Köhler, 32, 123.
Kraepelin, 222.
- LACTANTIUS, 133.
Law, 161 ff.
Le Bon, 176 ff.
Lecky, 131.
- Leuba, 19, 89, 153, 196, 203, 205,
207 f., 209 ff., 220, 221 ff.,
233 f.
Lévy Bruhl, 57, 59, 174.
Lindsey, 47.
Locke, 8, 16.
Loeb, 41.
Longuet, 218.
Lotze, 18.
Low, Miss B., 25.
Lowell, 203.
Lucian, 40, 41.
Luther, 76 ff.
- MACAULAY, 53.
MacCurdy, 32, 123.
McDougall, 7, 29, 30 f., 33, 59, 90,
131, 137 ff., 178 ff., 185, 220.
McDowall, 94.
McTaggart, 15.
Marchand, 104 f.
Marett, 218.
Marguerite Marie Alacoque, 205 f.,
218.
Markey, 82.
Mason, 163.
Matthews, 11.
Mauss, 59.
Maxwell, J. Clerk, 39.
Melanchthon, 76.
Mercier, 6.
Mesmer, 108.
Mickleth, 101, 102.
Miles, 222.
Mill, 15.
Milmine, 104.
Milner-White, 167.
Milton, 143, 150.
Mitchell, 91, 153.
Moberly, 62.
Moore, 129.
More, 72.
Morgan, Lloyd, 83.
Myers, 106 f.
- NIETZSCHE, 53, 137, 241.
Norton, 203.
- OGDEN, R. M., 32.
Optatus, 163.
Otto, 19, 50, 215 ff.
- PARTRIDGE, 222.
Patten, 57.
Pavlov, 41.
Pfister, 118 ff.

Plato, 71, 134, 225, 245.

Poulain, 204.

Pratt, 9, 79, 146, 176, 208 f.

Pringle Pattison, 173.

Pym, 156.

QUICK, 104, 166 f.

Quimby, 108 f.

RANK, 53.

Rawlinson, 62, 72, 165.

Reitzenstein, 62.

Riklin, 53.

Ritschl, 61, 241.

Rivers, 116, 119, 222.

Rolle, 218.

Royce, 79.

Russell, Bertrand, 14, 164.

SANDAY, 63.

Schelling, 57.

Schleiermacher, 18, 216.

Selbie, 5, 137, 175.

Seneca, 137.

Shand, 13, 17, 29, 33.

Socrates, 137.

Spearman, 6, 8, 11, 15, 18.

Starbuck, 5.

Stout, 43.

Streeter, 165.

Strong, 167 ff.

TANSLEY, 6, 49, 55, 138, 142.

Temple, F., 21.

Temple, W., 57.

Tennant, 7, 12, 44, 133 f.

Tennyson, 46, 64, 80, 130, 222.

Teresa, 204 f.

Tertullian, 73, 133.

Thornton, 83.

Thouless, 6, 34, 86, 90, 122, 124,

131, 153, 204.

Tracy, 85.

Trotter, 171, 182,

Turner, 102, 165.

Tyndall, 39, 41.

'Vé, Mlle.,' 153, 206.

von Hügel, 12, 89, 218.

WARD, 6, 43 f.

Watson, 6, 7 ff., 22, 47, 82.

Webb, 57 ff., 72, 75.

Weir Mitchell, 222.

Wells, 207.

Wesley, 125.

Whitehead, 32.

Williams, 132 ff., 136, 139 f.

Wolf, Julius, 48.

Woodlock, 104.

Wycliffe, 163.

ZIEHEN, 6.

II

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- ABSOLUTE, 211, 246.
 Absolution, 155.
 Abstract principles, 189.
 Abstract sentiments, 34, 189 f.
 Abstractions, 245 f.
 Advice, 157.
 Affect, 11, 13 ff.
 Alcohol, 222.
 Alternation of consciousness, 152 f.
 Altruism, 139 f.
 Animal magnetism, 105, 108, 125 f.
 Anxiety, 151.
 Aphasia, 123.
 Associationism, 8.
 Assurance, 76 f., 241 f.
 Attention, 86, 91, 176, 182.
 Attraction, 93.
 Authority, 161 ff., 208 f.
 Automatism, 204.
 Autonomy, 56, 172.
 Auto-suggestion, 87, 91, 111, 115.
 Awareness, 242.
 Awe, 217 f.
- BEATIFIC VISION, 1.
 Behaviour, 29.
 Behaviourism, 7 ff., 21 f., 46 ff., 232 f.
 Beyond, the, 208, 217, 232.
 Bible, the, 230, 240.
 Brotherhood, 52, 186 ff.
- CAUSATION, physical, 233.
 Censorship, 16.
 Certainty, 241.
 Charismatic ministry, 163.
 Child, the, 79 f., 88, 178 f., 186 f.
 Christianity, 187, 229 ff.
 Christian Science, 103 f., 106 ff.
 Church, the, 162 ff., 183 f., 187 f., 190, 200 f.
 Collective consciousness, 175, 181.
 Collective representations, 59.
 Collective will, 181.
 Companionate marriage, 47.
 Complex, 142, 147, 152.
 Concentration, 87.
 Concupiscence, 133.
 Conditioned reflex, 10, 41.
 Conflict, 147, 149 ff.
 Conscience, 144, 166 f., 189 f.
- Consciousness, 7, 12, 79 ff., 221.
 Contagion, 177.
 Contemplation, 87.
 Contention, 87.
 Corruption, 133.
 Cranial capacity, 185.
 Creative impulse, 28.
 Creative reality, 65, 176, 190, 200 ff., 224 f., 231, 235, 248.
 Creature-feeling, 216 ff.
 Crowd, the, 176 ff., 200.
 Cure, 121.
 Custom, 173, 180.
- DAEMONIC TERROR, 217 ff.
 Death-instincts, 25, 176.
 Degrees of reality, 224.
 Democracy, 164.
 Dependence, 216.
 Depression, 99.
Depravatio, 133.
 Determinism, 21, 22, 234.
 Devil, the, 150.
 Disobedience, 131, 135.
 Displacement, 48.
 Dominants, 54 f., 234.
 Dread, 217.
 Dreams of flying, 205.
 Drugs, 221 ff.
- ECSTASY, 204 ff.
 Education, 183.
 Ego, the, 12, 17 f., 79 f., 137, 141, 187, 211.
 Ego-ideal, 49, 144, 187.
 Ego-instincts, 24.
 Election, 100.
 Emergent evolution, 83.
 Emotion, 7.
 Ends, individual, 26.
 Ends, social, 182 f.
Ens Realissimum, 246.
 Epidaurus, 97, 105 f.
 Epilepsy, 222.
 Episcopacy, 163.
 Ether, 222.
 Evil, 132 ff., 198, 201, 248.
 Excitation, 99.
 Experience, 209 ff.
 Experiment, 9, 233, 235 ff.
 Extraversion, 151.

FACT, 27, 64, 230 f.
 Faculties, 8.
 Faith, 73 ff., 100 ff., 116, 165, 183,
 185, 190 f., 197, 236.
 Family, the, 186 f.
 Fantasy, 52, 53 ff., 64.
 Fascination, 218.
 Father, the, 50 ff., 144, 186.
 Father-substitute, 119.
 Feeling, 13 ff.
 Fellowship, 229.
Fides formata, 76.
Fides informis, 76, 93 f.
Fomes peccati, 133.
 Forgiveness, 62, 155, 199 f., 249.
 Freedom, 7, 11, 19 ff., 142, 244.
 Friendship, 167, 229, 237, 242, 249.
 Function, 122 f.
 Functional disorder, 109 f., 113 f.

Gestalt-psychologie, 29, 32, 123.
 Ghosts, 99, 214.
 Given, the, 211 f.
 God, 51, 65, 141, 189, 212 f., 229,
 237, 246.
 Gods, 51, 53 ff., 217.
 Grace, 94.
 Gregarious impulse, 92.
 Group, the, 92, 167, 171 ff., 200 f.
 Guilt, 144.

HALLUCINATION, 204.
 Hasheesh, 222.
 Herd-instinct, 139, 171 ff.
 Herd-sentiment, 140, 171 ff.
 History, 189, 230 f.
 Holism, 41.
 Horde, the, 186.
 Horror, 217.
 Hypnoidal states, 86.
 Hypnosis, 86, 91, 93, 119, 177,
 186 f.
 Hysteria, 110, 117, 151, 152.

IDEAL, 49 f., 185 ff., 189, 234, 247.
 Ideas, 16.
 Identification, 49, 138, 188.
 Illumination, 204 f., 210.
 Illusion, 110, 187.
 Immortality, 196.
 Individual, the, 42, 60, 140, 165,
 174, 176 ff., 190 f.
 Individual psychology, 26, 42.
 Individual sincerity, 161 f., 164.
 Individualism, 166.
 Individuality, 79 f.
 Infantile, the, 79 f., 88.

Inner Light, 164.
Inordinatio, 135.
 Instinct, 7, 9, 29 f., 133, 171 f.
 Integration, 147.
 Introspection, 8 ff.
 Introversion, 151.

KNOWLEDGE, 74 f., 81 f., 94.

LEADER, the, 184 ff.
 Levels of reality, 224.
 Levels of value, 242.
 Levitation, 204 f.
 Libido, 27 f., 54 f., 142, 186.
 Life-impulse, 21 ff.
 Lourdes, 98 ff., 104 f.
 Love, 34, 74 ff., 84, 118 ff., 138,
 141, 171, 183 ff., 197 f., 244,
 248 ff.
 Love-life, 33.

MAGNETISM, 105, 108, 119, 125 f.
 Majesty, 217.
 Manic-depressive insanity, 222.
 Medicine, 112.
 Melancholia, 154, 222.
 Memory, 17.
 Mescal, 222.
 Metaphysics, 245, 248.
 Method, psychological, 7 ff.
 Method, scientific, 6, 231, 233 ff.,
 239, 243.
 Michelson-Morley experiment, 235,
 239.
 Mind, 109 f., 112.
 Mind-cures, 108 ff.
 Miracles, 97, 99 ff., 111 f., 199, 239 f.
 Missions of healing, 101, 106 f.,
 117 f.
 Moral disease, 142, 148, 152, 199.
 Moral ideal, 138, 144 f., 147.
 Mysterium tremendum, 217 f.
 Mysticism, 85, 202 ff., 206, 218 f.
 Mythology, 27, 53, 55, 64, 71.

NARCISSISM, 144.
 Necessity, 20.
 Negation, 245 f.
 Negation of self, 210.
 Nerves, 99.
 'New Psychology,' 4.
 Nightmare, 220.
 Nitrous oxide, 221 ff.
 Non-rational, the, 215 ff.
 Non-rational behaviour, 177 ff.
 Non-rational causes, 173 f.
 Numinous, the, 216 ff.

- OBJECT-CHOICE, 188.
 Object-love, 188.
 Objectivity, 12, 23 f., 33 f., 83, 169, 195 ff., 223.
 Oedipus-complex, 144.
 Ontological argument, 71.
 Optimism, 209, 214, 223.
 Options, 45.
 Organic disorder, 109 ff., 113 f.
 Original sin, 133 f.
 Other, the, 4, 12 31 ff., 79 f., 176, 205, 210 ff., 216 ff., 232.
 Overpoweringness, 217.

 PANIC DREAD, 217.
 Pantheism, 206, 211.
 Paranoia, 154, 211, 222.
 Passivity, 93, 204 f.
 Patriotism, 183.
 Patterns, 32, 123.
 Penance, 156.
 Penitence, 146.
 Personality, 7, 43 f., 112, 122, 179 ff., 197 ff.
 Philosophy, 245.
 Phobias, 152.
 Pleasure-Pain principle, 16, 23.
 Pragmatism, 44 ff.
 Prayer, 84 ff.
 Pre-logical thinking, 59.
 Prestige, 91, 98, 115, 173.
 Primitive behaviour, 177 ff.
 Primitive credulity, 79, 105.
 Private judgment, 164, 166 f.
 Projection, 52.
 Prophecy, 239 f.
 Psycho-analysis, 9, 48 ff., 114 f., 119 ff., 234.
 Psychoses, the, 151.
 Psychotherapy, 109 ff., 114 ff., 147, 198.
 Public opinion, 175.
 Purpose, 11, 19 ff., 29, 122 f., 142, 182, 221.

 QUASI-ALTRUISM, 138.
 Quietism, 206.

 RACIAL UNCONSCIOUS, 54, 59, 234.
 Rapture, 205.
 Rationalization, 114, 116.
 Reality, 64, 88, 183, 189, 202, 208, 211, 231, 235, 246.
 Reality-feeling, 215.
 Reality-principle, 23 f., 31, 64, 224.
 Reason, 166 ff.

 Re-education, 118.
 Reflex, 10, 21, 41.
 Regression, 88, 177.
 Religion, 18 f., 47, 49 ff., 56, 57 ff., 122 ff., 148, 197, 216 ff.
 Religious mania, 154.
 Repentance, 152.
 Repression, 25, 147, 151 f.
 Responsibility, 7, 142, 147.
 Resurrection, 236, 238 f.
 Revelation, mystical, 203 f.
 Revivalism, 147.
 Rights, 190.

 SAINTS, 140, 149 f.
 Sanctions, 162.
 Savage, the, 178 f.
 Saviour-gods, 62.
 Schizophrenia, 222.
 Science, 39 ff., 232 ff.
 Self, *see* Ego.
 Self-abasement, 204 f.
 Self-consciousness, 136.
 Self-regard, 136 ff.
 Sense of presence, 208, 214 ff., 221.
 Sense of reality, 221 ff.
 Sentiments, 33 f., 62, 78, 137 f., 140 f., 147 f., 183.
 Sex, 22 f., 244.
 Shuddering, 217.
 Sin, 129 ff., 148 ff., 199, 248.
 Sincerity, individual, 161 ff.
 Sinlessness, 150, 248.
 Sleep of the powers, 205.
 Social group, 167 f., 179 ff.
 Social theories, 57 ff.
 Social will, 175.
 Somnambulism, 110.
 Space, 235.
 Special providences, 234, 248.
 Spiritual direction, 153 ff.
 Spiritual healing, 97 ff.
 Spiritual marriage, 205.
 State, the, 163, 165 f., 175, 183.
 Stigmatization, 204.
 Stoicism, 137.
 Structure, 123.
 Subconscious, the, 63.
 Sublimation, 131.
 Subliminal self, 208, 223.
 Suffering, 198 f., 235, 248.
 Suggestibility, 92 ff., 99, 177 ff., 197.
 Suggestion, 86 ff., 90 ff., 100, 114 ff., 177.
Summum Bonum, 246.
 Superman, the, 137, 139.

Supernatural, the, 99, 209.

Symbolism, 16, 71, 189.

THEISTIC PROOFS, 6.

Things, 81 ff., 224.

Tradition, 170, 180 ff.

Transference, 119 f., 152, 157 f.

UNCONSCIOUS, the, 50.

Unconscious, racial, 54, 59.

Union with God, 88, 205, 210.

Unitive Way, 87.

Unseen, the, 214, 223, 247.

VALUE, 12, 30 f., 43 f., 242 f.

Value-judgment, 241.

Vital impulse, 56.

Vitalism, 41.

WORSHIP, 84 ff., 197.

Worth, 30 f., 43 f., 197.

Wrath of God, 145 f.

Yetser ha-ra', 132.

Yetser hattohh, 132.

Yoga, 87.

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